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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper compares the constitutional arrangements of various territorial entities 
in the South-West Pacific, leading to a discussion of those entities‟ status in 
international law. In particular, it examines the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, 
Norfolk Island, French Polynesia, New Caledonia and American Samoa – all of 
which are perceived as „Territories‟ in the international community – as a way of 
critically examining the concept of „Statehood‟ in international law. 
 
The study finds that many of these „Territories‟ do not necessarily fit the 
classification that they have been given. In particular, most of the territorial 
entities listed above have significant competence to control their own domestic 
affairs. Some have also begun to develop their own international legal personality 
by virtue of de facto control over their own external affairs. The United Nations‟ 
focus on ensuring self-determination also indicates that these territorial entities are 
likely to gain more autonomy as time goes on. 
 
As a result, this paper argues that some of the „Territories‟ are not necessarily 
Territories at all; instead, they possess independent control over their own 
domestic and external affairs, and therefore act as de facto States on the global 
stage. However, many of these territorial entities still remain heavily associated 
with recognised sovereign States, with none of the included territorial entities 
possessing their own de jure Head of State or citizenship: both of which are 
arguably key foundations of an independent identity. Consequently, there are still 
questions over the extent to which the territorial entities can be considered 
sovereign, especially given that the relevant „administering States‟ still seem to 
take economic responsibility for their territorial entities if they believe the 
situation warrants it. 
 
Given these points, this paper argues in favour of a reconceptualisation of the 
concept of Statehood. It argues that the rise of territorial entities which not only 
have independent control over their affairs, but which also have significant links 
to existing States, means that terms such as independence and sovereignty are not 
either/or concepts. Instead, these concepts should be seen as spectrums, giving 
rise to a broader definition of Statehood that does not restrictively define States as 
independent, sovereign entities, but that embraces the concept of „Freely 
Associated States‟.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The second half of the twentieth century saw major change in the global 
international system. With the Second World War leaving most European powers 
in tatters, and with a rise of nationalism throughout the world, the post-war period 
saw an extraordinary rise in the number of States due to the tsunami of 
decolonisation. No continent was immune, with the end of British, French, Italian, 
Dutch and other empires‟ Territories in Africa, Asia and South America. The 
peoples of these former-Territories fought doggedly to exercise their right to self-
determination by seceding from the control of their previous colonisers, taking on 
their own legally separate identity in international affairs.  
 
In contrast, one area that seems to have only partially embraced decolonisation is 
the South-West Pacific. Although about half of the former Pacific Territories are 
now independent, sovereign States, the other half are still widely classed as 
„Territories‟ in international law. In fact, several of these Pacific Territories 
explicitly decided not secede, but have instead entered into freely associated 
relationships with their former controlling State.  Other Territories have chosen to 
retain a status that the United Nations considers „non-self-governing‟. This has led 
some commentators to state their doubts that small Territories might not have the 
capacity to operate as States, and therefore some Territories might not want to 
take on that status.
1
  
 
This paper will explore the actual status of communities in the South-West Pacific 
region, including an examination of the concepts „State‟, „Territory‟, „Free 
Association‟, and „Self-Determination‟ – and the applicability of these concepts to 
Pacific communities. In particular, this study focuses on those communities – or 
territorial entities – in the Pacific who are not commonly classed as independent, 
sovereign States, but who are instead commonly seen as Territories that are 
represented in the international system by an „administering State‟. A key focus is 
on the constitutional links between these Territories and their administering 
                                                          
1
 John Key, Leader of the National Party, “Speech: New Zealand National Party” (Speech to NZ 
Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand, 9 April 2008). See also: Alison 
Quentin-Baxter “Sustained Autonomy – An Alternative Political Status for Small Islands? 
(1994) 22 VUWLR 1. 
2 
States, and what these imply for maintaining a formal State-Territory relationship 
at international law. 
 
The rationale for doing this is two-fold. First, comparatists are generally curious 
about other systems. Scholarly literature has paid relatively less attention to the 
Pacific region than other areas that have undergone significant decolonisation in 
the UN era. Exploring the constitutional structures of Pacific territorial entities is 
therefore interesting and useful in itself. Second, a comparison of the territorial 
entities of the Pacific allows the elucidation of findings that might not result from 
singular studies. In particular, this paper aims to compare how the different 
Territories are treated in order to examine whether the reasonably rigid traditional 
definitions of „State‟ and „Territory‟ can still hold in twenty-first century 
international law and scholarship.  
 
   3 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Comparative Law Methodology 
Comparative law can be a useful tool for examination. Curran, for example, 
argues that “comparison is central to all legal analysis, as it is central even to the 
very process of understanding”.2 Hirschel agrees, arguing that “comparison is a 
fundamental tool of scholarly analysis. It sharpens our power of description and 
plays a central role in concept formation by bringing into focus potential 
similarities and differences among cases”.3 In particular, comparative studies like 
this paper use comparison to explore and flesh out legal concepts, and explore 
how similar concepts are put into practice in very different ways by different legal 
systems. Reitz, for instance, argues that “by asking how one legal system may 
achieve more or less the same result as another legal system without using the 
same terminology or even the same rule or procedure, the comparatist is pushed to 
appreciate the interrelationships between various areas of law, including 
especially the relationships between substantive law and procedure”.4 
 
This paper uses a comparative law methodology described by Hirschl as “concept 
formation through multiple description”.5 This methodology explores how 
different systems deal with similar constitutional issues, and in doing so improves 
scholars‟ understanding of key constitutional and international concepts, such as 
sovereignty, independence and self-determination. This will result in what Vernon 
Palmer describes as “a pragmatic and inclusive view of comparative 
methodology”,6 rather than a technical approach that views comparative law as a 
form of science. In particular, Palmer argues that “each legal culture is a unique, 
culturally contingent product which is incommensurable and untranslatable except 
through a deep understanding of the surrounding social context”.7  
 
                                                          
2
 VG Curran “Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in US Comparative Law” (1998) 
46(1) Am J Comp L 43, at 45. 
3
 R Hirschel “The Question Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law” (2005) 53 Am J 
Comp L 125, at 129. 
4
 J Reitz “How to do Comparative Law” (1998) (Issue 4) 46 Am J Comp L 617, at 621. 
5
 Hirschel, above n 3. 
6
 VV Palmer “From Lerotholi to Land: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology” 
(2005) (Issue 1) 53 Am J Comp L 261. 
7
 Ibid.  
4 
Therefore, comparative scholarship requires more than just a focus on the 
technicalities of the law, but also an examination of how that law is influenced by 
the cultural and social context of the legal system being studied. Berger agrees, 
arguing that a key aspect of comparative law methodology is understanding the 
fundamental norms underpinning a legal system before attempting to compare 
how different systems treat legal issues.
8
 Berger‟s study, for example, established 
the importance of a Muslim / non-Muslim divide in Egyptian law as an important 
norm impacting on how family law issues are dealt with in Egypt. Geoffrey 
Palmer also notes that any comparative constitutional study requires the scholar to 
understand the constitutional core of each system before moving on to do any 
actual comparison.
9
 Essentially, both Berger and Palmer advocate that it is 
important that comparative scholars develop an “organic method which 
incorporates both law and social underpinnings into the same comparative act”.10  
 
One of the difficulties of comparative law, however, is from being an „outsider‟, 
or being unfamiliar with (some of) the legal systems being studied. Reitz notes 
that “good comparatists should be sensitive to the ever present limitations on 
information available about foreign legal systems and should qualify their 
conclusions if they are unable to have access to sufficient information or if they 
have reason to suspect that they are missing important information”.11 However, 
other scholars point out that provided appropriate care is taken, studying a system 
as an „outsider‟ can actually be beneficial. Bussani and Mattei, for instance, argue 
that “often, the circumstances that operate explicitly and officially in one system 
… operate secretly [in another system], silently between the formulation of the 
rule and its application by the courts”.12 Bussani and Mattei‟s argument is that a 
lack of familiarity actually allows a comparatist to see those „silently operating 
principles‟ more easily than those with inside knowledge of the system.13 Curran 
makes a similar point, arguing that “comparatists need to retain their stance as 
outsiders… otherwise, they will fail to perceive with sufficient acuity those 
                                                          
8
 M Berger “Conflicts Law and Public Policy in Egyptian Family Law: Islamic Law through the 
Backdoor” (2002) 50 Am J Comp L 555. 
9
 G Palmer “The Hazards of Making Constitutions: Some Reflections on Comparative 
Constitutional Law” (2002) 33 VUWLR 201. 
10
 VV Palmer , above n 6. 
11
 Reitz, above n 4. 
12
 M Bussani and U Mattei “The Common Core Approach to European Private Law” (1996-1997) 
3 Columbia J Eur L 339, at 343. 
13
 Ibid. 
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fundamental, powerful aspects of target legal cultures which are so entrenched as 
to be unarticulated and even unconscious”.14  
 
To that end, scholars note that the best comparative law studies are therefore those 
that explicitly point out similarities and differences. Reitz argues the importance 
of drawing explicit comparisons between systems, and actively comparing how 
different systems treat similar issues.
15
 Similarly, Curran points out that as 
“comparison involves understanding one entity or domain in terms of an other 
entity or domain”,16 effective comparative law studies should therefore actively 
contrast one legal system with another, rather than being implicit. However, a 
good comparative law study is not just about pointing similarities in two different 
legal systems. Reitz, for instance, argues that “the real power of comparative 
analysis arises precisely from the fact that the process of comparing „apples‟ and 
„oranges‟ forces the comparatist to develop constructs like „fruit‟”.17 In other 
words, to realise the full benefits of comparative law, scholars need to do more 
than just make explicit comparisions, but should instead also analyse and explain 
the reasons for those similarities and differences. Consequently, this paper will 
attempt to not only describe the different administering State-External Territory 
relationships, but will also attempt to critically analyse the reasons behind these 
processes.  
 
This essentially means that this paper follows a „Cornell method‟ style of 
comparative law. This is the idea that when a comparatist examines different legal 
systems, he or she does not just compare in abstract, but instead should “think 
explicitly about the circumstances that matter, by forcing [the comparatist] to 
answer identically formulated questions”.18 In particular, the paper follows 
Reitz‟s19 advice that it is useful to move comparative law away from abstract 
comparisons, and to instead focus on how different legal systems approach the 
same real-life problem. Bussani and Mattei agree, arguing that comparative law 
studies yield the most benefit when they are structured around identical questions 
                                                          
14
 Curran, above n 2, at 57. 
15
 Reitz, above n 4. 
16
 Curran, above n 2, at 45. 
17
 Reitz, above n 4, at 625. 
18
 Bussani and Mattei, above n 12, at 344. 
19
 Reitz, above n 4. 
6 
posed to various legal systems, with the study focussing on the answers to these 
questions in different systems.
20
  
 
Given this methodology, this paper seeks to examine the overarching question: 
how are each Pacific Island External Territory‟s constitutional affairs structured 
with its administering sovereign State? An answer to this question will therefore 
require an examination of how the concept of self-determination is applied in the 
Pacific context, the ways in which Pacific Territories are members of the 
international system, the way in which External Territories are legally linked to 
the States that exercise sovereignty over them, the rights and responsibilities that 
citizens of the External Territories have, and the relationship between 
constitutional control and economic sustainability. Following the Cornell method, 
this allows an examination of the concept of „self-determination‟, as well as 
broader examinations of what ideas such as „State‟ and „Territory‟ actually mean. 
 
Territory Selection 
Although it would be ideal to examine all External Territories, the scope of this 
paper is limited by the fact that it is a three-paper thesis, and therefore carries a 
specified word limit. Furthermore, a great deal has been written about the 
principle of self-determination and its applicability to the African and Caribbean 
colonies that seceded and formed their own States, as well as the applicability of 
the doctrine to minorities within existing States.  
 
Consequently, this paper focuses on those inhabited Territories whose 
constitutional structure, history and experiences are most educational for New 
Zealand: the other Territories of the South-West Pacific who are geographically 
separate from their administering State. This means that this paper focuses on the 
External Territories that are classified as being in the „South-West Pacific‟ region 
– the area that is East of Australia (150°E), West of the Pitcairn Islands (135°W), 
South of the Equator (0°), and North of New Zealand (35°S). This encompasses 
eight territorial entities that are not commonly classified as „States‟ in 
international law. However, for practical reasons, this study focuses on seven of 
these entities, excluding Wallis and Futuna due to the practical difficulty in 
                                                          
20
 Bussani and Mattei, above n 12. 
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sourcing accurate information.
21
 This study therefore includes the External 
Territories set out in table one below: 
 
Table One: External Territories included in this Study 
Sovereign 
State 
External 
Territories 
included in this 
study 
Relationship Status (as classified 
by the Sovereign State) 
On UN List of 
Non-Self-
Governing 
Territories?
22
 
Australia Norfolk Island Self-governing External Territory  
New 
Zealand 
Cook Islands 
Self-governing in free association 
with New Zealand since 1965. 
 
Niue 
Self-governing in free association 
with New Zealand since 1974. 
 
Tokelau Territory of New Zealand. Yes 
France 
French 
Polynesia 
Territorial Collectivity since 2003.
23
  
New Caledonia 
Sui generis (or Special-Status) 
Collectivity since 1999. 
Yes 
United 
States of 
America 
American 
Samoa 
Unincorporated and unorganised 
Territory administered by the Office 
of Insular Affairs, U.S. Department 
of the Interior 
Yes 
 
A map of the South-West Pacific, with a clear illustration of External Territories 
in the South Pacific is contained in Appendix A at 145. 
 
Paper Structure and Core Research Questions 
The overarching research question of this paper is to examine the different ways 
in which administering States structure constitutional relationships with their 
External Territories in the South-West Pacific. This first requires two introductory 
chapters: 
 Chapter I focuses on unpacking some of the core terms that this paper will 
use. It explores the conceptual and practical differences between „States‟ and 
„Territories‟, and how they differ as subjects of international law. It then 
examines the right of „self-determination‟ that many „External Territories‟ 
                                                          
21
 It is also important to note one major limitation with using a comparative law methodology: the 
difficulty in ensuring that all information is accurate. As the comparatist is not a „legal native‟ 
to all of the systems covered in a comparative study, he or she faces difficulty when sources 
may conflict.  
22
 Special Committee on Decolonisation “List of Non-Self-Governing Territories” (2011) United 
Nations <http://www.un.org/en/events/nonselfgoverning/nonselfgoverning.shtml>  
23
 French Polynesia is further classified as an „overseas country‟ within its designation of a 
territorial collectivity. 
8 
have used to become their own State, including a brief discussion of to 
whom the concept of self-determination applies, and for what outcomes it 
provides. 
 Chapter II provides some background information about each of the 
Territories included in this paper, including their constitutional frameworks, 
and what moves each Territory‟s people have made toward achieving self-
determination. 
 
The paper then moves to answering the above overarching research question on a 
thematic basis:  
 Chapter III looks in more detail at the notion of identity, given that a 
separate identity is required for self-determination, and that the development 
of a separate identity affects the perception of territorial entities‟ status in 
international law. 
 Chapter IV examines the concept of independence in each of the Territories, 
given that independent control over domestic affairs is a core element of 
Statehood in international law. 
 Chapter V then considers the recognition of sovereignty of each of the 
Territories, given that being recognised as sovereign – with an 
unencumbered international legal personality – is a critical way in which 
States are distinguished from other international actors. 
  
In addition to these chapter-specific themes, the paper will also attempt to address 
the „so what‟ question. In particular, this paper examines whether there needs to 
be a new category developed at international law for States who have de facto 
independence over both domestic and external affairs, but may not have de jure 
sovereignty in international law. 
   9 
 
CHAPTER I: STATES, TERRITORIES, AND SELF-DETERMINATION  
 
Independent Legal Personality  
As pointed out by Malcolm Shaw, “in any legal system, certain entities, whether 
they be individuals or companies, will be regarded as possessing rights and duties 
enforceable at law”.24 Entities who do gain rights and responsibilities in law are 
referred to as „legal persons‟. Most systems also create different categories of 
legal personality. In New Zealand domestic law, for example, a „natural person‟ 
has a legal personality that is able to do more things than an incorporated 
company, which has a much more restricted form of legal personality.
25
 In 
international law, there are many actors, including „territorial entities‟ (such as 
„States‟ and „Territories‟), International-Governmental Organisations (such as the 
United Nations or the International Monetary Fund), Multinational Corporations, 
and Non-Governmental Organisations. Of these, the traditional view in legal 
literature is that „States‟ have the most unencumbered legal personality, with full 
capacity to enter into agreements and join international organisations.  
 
„States‟ are therefore very important entities in international law. The difference 
between „States‟ and other types of „territorial entities‟ is therefore essential for an 
international law scholar to understand. This chapter explores what the term 
„State‟ means, and how a „State‟ differs from the other traditional territorial entity 
– a „Territory‟. The chapter will also explore how a „Territory‟ can become a 
„State‟ and a full legal participant in international law.  
 
‘States’ in International Law 
Oppenheim once famously wrote that “States solely and exclusively are the 
subjects of international law”.26 Similarly, Shaw notes that States are still “the 
primary focus for [determining the scope of] social activity of humankind and 
thus for international law”.27 But where does the concept of a „State‟ come from, 
and what does it mean? These are not easy questions to answer, as there are a 
                                                          
24
 Malcom Shaw, International Law (6
th
 ed, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2008) 
at 195. 
25
 For example, only natural persons can marry as per the Marriage Act 1955 or enter into a civil 
union as per the Civil Union Act 2004.  
26
 L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (Vol. 1)(2
nd
 ed. Longmans, United Kingdom 1912) 
at 19.  
27
 Malcom Shaw, above n 24, at 197. 
10 
range of views on precisely what a „State‟ is in international law. However, as 
most views tend to be roughly comparable (with only nuanced differences), this 
section will examine the main international treaties and relevant secondary 
material in order to define the term „State‟ in this paper. 
 
The modern Western definition of a „State‟, which dominates international law 
today, was first developed in international law as part of the Westphalian Peace 
Treaties.
28
 Those treaties were signed at the conclusion of the Thirty Years‟ War 
(1618-1648), and developed the concept of a „Nation-State‟ in international law: a 
geopolitical entity made up of a community of people(s) who share economic, 
political and territorial unity under some form of authority with exclusive control 
over that Nation-State‟s territory.29 This definition has been carried forward into 
today‟s international system: as recent as 1991, the Arbitration Commission of the 
European Conference on Yugoslavia defined a State as “a community which 
consists of a territory and a population subject to an organised political 
authority”.30 This opinion reaffirmed the principles of the earlier Montevideo 
Convention,
31
 signed by the United States of America and several South 
American States in the 1930s, which is now widely agreed to form part of 
customary international law.
32
 Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention notes that 
States in international law possess four attributes: a permanent population, a 
defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other 
States.
33
  
 
Both of these definitions set out clear criteria for a territorial entity to meet if it 
wishes to be considered as a State. Linking back to the „Nation-State‟ concept, in 
order to be considered a State, territorial entities must first show they are a nation: 
that they have a resident population within a defined territory. Territorial entities 
must then also show that they meet certain political characteristics: in particular, 
                                                          
28
 J M Kelly A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, New York, 1992). 
29
 Eiki Berg and Ene Kuusk “What makes sovereignty a relative concept? Empirical approaches to 
international society” (2010) 29 Pol. Geography 40, at 40.  
30
 Opinion No. 1 of the Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia, 
established pursuant to the Declaration of 27 August 1991 of the European Community. 
31
 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (signed 26 December 1933, entered 
into force 16 December 1934), art 1.. 
32
 Malcom Shaw, above n 24; Morton Halperin, David Scheffer, and Patricia Small, Self-
Determination in the New World Order (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United 
States of America, 1991). 
33
 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (signed 26 December 1933, entered 
into force 16 December 1934), art 1. 
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that they have an authority that acts as a government, and that this government is 
able to enter into relations with other States. In practice, these latter two criteria 
are underpinned by the concepts of „independence‟ and „sovereignty‟, or – as put 
by Berg and Kussk – “having supreme authority and being rightfully entitled to 
exercise that authority”.34  
 
As with the term „State‟, there is a wide variety of views on the precise definitions 
of „independence‟ and „sovereignty‟. However, all views tend to focus on the 
same attributes, including some form of self-government over domestic affairs, 
non-intervention by other States, control over foreign policy, an unencumbered 
legal personality, a separate identity, and recognition by other States. 
Consequently, the next two sections use these characteristics to define the terms 
„independence‟ and „sovereignty‟ for the purposes of this paper. 
 
Independence 
As the name implies, independence entails an entity being in control of its own 
affairs – without interference or oversight by other State. In the Aaland Islands 
case, for instance, the International Committee of Jurists was tasked with 
providing an opinion on whether the Aaland Islands were part of Finland. They 
noted that Finland did not become a State in international law as soon as it 
declared independence, but instead that event “did not take place until a stable 
political organisation had been created” and could assert its authority throughout 
its territory.
35
 In other words, for Finland to truly be classed as independent, it 
needed to have an uncontested government that could exercise autonomous 
control over the territory of the State, and which was rightfully authorised by the 
people to govern. In other words, to be considered independent, a territorial entity 
must show that it has uncontested control over internal matters: that it governs its 
own affairs and that other States do not intervene in domestic matters. In the 
Aaland Islands case, Finland was not classed as a sovereign State straight after 
declaring independence partly because there were still foreign troops involved in 
domestic affairs up until the end of the Finnish Civil War in May 1918.
36
 
Independence therefore also usually involves a territorial entity developing its 
                                                          
34
 Berg and Kuusk, above n 29, at 40.  
35
 The Report of the Commission of Jurists on the Aaland Islands case (1920) LNOJ Sp. Suppl. 
No. 4 at. 8-9.  
36
 Ibid.   
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own distinct identity in international law. It therefore comes as no surprise that 
Acquaviva argues “independence ... is the feature distinguishing [State] subjects 
of international law from other entities”.37 
 
Sovereignty 
Sovereignty, on the other hand, is about being recognised as independent and as a 
full actor in the legal system. A key feature of States is that they are full subjects 
of international law: in particular, States can enter into international agreements, 
and enter into relations with other States. However, States can only do this if they 
are recognised by other international actors (such as other States and international 
organisations) as having the status of Statehood, or as having the sovereign right 
to interact as an independent entity on the global stage. In effect, States are 
recognised by other actors as being sovereign actors with their own 
unencumbered international legal personality.  
 
In other words, territorial entities are seen as sovereign States once they are 
recognised by other international legal actors as not just having de facto self-
government, but also as having the de jure right to independently administer their 
own territory. Shaw, for instance notes that sovereignty is when an entity is seen 
as having full rights of territory, in contrast to minor rights such as leases over 
land.
38
 Consequently, States are recognised as being rightfully responsible for 
their own actions both internally and on the international stage. This, in turn, 
includes the recognition that they are not „administered‟ or „controlled‟ by another 
State: in effect, sovereignty is the recognition by others that a State is fully and 
rightfully independent – it is free from control by others, and it is a fully 
responsible actor on the global stage. This recognition is perhaps the key 
difference between States and other forms of territorial entities. 
 
What is particularly striking about this recognition criterion, however, is its 
subjectivity. Acquaviva, for instance, notes that the concept of States being 
sovereign has an important consequence in international law: the fact that all 
States refuse to think of other entities as superior to them means that all States are 
                                                          
37
 Guido Acquaviva “Subjects of International Law: A Power-Based Analysis” (2005) 38(2) 
Vand.J.Transnat'l L 345, at 381. 
38
 M Shaw “Territory in International Law” in M Shaw (ed) Title to Territory (Ashgate, United 
Kingdom, 2005). 
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treated as equal legal subjects.
39
 Unlike the criteria of a „permanent population‟ 
and a „defined territory‟, which can (for the most part) be measured reasonably 
objectively, each State is free to choose which other States it recognises as 
sovereign and possessing full legal personality on the international stage. As a 
result, a territorial entity may be recognised as a sovereign State by some States, 
but not by others.
40
 Israel is a good example of this, as it is recognised by some 
States (and by the United Nations), but not by other States. It therefore has a full 
international personality when dealing with those States and international 
organisations who recognise it as sovereign, and a limited (or even no) 
international personality when dealing with those entities which do not recognise 
it. After all, those States who do not recognise Israel as a State with a full 
international legal personality are not going to enter into agreements with the 
Israeli government.  
 
The Israel example also indicates the political nature of international law. Many 
States do not recognise Israel: not necessarily because of a belief that the Israeli 
government does not control its own affairs, but because they believe Israel does 
not have the right to control its own affairs. In other words, Israel is not viewed as 
rightfully sovereign in those States‟ eyes because they believe another 
government should be (or is) the legal entity in control of the territory and/or 
people currently governed by Israel. A similar example is seen in the case of 
Taiwan, which is not recognised by many States on the basis that the People‟s 
Republic of China asserts that it is in control of the territory of the island of 
Taiwan (also known as the island of Formosa). 
 
Recognition of sovereignty is therefore important, although somewhat circular in 
logic. This is because territorial entities are more likely to be classed as States by 
international organizations if they are recognised as sovereign by a large number 
of existing States. This means that, somewhat paradoxically, States gain an 
international legal personality by being recognised as having that international 
legal personality (i.e. being sovereign) by other States – who, of course, have their 
own international legal personalities already. 
                                                          
39
 Acquaviva, above n 37, at 383. 
40
 This is also in contrast to legal personality recognition in most legal systems, which set objective 
criteria for recognition. For instance, in New Zealand, a natural person gains full recognition 
and full legal personality at the age of 18 years old. 
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Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, a „State‟ means an entity with a clear 
territory and population, and with a government that meets the „Statehood‟ 
criteria: in particular, that government must exercise independent control over 
domestic affairs, and be recognised as a sovereign actor on the global stage by at 
least some other States. It should be noted, however, that this is a traditional view 
of „States‟ in international law. A key question that this paper considers is whether 
this view still holds in the twenty-first century and in light of the various territorial 
entities often considered as „Territories‟ in the Pacific. However, this leads to the 
question that if a territorial entity does not meet the criteria of Statehood, how 
ought that entity be classified as in international law? The most simplistic answer 
(which this paper will address in more complexity) is that these entities are 
„Territories‟. 
 
‘Territories’ in International Law 
To that end, this section outlines what „Territories‟ are, and what type of legal 
personality they have in international law. Again, as there is a wealth of literature 
on this issue, this section will set out the traditional view. A key focus of this 
paper is exploring whether this traditional view still holds given an analysis of 
what are considered „Territories‟ today against the definition in this section: in 
particular, is the classification of some of the territorial entities in the Pacific as 
„Territories‟ defensible?  
 
Perhaps the best way to approach a definition of „Territory‟ in international law is 
to begin with the broadest interpretation of a commonly used noun: „territory‟, 
which is the geographic area enclosed by a sovereign State‟s borders.  The 
concept of States above implies that all parts of a State‟s territory forms an 
internally homogenous political unit. However, in many States (and especially so 
in federal systems) this is not the case – instead, various parts of a State‟s territory 
form their own sub-State territorial entity. These sub-State units can generally be 
classified into two groups: „states‟41 and „Territories‟. In most federal systems, 
„states‟ retain certain legal competencies (as spelled out in the State‟s 
                                                          
41To avoid confusion, this paper will use the term „States‟ (with a capital S) for actors on the 
global stage, and the term „states‟ (with a lower-case s) for those sub-national entities that are 
part of a federal State. Similarly, „Territories‟ (with a capital T) means those entities that are 
part of a State‟s geographic area, or „territory‟ (with a lower-case t).  
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constitution), having ceded other competencies to the federal State government. 
Many federal systems also protect the interests of states in their legislative 
systems by ensuring each state has relatively equal representation in an upper 
house in the legislative process. Territories, on the other hand, usually have less 
autonomy and/or representation in the State legislature than states, and usually do 
not have any explicit legal competencies enumerated in the State‟s written 
constitution. Instead, any legislative competence a Territory has is provided by a 
domestic statute passed in the State legislature.  
 
This can be shown by a number of examples. The United States of America (US), 
for instance, comprises not just the fifty federal states which each have full 
representation in both chambers of the US Congress (and which each have equal 
representation in the US Senate),
42
 but also comprises a number of Territories 
which do not have voting representatives in chamber of Congress,
43
 despite the 
fact that the US is responsible for these communities in international law. 
Similarly, in both Canada and Australia, the federal government has more control 
over national territories than it does over the federal states (called „provinces‟ in 
Canada). Both the Canadian
44
 and Australian
45
 constitutions set out clear legal 
competencies that are the exclusive domain of the states (or provinces) and that 
that the federal government is therefore not authorised to legislate on. In contrast, 
Territories in both Australia and Canada have less representation in the federal 
legislature, and do not retain specific competencies under the relevant 
constitution: instead, the Australian or Canadian federal legislature is able to 
legislate for their Territories as they see fit.  
 
Relating this back to the criteria of States discussed earlier, this means that a 
„Territory‟ does not possess full independence nor can it be recognised as 
sovereign. Instead, a Territory is a sub-State unit whose authority is not 
                                                          
42
 US states are entitled to representatives in the House of Representatives based on their 
population as per Article 1of the United States Constitution. Similarly, Article 3(1) provides 
for two representatives per state in the US Senate. This can be compared with Article 4(3), 
which guarantees Congress the “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States:. 
43
 That said, US  Territories each elect a non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives. 
44
 Canada Act, 1982 (Canada). See s 32(1) which delegates legislative powers to the provinces of 
Canada but ensures power for legislating in respect of the Territories remains with the federal 
government. 
45
 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp).  It is useful to compare the provisions 
of Chapter V granting legislative competencies to the states, with  s 122, which allows the 
Federal Parliament to make laws for any territory of the Commonwealth. 
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autochthonous (unlike many states which have joined larger federal units) but 
whose governing authority is dependent on rescindable powers granted to it by a 
sovereign State (known as the „administering State‟). There are two main types of 
Territory. Internal Territories are part of the State‟s integral territory – for 
example Australian Capital Territory is an Internal Territory of Australia. External 
Territories (which are the focus of this paper) are geographically separated from 
the State‟s „mainland‟46 – for example, Norfolk Island is an External Territory of 
Australia because it is not contiguous to „mainland‟ Australia nor is it included in 
„mainland‟ Australia‟s Exclusive Economic Zone. External Territories, just like 
their internal counterparts, are instead usually represented in international law by 
a sovereign State. 
 
This study specifically focuses on what are often referred to as „External 
Territories‟ (or sometimes as „Dependent Territories‟). These are a special type of 
Territory that is not geographically contiguous
47
 to the integral territory of the 
administering State responsible for them in international law. Furthermore, 
although External Territories often have some form of internal government, this is 
often perceived by other States as subordinate to the „domestic‟ legislature of the 
administering State (even if this is not actually the case). In other words, External 
Territories are seen as „dependent‟ on the administering State. Nevertheless, as 
will be explored in this study, External Territories tend to have more autonomy 
than internal territories that form part of a State‟s integral territory. However, 
despite this extended autonomy, External Territories are not usually recognised as 
having a full international legal personality, as otherwise they would be 
considered States in international law.  
 
States, Territories, and Self-Determination 
The reason that External Territories are important in international law is because 
they are often perceived as relics of colonisation. Before the twentieth century, 
External Territories were not a contentious issue in international law. This was 
because most External Territories were parts of colonial empires without a form 
of voice in the international system: they were instead represented by their 
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 Appendix B (at 146) contains a map of External Territories in the early twenty-first century. 
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 This includes any declared exclusive economic zone under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3 (signed 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 
1994), art 55. 
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administering States. However, as these administering States were the dominant 
players in international law and politics at the time, it was seen as entirely 
appropriate to those players for the European States to maintain large empires 
throughout the world.
48
 Although there was some discussion about the 
applicability of self-government and the right of a people to determine their 
system of government, this discussion was rarely extended beyond the rights of 
the peoples of European States. 
 
This situation changed with the establishment of the United Nations (UN), and the 
focus of the UN on eradicating colonialism. In particular, Chapter XI of the UN 
Charter set out specific rules for dealing with non-self-governing Territories, with 
UN members
49
 recognizing “the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of 
these [T]erritories are paramount”.50 The Charter also proclaimed that UN 
members accepted “as a sacred trust the obligation to ... develop self-government 
[and] to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples”51 of non-self-
governing Territories throughout the world. This focus on ending colonialism
52
 
was in turn part of a broader goal of the UN, enshrined in the organisation‟s 
founding purpose to “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples…”.53 
 
The inclusion of the term „self-determination‟ in the opening Article of the UN 
Charter highlights the importance of the concept to the United Nations‟ members. 
In general, self-determination “refers to a claim on the part of any group of people 
to determine their collective actions”,54 which – although a useful starting point – 
is not particularly helpful in determining what self-determination means. 
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 J M Kelly A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, New York, 1992). 
49
 Interestingly, a number of founding UN Members were not actually de jure States at the time 
they joined: India, for example, was still under British colonial rule, while the Philippines was 
still in a Commonwealth with the United States. Similarly, although New Zealand was a de 
facto State when the UN was founded, it had not yet passed the Statue of Westminster 
Adoption Act 1947, casting doubt on whether New Zealand had de jure sovereignty. 
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 Charter of the United Nations, art 73. 
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 Charter of the United Nations, art 73. 
52
 This focus on self-determination was pushed by the US, whose goal was likely motivated in part 
to deconstruct the United Kingdom and French empires and therefore reduce British and 
French power in global politics.   
53
 Charter of the United Nations, art 1. 
54
 Richard George “The Myth of the Collective Right to Self-Determination” in William Twining 
Issues of Self-Determination (Aberdeen University Press, United Kingdom) at 1. 
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However, a number of UN resolutions have since clarified what the concept 
means.  
 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) clearly sets out the right 
of all peoples to self-determination, and what achieving self-determination 
actually means. It states that “all peoples have the right to self-determination; by 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development”.55 The same definition was then 
used in the major human rights treaties written in the 1960s, elevating it to 
customary international law status: Article 1(1) of both the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) states that self-determination 
gives rise to the right for all peoples “to freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.56;57 The inclusion 
of self-determination in these human rights conventions indicates that it is a 
principle concerned not just with geopolitics and the legal status of External 
Territories (as per the UN Charter), but also with peoples‟ social and political 
rights (ICCPR) and with the right of each people to preserve their cultural, history 
and way of life (IECSCR). 
 
 
Given this, Halperin, Scheffer and Small‟s summary that “the principle of self-
determination is best viewed as entitling a people to choose its political 
allegiance, to influence the political order under which it lives, and to preserve its 
cultural, ethnic, historical, or territorial identity”58 is useful as an all-inclusive 
definition. This indicates that a key focus of self-determination is the right of a 
people to „call the shots‟ or choose how they wish to be governed – provided that 
this happens in consultation so as to protect the territorial integrity of existing 
States.
59
 Furthermore, George reasons that the self-determination right is 
paramount in the international system, and is “limited only by the right of other 
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groups similarly so to act”.60 This point was affirmed by the International Court of 
Justice in the East Timor case where the Court declared self-determination to be 
“one of the essential characteristics of contemporary international law” and that it 
has “an erga omnes character” (i.e. self-determination is a right that applies 
toward all).
61
  However, Knop notes that a key problem with the concept of self-
determination is its “unhelpful generality”.62 In particular, a major concern is the 
definition of the term „people‟, which is not defined in the UN Charter, and has 
not been particularly well clarified by international law.
 63
 Anna Michalska, for 
instance, argues that “the notion [of] „people‟ is ambiguous and used in different 
contexts”,64 making it difficult to clearly define who does – and who does not – 
have the right to self-determination in international law. 
 
However, these criticisms are more focused on defining a „people‟ within the 
integral territory of a State. In fact, the UN Charter and associated resolutions 
make it clear that the principle of self-determination is applicable to External 
Territories. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) is 
particularly useful in achieving this, as it set out criteria to assess whether a UN 
member had to provide information to the UN about non-self-governing 
Territories
65
 - as is required under the UN Charter‟s provisions dealing with 
decolonisation. Principle IV of that Resolution established that a‟ people‟ must 
show that they live within a clear geographic area and that they have their own 
ethnicity or culture. Furthermore, Principle IV also notes that members are 
required to transmit information as per Article 73(e) of the Charter “in respect of a 
[T]erritory which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or 
culturally from the country administering it” – i.e. an External Territory, such as 
all the subjects of this paper (each of whom fit the Principle IV criteria). Given 
Chan‟s assertion that Resolution 1541 provides “the most authoritative criteria for 
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a people to be recognised as possessing the right to self-determination”,66 the 
importance of the provisions in Principle IV should not be underestimated. 
 
Achieving Self-Determination 
The concept of self-determination is important to this paper because it is explicitly 
linked to External Territories. In other words, the UN Charter and General 
Assembly Resolutions discussed above show that the UN has a keen interest in 
ensuring that all peoples of External Territories have achieved self-determination. 
This means that a major focus of this paper is examining whether or not the 
External Territories have indeed done this by assessing whether they have taken 
control of their own political, economic and cultural destiny. In particular, the 
paper will examine whether each External Territory is „calling the shots‟ 
regarding how it is governed. Before doing this, it is important to first examine 
what paths the United Nations has set out as ways to achieve self-determination. 
This section therefore overviews General Assembly Resolutions (and associated 
literature) to assess the criteria that must be fulfilled before the United Nations 
will accept that a people have exercised their right to self-determination. 
 
The most important document for this assessment is General Assembly Resolution 
1541 (XV), which established that External Territories can attain self-government 
by one of three means: seceding from the controlling State and becoming an 
independent, sovereign State in their own right, integrating to become part of an 
existing State, or freely associating with an existing State.
67
 These three categories 
were also included in General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), which also 
noted that self-determination would be exercised when a territorial entity was 
“possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to [that 
Territory] without distinguishing as to race, creed or colour”.68 Self-
determination, therefore, is largely concerned with achieving self-government, 
which also makes sense given that the United Nations still maintains a list of non-
self-governing Territories as per Chapter XI of the UN Charter (which deals with 
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decolonisation).
69
 Musgrave for instance, argues that these resolutions imply the 
United Nations links self-determination linked to the concept of representative 
government.
70
 Nevertheless, the three routes to achieving self-determination 
(secession, integration, and free association) will now each be briefly considered. 
 
Secession: Forming a new State 
The first option, secession, is well-covered by international law literature. 
Secession occurs when a non-self-governing Territory makes a “formal 
withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or units on the 
basis of a claim to independent sovereign status”.71 In other words, people can 
exercise their right to self-determination by deciding to form their own sovereign 
State – an action that Buchanan describes as “the most extreme form of political 
separation”.72 Secession has been by far the most common outcome of successful 
self-determination movements, and particularly so for External Territories which 
have wanted to become fully self-governing. Christopher asserts that between 
1945 and 1999, “some 95 new [S]tates have formed [and been recognised by other 
States] as a result of decolonization”.73 The Yale Law Journal notes that this 
should come as no surprise, as secessionist claims “highlight the failure of the 
[State] system to provide mechanisms for the orderly emergence of new 
communities”.74 This argument highlights the assumptions behind the State-
model: the idea that the community that makes up a State is one homogenous 
people who all subscribe to the authority of the government. This may not 
necessarily be true, especially in the case of an External Territory which is 
geographically distant from its administering State.  
  
However, secession is not a unilateral right. General Assembly Resolution 2625 
(XXV)
75
, for instance, proclaims that no international actor has the right to 
“dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity 
of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with 
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the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.76  Musgrave 
explains that the resolution therefore only “appears to sanction secession in the 
case of sovereign and independent [S]tates if part of a [S]tate‟s population is not 
represented in the [S]tate‟s government”.77 In other words, unilateral secession is 
only legal in international law in the case of oppression.
78
 This is because 
although secession is a legitimate way in which a Territory can become self-
governing, it is problematic when it occurs unilaterally – primarily because it 
undermines the important (and self-serving) customary international law principle 
of territorial integrity
79
 that is enshrined in the UN Charter.
80
  
 
For instance, in the Kosovo Independence Declaration decision, which dealt with 
the legality of Kosovo‟s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, the 
International Court of Justice noted that “the Court recalls that the principle of 
territorial integrity is an important part of the international legal order and is 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations”.81 This affirmed an earlier 
decision made by the Supreme Court of Canada when it considered the potential 
right of Quebec to secede from the rest of Canada. In that case, the Court 
summarised that “international law expects that the right to self-determination will 
be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign [S]tates and 
consistently with the maintenance of territorial integrity of those [S]tates”.82 It is 
therefore unsurprising that in the UN era, very few Territories have successfully 
unilaterally seceded (i.e. without the controlling State‟s consent) from sovereign 
States and then had that secession recognised widely by the international 
community, with Bangladesh being the one of the few examples.
83
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Integration 
The second option, integration, occurs when a non-self-governing Territory 
chooses to become part of the integral territory of the administering State, with the 
same rights and qualities as other sub-State units in that State. Upon integration, 
an External Territory is no longer administered separately by the State. Resolution 
1541 (XV) notes that “integration with an independent [S]tate should be on the 
basis of complete equality between the people of the erstwhile non-self-governing 
Territory and those of the independent country with which it is integrated”.84 
Integration, although uncommon, is not unheard of as a way for people to express 
their right to self-determination: for example, several French External Territories 
voted in the 1940sto integrate and become part of France‟s integral territory.85 
Similarly, Puerto Ricans have recently voted in favour of their government 
advocating that Puerto Rico should become a state within the US.
86
 Lustick, 
Miodownik and Eidelson explain that integration is often promoted by States to 
Territories as a way of preventing secession and ensuring territorial integrity; in 
particular, States may focus on making commitments towards policies of 
inclusiveness of different cultures, as well as moving from a unitary to a more 
federal system of organisation.
87
 A relevant example is the Cocos Islands, whose 
people voted in favour of integration with Australia in 1984 following a 
commitment by the Australian Government to protect the religious beliefs, 
traditions and culture of the Cocos Islands people.
88
 
 
Free Association 
The third option in General Resolution 1541– free association – is a less clear-cut 
concept than secession or integration. The most authoritative explanation of free 
association is set out in Principle VII of that Resolution, which states that free 
association means that the “associated [T]erritory should have the right to 
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determine its internal constitution without outside interference”.89 The use of the 
term „internal constitution‟ here implies that free association involves some form 
of independence over internal affairs, or in other words, that the Territory 
becomes self-governing. Furthermore, according to Principle VII, a freely 
associated relationship should “respect the individuality and cultural 
characteristics of the [T]erritory”.90 Note that Resolution 1541 also instructs that 
for there to actually be free association, the Territory must always have the ability 
to end the relationship. Beyond this, however, Resolution 1541 sheds little light 
on what is required of a relationship based on free association, other than simply 
stating that the choice to enter into such a relationship must be made freely by the 
Territory as per the doctrine of self-determination. 
 
Nevertheless, we can take these provisions and combine them with two other 
points: the fact that free association is presented as an alternative to secession and 
integration; and the fact that the UN links self-determination to self-government. 
Consequently, one can argue that free association is not the formation of a new 
State, nor the integration into an existing State, but instead is a status where the 
Territory is linked (or „associated‟) with an Administering State in some way that 
provides the Territory with independent self-government over domestic matters. 
However, one can also surmise from these General Assembly Resolutions that 
free association does not make a Territory sovereign, as otherwise it would be 
recognised as a State in international law.  
 
The Resolutions indicate that free association is not the same as secession, and 
secession is the forming of a new State. Fairbairn, Morrison, Baker and Groves
91
 
note that the option of free association was originally included in case Territories 
wanted a „temporary‟ arrangement to exercise self-determination before moving 
on to full secession and Statehood, which helps to explain the lack of parameters 
within UN documentation regarding what free association entails. Despite this, 
some entities that are in free association have been recognised as States,
92
 
indicating that the view of free association as incompatible with Statehood may be 
out of date.  Furthermore, as is discussed in Chapter II, relationships based on free 
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association have endured – and even succeeded – in the South-West Pacific. 
Consequently, this paper now turns to examine seven key territorial entities (the 
Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Norfolk Island, American Samoa, New Caledonia 
and French Polynesia) and their levels of identity, independence and sovereignty 
to draw conclusions about the status and definitions of States, Territories, Self-
Determination and Free Association in international law in the twenty-first 
century.  
26 
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CHAPTER II: INTRODUCING THE PACIFIC TERRITORIES 
 
Chapter II overviews the various subjects of this paper – the external Territories 
of the South-West Pacific. It provides background on each of the Territories 
covered in this paper by outlining each Territory‟s legislative,93 executive and 
judicial branches,
94
 as well as providing some brief information regarding each 
Territory‟s administering State. Basic population and geographic data on each 
Territory is contained in Appendix C at page 147.  
 
The Realm of New Zealand 
New Zealand is the major focus of this study, and the „home nation‟ to which the 
other legal approaches are compared. This paper also examines three Territories - 
the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau – for which „New Zealand‟95 is considered 
the administering State in international law. New Zealand also used to administer 
Samoa (previously called the Territory of Western Samoa); however, Samoa is 
now an independent, sovereign State as per s 3 of the Western Samoa Act 1961. 
Together, New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau share the Queen in 
right of New Zealand as their Head of State, and are collectively known as the 
„Realm of New Zealand‟. 
 
Interestingly, this term (the Realm of New Zealand) is an artificial construct 
created by the Letters Patent 1983 to form a relationship between New Zealand, 
the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau.
96
 The term does not appear to exist 
anywhere else, and is not used in international law: for instance, New Zealand 
does not enter into international agreements under the name „the Realm of New 
Zealand‟. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, the term „the Realm of New 
Zealand‟ or „the Realm‟ will be used as a means of distinguishing „New Zealand‟ 
from the construct that comprises New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue and 
Tokelau.  
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New Zealand 
New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy which does not have a „written 
constitution‟ (there is no one document laying out constitutional provisions, and 
many constitutional provisions are actually conventions). New Zealand has a 
unicameral legislature called the House of Representatives („the House‟) or the 
New Zealand Parliament,
97
 which is strongly dominated by political parties. The 
House usually has 120 members, elected for three-year terms by the people of 
New Zealand under a mixed member proportion system – approximately half of 
the members are elected from direct constituencies (known as „electorate seats‟),98 
while the other half are elected from party lists (known as „list seats‟). Overall, 
however, it is the „party list‟ vote that determines what representation each 
political party has in the House: if a party receives 58% of the „party vote‟, the 
number of electorate seats it has received is topped up by members on the party 
list until that party has 58% of the seats in the House. The House has sovereign 
legislative powers and, in theory, can legislate as it pleases.  
 
The Prime Minister of New Zealand is the head of the Executive, and therefore 
the Head of Government. The Prime Minister is a member of the House and must 
retain the confidence of the House to continue in his or her role. In effect, this 
means that the Prime Minister is usually the leader of the largest party in 
Parliament. The Prime Minister and his or her Cabinet of Ministers (who are 
selected from the House) advise the Head of State – The Queen of New Zealand, 
who is usually represented by the Governor-General. It is legally possible, but 
conventionally and historically unheard of for the Governor-General to deviate 
from the Prime Minister‟s advice. The Governor-General also signs Bills passed 
by the House into law. 
 
New Zealand is perceived by the international community as the administering 
State for three Territories: the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. All four „realm 
countries‟ share New Zealand citizenship. However, each of these parts of the 
realm form different electoral constituencies: Cook Islanders, Niueans and 
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Tokelauans for instance, cannot necessarily vote for members of the New Zealand 
Parliament, and (similarly), New Zealanders cannot vote for the Cook Islands 
Parliament, the Niue Assembly or the Tokelau Fono.
99
 
 
The Cook Islands 
New Zealand considers the Cook Islands to be “self-governing in free association 
with New Zealand”.100 The Cook Islands achieved this status in the early 1960s 
after New Zealand offered the-then Cook Islands Legislative Assembly four 
options for its status in the future: integration with New Zealand, becoming self-
governing in free association with New Zealand, becoming an independent State, 
or integration into an eventual Pacific federation.
101
 The Cook Islands 
Government opted for free association, and was successfully re-elected by the 
Cook Islands people on this basis.
102
 This act of self-determination legitimised 
two core constitutional documents for the Cook Islands: the Constitution of the 
Cook Islands
103
 and the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964.
104
 The Constitution 
removed the power of New Zealand to legislate for the Cook Islands,
105
 although 
New Zealand law force in the Cook Islands on Constitution Day continued to 
remain in force.
106
  
 
The Cook Islands Constitution sets up a unicameral legislature called the Cook 
Islands Parliament („the Parliament‟). The Parliament comprises twenty-four 
members, elected on four-year terms from single-member constituencies in a first-
past-the-post electoral system.
107
 Each constituency roughly corresponds to 
traditional tribal boundaries.
108
 The Parliament is the main legislative organ, and 
                                                          
99
 Of course, New Zealand citizens who meet the requirements for voting in more than one realm 
country are entitled to vote in multiple elections. 
100
 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “Cook Islands: Country Paper” (7 
November, 2012) <www.mfat.govt.nz> 
101
 Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands (5
th
 sess, 1962) at 104-106. 
102
 Stephen Smith “Unchartered Waters: Has the Cook Islands become eligible for Membership in 
the United Nations?” (2010) 8 NZJPL 169. 
103
 This is set out in New Zealand legislation as a schedule to the Cook Islands Constitution Act 
1964 (NZ). 
104
 Section 3 of the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 (NZ) states that the Cook Islands shall be 
self-governing.  
105
 Ibid, art 46. 
106
 Ibid, art 77. 
107
 Ibid, art 27. 
108
 J T M Jonassen “Cook Islands” in S Levine Pacific Ways: Government and Politics in the 
Pacific Islands (Victoria University Press, New Zealand, 2009) 35 at 40. 
30 
has the sole power to make laws under the constitution.
109
 Bills become law when 
they are passed by majority vote in the Parliament and are assented to by the 
„Queen‟s Representative‟, who may return a bill to Parliament for reconsideration 
(though if Parliament again passes the bill, the Queen‟s Representative must 
assent to it).
110
 Law is interpreted by the High Court of the Cook Islands,
111
 which 
can in turn be appealed to the Cook Islands Court of Appeal,
112
 and from there to 
the Privy Council in London.  
 
There is also an advisory legislative body: the House of Ariki, which comprises 
twenty-four members appointed to their positions based on island groups.
113
 The 
House of Ariki is essentially a Council of Chiefs. It carries out a largely 
ceremonial function, but is mandated to act as an advisory council when requested 
by the Parliament.
114
 In practice, the House of Ariki tends to advise on Acts 
regarding land or which require consideration of traditional Cook Islander 
values.
115
  
 
The Head of the Cook Islands Government (and therefore the Cook Islands 
Executive) is the Cook Islands Prime Minister, who forms a Cabinet of Ministers 
comprising himself or herself plus up to five other members from the 
Parliament
116
 and up to one other person who does not necessarily have to be a 
member of Parliament but meets other specific criteria.
117
 The Prime Minister 
continues in his or her role as long as he maintains the confidence of a majority of 
the members of Parliament. Similar to its counterpart in New Zealand, the Cabinet 
is responsible for “the general direction and control of the executive government 
of the Cook Islands”,118 with Cabinet Ministers responsible for various Cook 
Islands ministries. The Cook Islands Head of State, on the other hand, is the 
Queen in right of New Zealand, whose functions are carried out in her absence by 
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the „Queen‟s Representative‟.119 This is interesting given that the Queen herself 
has issued Letters Patent nominating the New Zealand Governor-General as her 
representative in the Cook Islands,
120
 not a separate „Queen‟s Representative‟. In 
practice, however, the „Queen‟s Representative‟ still acts as the de facto Head of 
State, and this representative is appointed by the Queen in right of New Zealand 
on the advice of the Governor-General of New Zealand, who in turn acts on 
advice of the Cook Islands‟ Government. This means that the Cook Islands shares 
a de jure Head of State (and her legal agent) with New Zealand, but that in 
practice the Governor-General of New Zealand merely acts as a „postman‟ for the 
Cook Islands.
121
 
 
Niue 
Niue entered into a free association relationship with New Zealand just over a 
decade after the Cook Islands. Niue‟s constitutional arrangements are very similar 
to the Cook Islands, with core documents including the Niue Constitution Act 
1974, and the Constitution of Niue, which is contained as a schedule to the Act. In 
terms of self-determination, Niueans were originally offered free association at the 
same time as the Cook Islands, but asked for this decision to be deferred.
122
 
However, in 1974, Niueans voted to accept a new relationship with New Zealand 
based on free association.
123
 Niue originally became a colony of New Zealand 
after the first King of Niue (elected by the island chiefs) petitioned Queen 
Victoria for British protection in the late 1800s.
124
 
 
Like the Cook Islands, Niue is considered self-governing,
125
 and its legislature 
(the Niue Assembly) has supreme powers to legislate for Niue.
126
 Under the 
Constitution of Niue, the Niue Assembly comprises the Speaker and twenty 
members – fourteen of whom are elected from village-based single-member 
constituencies and six of whom are elected at large „from the common roll‟.127 
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The Speaker is elected by a majority of members of the Niue Assembly,
128
 
normally following a general election. The Speaker can be anyone who meets the 
requirements to stand for election to the Assembly,
129
 and has always been 
someone from outside the Assembly‟s ranks. The Speaker does not have voting 
rights, but presides over the Assembly and also gives assent to Bills which have 
been passed by the Assembly by majority vote:
130
 at this point they become 
law.
131
 Article 33 prescribes additional procedural requirements for legislation 
that deals with Niuean land. Similar to the Constitution of the Cook Islands, the 
Constitution of Niue contains clear statements granting the Assembly the power to 
make laws,
132
 and preventing the New Zealand Parliament from legislating for 
Niue without Niue‟s consent.133 Existing law continues to be in force,134 which in 
some cases includes law that doesn‟t explicitly refer to „Niue‟, as Niue was 
included as part of the Cook Islands prior to the 1960s.
135
 As with the Cook 
Islands, the Constitution creates a High Court and a Court of Appeal to interpret 
the law and to settle disputes.
136
 
 
Niue‟s head of government is the Premier, who is elected by an absolute majority 
of the members of the Assembly.
137
 The Premier appoints a Cabinet comprising 
himself and three other members of the Niue Assembly.
138
 As in the Cook Islands, 
the Cabinet is mandated with “the general direction and control of the executive 
government of Niue.
139
 The Premier and Cabinet hold office as long as they hold 
the confidence of the Assembly.
140
 Tony Angelo notes that this means that the 
Cabinet controls both the governing of Niue and the legislative programme and 
agenda of the Assembly
141
 - just like in the Cook Islands (and in New Zealand 
prior to the advent of MMP and minority governments). As with the Cook Islands, 
the de jure Head of State is the Queen in right of New Zealand, represented by her 
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Governor-General. In practice, however, the Speaker of the Niue Assembly 
carries out most domestic Head of State functions.  
 
Tokelau 
Unlike the Cook Islands and Niue, Tokelau is not in free association with New 
Zealand. In terms of self-determination, Tokelau conducted referendums in 2006 
and 2007 on whether it should take on a relationship similar to that between the 
Cook Islands and New Zealand, complete with a Constitution of Tokelau. 
However, as the requisite two-thirds majority to trigger free association was not 
reached, Tokelau today remains a “part of New Zealand”,142 administered under 
the Tokelau Act 1948. Nevertheless, under the Tokelau Act, legislative power has 
been devolved to a legislature known as the General Fono („the Fono‟), which 
“may make rules for the peace, order and good government of Tokelau”.143 
However, these rules cannot override any statute of the New Zealand Parliament 
that is in force in Tokelau.
144
 Similarly – and in contrast to the situation in the 
Cook Islands and Niue – any rule made by the Fono may be disallowed by the 
„Administrator of Tokelau‟,145 who is appointed by the New Zealand Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade.
146
 Although this does not occur in practice, this 
nevertheless highlights that Tokelau‟s Fono does not have parliamentary 
sovereignty.
147
 This aside, statute law of New Zealand does not apply in Tokelau 
unless it expressly says so,
148
 although existing laws prior to the Act continue in 
force.
149
 As per the Tokelau Amendment Act 1986, the High Court of New 
Zealand is also the court of law for Tokelau.
150
 
 
Little mention is made in the Tokelau Act of the membership of the General Fono. 
However, in practice, the Fono is made up of an elected Faipule 
(Representative/Ambassador) and an elected Pulenuku (Mayor) from each of 
Tokelau‟s three villages (Fakaofo, Atafu, Nukunonu), plus one additional 
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representative from each village for every 100 inhabitants in that village.
151
 These 
arrangements are also set out in the proposed Constitution of Tokelau (which 
would have come into force had the free association referendum received the 
requisite majority). The three sets of Fapule and Pulenuku, plus the population-
based representatives, comprise the Fono, which comprises 20 members in 2012. 
In a system very different to that of the classic Westminster Parliament, the Fono 
meets 3-4 times (for 3-4 days per session) each year in the village of the Ulu-o-
Tokelau (the head of Government). The Ulu rotates among the three Faipule so 
that each village takes a turn hosting the Fono. As there are three villages, it is no 
surprise that the Faipule and Pulenuku are elected every three years: each village 
therefore holds the Ulu-o-Tokelau position once per electoral cycle.
152
  As 
Tokelau is a Territory of New Zealand, the Queen in right of New Zealand is the 
Head of State.
153
 
 
Despite the establishment of the Fono as a national legislature, governance in 
Tokelau in practice revolves around the three villages. In 2006 the Administrator 
of Tokelau formally delegated his powers to each of the village councils, 
essentially giving them authority to govern their own individual affairs.
154
 Each 
village is therefore governed by its Faipule and Pulenuku, plus an elected council 
(the Taupulega), and has in turn ceded responsibility for issues of national 
importance - such as fishing rights – to the General Fono to deal with on a 
national level. Each Village also has its own Commissioner‟s Court, which settles 
disputes.
155
 This can be appealed to each village‟s Village Appeals Council.156 
Consequently – and in direct contrast to New Zealand, the Cook Islands, and Niue 
– the Tokelauan system is, in practice although not in law, heavily federalised  
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The Commonwealth of Australia and its External Territories 
Australia 
Australia is a parliamentary democracy modelled on the Westminster system, but 
with federal characteristics (federal institutions in Australia are referred to as the 
„Commonwealth‟): it is made up of five states and several Territories.157 The 
Commonwealth Parliament in Canberra is bicameral and consists of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate.
158
 The House of Representatives (currently 150 
members) must constitutionally comprise double the number of members of the 
Senate, and is elected every three years by the Australian people using instant-run 
off voting in single-member constituencies which are roughly the same size in 
population. The Senate is also elected by the Australian people, but is elected by a 
proportional voting system in state-based constituencies. Each state must have the 
same number of senators (this is currently twelve each). The Constitution does not 
require the territories to have representation in the senate; however both the 
Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory have been granted the 
ability elect two members each. 
 
The Commonwealth Parliament is the primary law-making institution in those 
areas where it has competence. Bills must pass through both chambers to become 
law; however, as Australia is a federal State, the Commonwealth Parliament can 
only legislate on certain issues for the states, set out under sections 51, 52, and 90 
of the Australian Constitution.
159
 However, the Commonwealth Parliament has 
full legislative powers regarding the Australian Territories.
160
 
 
The Prime Minister is the Head of Government and the Head of the Executive. He 
or she leads a Cabinet of Ministers, which is made up of Ministers selected by the 
Prime Minister from the House and the Senate. The Queen of Australia is the 
Head of State and is represented by her Governor-General, but in practice both 
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conventionally act on the advice of the Prime Minister, based on the conventional 
provision that the Prime Minister retains the confidence of the House of 
Representatives.
161
  
 
Norfolk Island 
Norfolk Island is one of Australia‟s external territories, ceded by the United 
Kingdom to Australia in 1844. As a Territory, Norfolk Island falls under s 122 of 
the Australian Constitution, which grants the Commonwealth Parliament full 
powers to legislate for the government of any Territory.
162
 Norfolk Island‟s 
„Constitution‟ is therefore contained in a Commonwealth statute: the Norfolk 
Island Act 1979 (Cth) („the Norfolk Island Act‟) – developed by the Australian 
federal government in the late 1970s as a result of increasing demands for self-
government by Norfolk Islanders. A key position created by that Act is the 
Administrator, who is appointed by the Governor-General (on the advice of the 
responsible Commonwealth Minister
163
),
164
 and who bears some similarity to the 
Administrator of Tokelau. The Administrator acts as a de facto Head of State for 
Norfolk Island, although he or she is subordinate to the Australian 
Commonwealth Governor-General.  
 
The Norfolk Island Act creates a unicameral Legislative Assembly, which 
comprises nine members
165
 elected for three year terms.
166
 The electoral method is 
a weighted first-past-the-post system: Norfolk Island residents have nine votes 
each to cast among the various candidates, and can cast up to four for a single 
candidate.
167
 The nine candidates with the most votes are elected. At their first 
meeting, the members of the Legislative Assembly nominate one of their number 
to be the „Chief Minister of Norfolk Island‟,168 and an additional one of their 
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number to be a „Minister‟.169 The Chief Minister also nominates another one or 
two Ministers from the Legislative Assembly.
170
 These Legislative Assembly 
members are then appointed to their positions as Ministers by the 
Administrator,
171
 and together comprise the Executive Council, whose role is to 
“advise the Administrator on all matters relating to the government of the 
Territory”.172 The Chief Minister must retain the confidence of the Legislative 
Assembly.
173
 
 
Besides holding the Chief Minister to account, the Legislative Assembly has 
extensive powers to propose law. In particular, the Legislative Assembly has the 
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Territory.
174
 
In practice, this has been interpreted as essentially making Norfolk Island self-
governing, and providing the Legislative Assembly with the ability to legislate on 
most domestic affairs‟ matters with some exceptions – namely, the acquisition of 
property on just terms, defence matters, the coining of money, and euthanasia. In 
fact, the Commonwealth Joint Standing Committee on the National Capital and 
External Territories stated in 2002 that the Norfolk Island Government “has a 
considerably wider range of powers than the states, including responsibility for 
important, [normally] exclusive, Commonwealth functions such as immigration, 
customs, and quarantine matters”.175  
 
The Norfolk Island Act creates significant opportunities for Commonwealth 
Australia to prevent legislation from coming into force. Once proposed laws are 
passed by a majority in the Legislative Assembly,
176
 they are then presented to 
Administrator for assent, and do not enter into force until the Administrator has 
agreed to them.
177
 The Administrator may assent, withhold assent, return the 
proposed law to the Legislative Assembly for reconsideration, or forward the 
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proposed law to the Governor-General for assent.
178 
However, what happens in 
practice depends on the type of issue being proposed. In particular, the Norfolk 
Island Act provides that: 
 In the case of proposed laws that solely deal with „schedule 2 matters‟ 
(which are matters usually performed by state or local governments),
179
 
the Administrator follows the advice of the Executive Council or the 
Commonwealth Minister responsible for Norfolk Island.
180
  
 In the case of proposed laws that deal with „schedule 3 matters‟ (which are 
matters usually performed by the Commonwealth Parliament) 
181
 the 
Administrator relies on the advice of the responsible Commonwealth 
Minister.
182
   
 For all other matters, the Administrator must send the proposed law to the 
Governor-General for assent.
183
  
 
In all three scenarios above, the Commonwealth Governor-General can also 
disallow a law, provided he or she does so within six months of the 
Administrator‟s assent.184 Given that the Governor-General acts on the advice of 
the Commonwealth Government, this means that Canberra effectively has the 
power to disallow Norfolk Island legislation. The Governor-General also has the 
power to introduce a proposed law into the Legislative Assembly.
185
 Finally, the 
Commonwealth Parliament retains the power to legislate for Norfolk Island, 
although Commonwealth Acts do not apply to the Territory unless they explicitly 
state otherwise,
186
 or were in force prior to the Norfolk Island Act.
187
 In terms of 
interpretation, the Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth) continues the existence of the 
Supreme Court of Norfolk Island (which was established by the Norfolk Island 
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Act 1957 (Cth)).
188
 Decisions of this Court can be appealed to the Australian 
federal court system. 
 
Australian citizenship law extends to Norfolk Island; however, the Norfolk Island 
Legislative Assembly is given competency over its own immigration laws. 
Consequently, Australian citizens from the mainland do not have the automatic 
right to reside on Norfolk Island, and must carry a passport or document of 
identity to travel to Norfolk Island for a short-term stay. Norfolk Islanders who 
hold Australian citizenship are entitled to move to and work on the mainland. 
They are also entitled to enrol to vote in the Australia Federal elections, even if 
they do not live in mainland Australia – however, as Norfolk Island does not have 
a specific constituency represented in the Australian Parliament, Norfolk Islanders 
normally enrol and vote as though they live in Canberra.
189
 Overall, this means 
Norfolk Island is partially integrated into Australia‟s integral territory.  
 
The Republic of France and its Territories in the Pacific 
France 
The Constitution of the „French Republic‟ (also known as „France‟ or „the 
Republic‟) differs from the constitutions of Australia and New Zealand because it 
is not a parliamentary democracy, but a presidential republic. Legislatively, 
France has a bicameral legislature (called „the Parliament‟) consisting of the 
National Assembly and the Senate. The National Assembly comprises 577 
députés elected for five year terms (in a two-round system
190
) from single-
member constituencies, while the Senate comprises 348 senators elected by an 
electoral college (made up of elected local officials such as regional councillors 
and mayors, plus national assembly members) for six-year terms.
191
  
 
Approval from both chambers is normally required for a Bill to become law; 
however, the Constitution does allow for the National Assembly to overrule the 
Senate in the case of disagreement, provided that a „joint committee‟ of both 
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40 
houses first examines the Bill and attempts to recommend amendments agreeable 
to both houses.
192
 The Constitution allows the Parliament to create „Organic 
Laws‟ (sometimes called „Institutional Acts‟), which set up constitutional 
arrangements outside the written constitution. Organic Laws have a similar 
legislative process to normal legislation, but have additional „cooling off‟ periods 
before voting, have restrictions on the ability of the National Assembly to 
overrule the Senate in the case of disagreement (an absolute majority is required), 
and cannot be promulgated until the French Constitutional Council (a 
Constitutional Court) has declared their conformity with the Constitution.
193
 
 
Where the French system differs from the Westminster constitutions is that the 
French Head of State is the President of the Republic, who is directly elected by 
the people of France (in a two-round system) for a five-year term. Just like other 
Heads of State, the President summons and dissolves the Parliament, and calls for 
elections; however, he or she also has clear constitutional competencies over 
external affairs.
194
 The Head of Government is the Prime Minister, who is 
appointed by the President on the basis that the Prime Minister has the confidence 
of the National Assembly. Although the Prime Minister is the de jure head of the 
Executive, in practice, when the President‟s party has control of the National 
Assembly, the President also plays a major role in shaping all government policy. 
 
Unlike in the Realm of New Zealand, the French Territories participate in the 
electoral process. French citizenship law extends to all French Territories, 
meaning that French citizens (from mainland France) have automatic right of 
entry into both New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
195
 As a result, all French 
citizens in French Polynesia and New Caledonia are entitled to representation in 
the French National Assembly and Senate based on their population size.
196
 Of the 
Territories covered in this paper, both French Polynesia and New Caledonia each 
elect two députés for the National Assembly. French Polynesia elects two senators 
to the French Senate, while New Caledonia elects just one senator to the French 
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Senate. Nevertheless, despite the ability of the Territories to elect members to the 
Parliament, the fact that they each only elect one or two members out of several 
hundred means that the make-up of the National Assembly and the Senate is 
predominantly determined by mainland France. All French citizens present in 
French Polynesia have the right to vote in French Polynesian elections; however, 
the situation is not the same in New Caledonia, where a „New Caledonian 
citizenship‟ requirement means that only those French citizens who meet 
additional residency criteria have the right to vote in New Caledonian elections.
197
 
 
French Polynesia 
The French Constitution designates French Polynesia as an overseas territory.
198
 
French Polynesia‟s „constitution‟ is therefore laid out in the Statute of Autonomy 
of French Polynesia („the Statute of Autonomy), which is an Organic Law passed 
by the French Parliament.
199
 In terms of self-determination, French Polynesia 
(along with all other French Territories) voted in the late 1950s not to secede from 
France.
200
 However, French Polynesians have not accepted via referendum the 
Statute of Autonomy and their new status in French constitutional law. 
 
The Statute of Autonomy creates a unicameral legislature called the Assembly of 
French Polynesia. It comprises fifty-seven members elected by party lists
201
 for 
five year terms from multi-member constituencies.
202
 The Assembly has the 
power to legislate on all matters within its jurisdiction.
203
 This jurisdiction is 
spelled out in Article 140: the Assembly can make „territorial laws‟ on matters not 
specifically retained by the French Republic,
204
 and also on matters “taken by way 
of the participation of French Polynesia in the exercise of the powers of the State 
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under the conditions set out in Articles 31 to 36”.205 However, the French 
Republic also retains the power to legislate for French Polynesia, including on the 
areas listed above. Furthermore, Republic legislation that covers certain issues 
will automatically apply to French Polynesia, even if French Polynesia is not 
explicitly mentioned.
206
 As noted above, because the Statute of Autonomy is a 
French Organic Law, it can also be modified unilaterally by the Parliament of the 
French Republic. 
 
The President of French Polynesia is the Head of Government,
207
 and is elected by 
the French Polynesia Assembly by secret ballot.
208
 Once elected, the President 
appoints a Vice-President and up to fifteen Ministers, who (along with the 
President) form the Council of Ministers,
209
 which leads the government. 
Ministers must meet the requirements to be elected to the Assembly, but do not 
have to be members.
210
 According to Article 63, the Council of Ministers holds 
Executive power and sets policy. Consequently, the President of French Polynesia 
(as head of that Council) enforces acts, directs the administration of French 
Polynesia, makes regulations and represents French Polynesia.
211
 The High 
Commissioner of the Republic to French Polynesia (who is appointed by the 
French Government, and who is similar to an Ambassador) is the de facto Head of 
State, with the power to call elections and overall oversight of the administration 
of French Polynesia.
212
 The High Commissioner is also the “depository of the 
powers of the Republic”.213  
 
The French Polynesia Assembly is the main legislative organ, and passes Bills by 
majority vote.
214
 However, the Statute of Autonomy sets up two other advisory 
legislative bodies: 
 the High Council of French Polynesia, which is tasked with “advising the 
President of French Polynesia and the [Council of Ministers] in the 
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preparation of acts provided for in Article 140, designated as „territorial 
laws,‟ and of decisions and regulatory instruments”.215 The High Council 
is made up of members appointed by the Council of Ministers for non-
renewable six-year terms based on their competence in legal matters.
216
  
 the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, which comprises 
representatives of professional groups, trade unions and bodies and 
associations that participate in the economic, social and cultural life of 
French Polynesia.
217
 The Economic, Social and Cultural Council provides 
an opinion on Bills of an economic and social character
218
 at the request of 
the French Polynesia Assembly.  
 
Government Bills must be submitted to the High Council for its non-binding 
opinion before they are adopted by the Government in Council.
219
 Private 
Members‟ Bills must be submitted to the High Council for its opinion before they 
are placed on the agenda.
220
 Acts are then submitted to both the President of 
French Polynesia and the High Commissioner for approval. Either of these actors 
can return the Bill to the Assembly for reconsideration – if passed again, the High 
Commissioner must approve it and it becomes law (no consent is required in this 
instance from the President of French Polynesia).
221
 
 
There is therefore significant overlap in legislative powers between the Council of 
Ministers, the High Commissioner, the Republic, and the French Polynesia 
Assembly, especially as the approval of the Council of Ministers and the High 
Commissioner is usually needed to pass laws. The Assembly may also move a 
vote of no-confidence in the President,
222
 and the President of the French 
Republic may (on advice from the Council of Ministers) dissolve the Assembly 
“where the operations of the institutions of French Polynesia proves to be 
impossible”.223 Finally, a number of actors can request judicial review of a 
territorial law: any of the High Commissioner, the President, the President of the 
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Assembly of French Polynesia, or any six members of the Assembly may refer a 
territorial law to the Couseil d’Etat (the French Council of State), who will then 
review whether the law conforms with “the Constitution, the organic laws 
[including the Statute of Autonomy], international commitments and the general 
principles of law”.224 
 
New Caledonia  
The French Constitution designates New Caledonia as a special-status or  
sui-generis community.
225
 Like French Polynesia, New Caledonia is governed 
under a French Organic Law, passed by the French Parliament in Paris, known as 
the „Organic Law relating to New Caledonia‟ („the Organic Law‟). The Organic 
Law relating to New Caledonia and the Statute of Autonomy of French Polynesia 
bear many similarities, laying out which competencies are retained by the French 
Republic and which are delegated to each territory; however, a key difference is 
that the New Caledonia Organic Law sets up a federal structure in New 
Caledonia. Consequently, the Organic Law also lays out clear legal competencies 
between the New Caledonian Congress (the national legislature) and the New 
Caledonian Provincial Assemblies (the regional legislatures). 
 
Another major difference is that unlike the Statute of Autonomy of French 
Polynesia, the New Caledonia Organic Law is based on an international treaty 
between the French State and New Caledonia, known as the Nouméa Accord.
226
 
Signed in 1998, and ratified by a referendum of New Caledonians in an act 
towards achieving self-determination
227
 the focus of the Nouméa Accord is to 
allow New Caledonia to progressively become more autonomous over two 
decades, leading to an eventual series of referenda on whether New Caledonia 
should become independent.
228
 The Nouméa Accord therefore set out a clear 
progressive transfer of powers from the French State to New Caledonia, which is 
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in turn reflected in the Organic Law and New Caledonia‟s sui-generis community 
status.  This is important, because it means that while the French State can 
unilaterally change some parts of the Organic Law (like it can with the Statute of 
Autonomy of French Polynesia), it is restricted from doing so for the provisions in 
the Organic Law that are based on the Nouméa Accord and therefore have 
international treaty status.  
 
In any case, the Organic Law sets up a federal structure,
229
 with two sets of local 
legislatures (the Provincial Assemblies and the New Caledonian Congress), plus 
the Parliament of the French Republic. The legislative powers retained by the 
French Republic are set out in Article 21, including (among others) jurisdiction 
over matters such as nationality, justice, defence, currency, and maritime and air 
services. Article 22 sets out the areas that New Caledonia has competency in, 
including (among others) taxation, social protection, customary law, roading, 
public health, and electricity.
230
 Matters not mentioned in Articles 21 or 22 are the 
domain of the Provincial Assemblies.
231
 The Organic Law also sets out several 
powers of the Republic that have now been transferred to New Caledonia, 
including jurisdiction over education, civil security and criminal law.
232
 The 
French Republic can legislate on the matters for which it retains competency, 
provided that the legislation expressly mentions New Caledonia (there are 
exceptions on constitutional, defence and administrative law issues).
233
  
 
The Organic Law sets up three Provincial Assemblies: one for the Loyalty Islands 
(15 members), one for the Southern part of Grand Terre
234
 (40 members) and one 
for the Northern part of Grand Terre (22 members). Provincial Assembly 
members are elected for five-year terms using a proportional representation 
system.
235
 Fifty-four members drawn from the Provincial Assemblies based on 
their positions on party lists are also members of the New Caledonian Congress – 
the national legislature.
 236
 The Congress then elects (by a method of proportional 
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representation) the President of New Caledonia and up to eleven Ministers, who 
are together known as the „Government in Council‟ (or „the Government‟)‟.237 
Maclellan explains the rationale behind the proportional electoral system for the 
Government: it is designed to encourage collegiality in a multi-ethnic, multi-party 
society with many different views as this method means each of the major parties 
in Congress will get at least one Minister from its ranks.
238
 Nevertheless, once 
elected, the Government “prepares and enforces the decisions of Congress”.239  As 
in French Polynesia, the Head of State in New Caledonia is the President of the 
French Republic, who is in turn represented by the High Commissioner to New 
Caledonia.
240
 
 
As seen in French Polynesia, the Organic Law grants the Congress the power to 
pass „territorial laws‟ on the areas that New Caledonia has competency, plus on a 
number of issues set out in Article 99, ranging from national symbols to 
employment to rules of property. Bills are passed by a simple majority,
241
 and are 
then adopted by the „Government in Council.‟242 However, any one of the High 
Commissioner, the Government, the President of the Congress (the Speaker), the 
President of a Provincial Assembly or eleven members of Congress can ask for a 
new decision by Congress. If Congress again passes the bill by a simple majority, 
it becomes law,
243
  with one exception: if the High Commissioner, the 
Government, the President of Congress, the President of a Provincial Assembly or 
eighteen members of Congress submit the Bill to the Constitutional Council of the 
French Republic for its opinion. The Constitutional Council has the power of 
judicial review and can declare bills invalid if it thinks they breach the New 
Caledonian Organic Law.
244
 Other judicial institutions include the „Judicial Courts 
of New Caledonia‟, which deal with all non-administrative law matters. District 
courts‟ decisions can be appealed to the Nouméa Court of Appeal. Administrative 
matters, on the other hand, are not dealt with in New Caledonia at all – instead, 
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any administrative matters are heard by the Administrative Court of France (in 
Paris), which can then be appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, and 
then to the Couseil d’Etat (Council of State). 
 
The Organic law also sets up three other advisory legislative bodies: the 
Economic and Social Council,
245
 the Mines Council,
246
 and the Customary 
Senate.
247
 The Government and the French Republic are obligated to consult the 
Customary Senate on all matters that relate to Kanak identity (the Kanaks are the 
indigenous people of New Caledonia). The Economic and Social Council is 
consulted by the Government on matters that have an economic or social 
character.
248
 The Mining Council provides opinions on matters on natural 
resource extraction.
249
 All three bodies can be overruled by the National 
Congress. 
 
The United States of America and its South-Pacific Territory 
The United States of America 
The United States of America (the US) is a presidential federal democracy 
comprising fifty states which (like the states in Australia) have ceded through 
enumeration certain powers to the federal government.
250
 The federal legislature 
(the Congress) is bicameral, and is made up of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate.
251
 The House currently comprises 435 members who serve two-year 
terms and who are elected from single-member constituencies by a first-past-the-
post system. Each state is entitled to roughly the same proportion of House 
members as its proportion of the population, and the borders of each constituency 
are determined on a state-basis (i.e. not by a federal agency). The Senate 
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comprises two representatives („senators‟) from each state, who are now directly 
elected for six year terms by the members of that state. Legislation must be 
approved by both chambers. 
 
The Head of State and the Head of Government is the President of the United 
States of America,
252
 who is elected every four years via a directly elected 
electoral college, and who does not need the confidence of the US Congress to 
remain in his or her role (although the President can be impeached for high crimes 
and misdemeanours
253
). The President leads the Executive Branch of 
Government. The President sets the policy of the US Government, and nominates 
people to serve as Secretaries (similar to Ministers) in his or her Cabinet.  
  
American Samoa 
American Samoa is the only inhabited American Territory fully located in the 
Southern Hemisphere. It also presents an interesting case because unlike most of 
the Territories discussed in this paper, the islands of American Samoa voluntarily 
ceded sovereignty to the United States under the Treaty of Cession of Tutuila and 
the Treaty of Cession of Manu‟a.254 These treaties were then ratified by the 
Ratification Act of 1929,
255
 which officially made American Samoa a United 
States territory. The US Constitution gives Congress full legislative competency 
over territories of the Union.
256
  
 
The US Ratification Act transferred all powers of government of American 
Samoa to any person directed by the President of the United States. President 
Truman therefore used that Act to transfer administration of American Samoa to 
the Secretary of the Interior, via Executive Order 10264 in June 1951.
257
 In 1967, 
the Secretary of the Interior approved the Constitution of American Samoa, 
following that constitution‟s acceptance via referendum by the people of 
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American Samoa. This acceptance can be considered an act toward achieving self-
determination by the People of American Samoa.
258
  
 
As the Constitution of American Samoa is not a law of the United States 
Congress, American Samoa is classified as an unorganised,
259
 unincorporated
260
 
territory.  This has implications for the applicability of the US Constitution as 
supreme law. In particular, the US Supreme Court ruled in the „Insular Cases‟261 
that Territories belonged to, but were not part of the United States. The 
implication of this is that the US Constitution is not automatically applicable to 
unincorporated US Territories. Robert Statham Jr asserts that this means core 
provisions such as equality before the law (as seen in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the US Constitution) are “not currently applied fully to American 
Samoa, and to do so would place American law in direct conflict with local 
customs and traditions”,262 especially given that the American Samoan 
Constitution essentially sets up specific provisions protecting local nobility (the 
matai) and restricting ownership of land (to American Samoans only). 
Presumably because of this, American Samoans are US nationals, rather than US 
citizens, and therefore do not vote in federal elections or pay federal taxes, but do 
have the right to enter (and work) in the United States. American Samoa elects 
one delegate (for a two-year term) to serve as a non-voting member of the US 
House of Representatives. 
 
Under the American Samoa Constitution, the head of Government is the Governor 
of American Samoa. The Governor is now locally elected by a popular vote (on a 
ticket with the Lieutenant-Governor) using a first-past-the-post electoral method 
for a four-year term.
263
 The Governor is responsible for the “supervision and 
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control of all executive departments, agencies and instrumentalities of the 
Government of American Samoa”.264  
 
The American Samoa Constitution also sets up a bicameral legislature („the 
Fono‟) consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The House 
comprises twenty voting members elected from 17 territorially based districts of 
American Samoa (3 districts have two representatives) in a first-past-the-post 
system every two years, and also one non-voting member elected by a public 
meeting on Swains Island.
265
 The Senate is made up of 18 members from three 
territorially based districts.
266
 Senators must be matai (Chiefs), are elected by 
local custom in village meetings of matai, and hold office for four years.
267
  
 
Article II, s 9 of the Constitution of American Samoa sets out legislative 
procedure. Bills can originate in either chamber, and must pass three readings in 
each chamber by majority vote (either chamber may amend or reject the Bill at 
any stage). Bills are then sent for approval by the Governor, who may approve the 
Bill and make it law, at which point the Governor must also deposit the Bill with 
the US Secretary of the Interior.
 
Alternatively, the Governor may refuse to 
approve the Bill and instead return it to the chamber in which it originated. The 
Fono can then re-pass the Bill with a two-thirds absolute majority of each 
chamber. If the Governor still refuses to sign the Bill, he or she must send it to the 
US Secretary of the Interior who has ninety days to decide to approve the Bill – if 
the Secretary does not, the Bill does not become law.
268
 American Samoan law, 
including questions on the American Samoa Constitution, is interpreted by the 
District Courts and the High Court of American Samoa.
269
 
 
However, the Fono does not have supreme power to legislate. Although the Fono 
may pass legislation in respect of American Samoa, the American Samoa 
Constitution expressly states that no legislation may be inconsistent with the 
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Table Two: Summary of the Pacific Territories 
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American Samoa Constitution, with the laws of the United States applicable in 
American Samoa, or with treaties or international agreements to which the US has 
acceded.
270
 Furthermore, the American Samoa Constitution can be 
administratively overridden at the US Federal Level – Article IV, Sections 1 and 
2, for instance, were amended by the US Secretary of the Interior so that the 
Governor was elected by popular vote.
271
 Similarly, in 1983, the US Congress 
passed a law modifying the amendment provisions of the Constitution of 
American Samoa from requiring approval of the US Secretary of the Interior to 
also requiring approval via an Act of the US Congress.
272
 
   
Conclusion 
This chapter shows that there are myriad approaches to setting up constitutional 
structures within Territories, just as there are as many different independent 
constitutional structures as there are independent, sovereign States. Table Two (on 
the previous page), for instance, summarises the very different structures present 
in the South-West Pacific Territories. 
 
The following chapters will analyse these structures in order to assess the level of 
independence and sovereignty that Territories have compared to States. In 
particular, Chapter III will examine the extent to which each Territory‟s 
constitution acknowledges that Territory‟s culture and identity. Chapter IV will 
then consider the extent to which each Territory can be considered independent 
(as per the definition in Chapter I), including a discussion of the extent to which 
each Territory is still linked (or associated) with its administering State. Finally, 
Chapter V will examine the extent to which any of the Territories covered in this 
paper can be said to be sovereign, and whether this means that any of the 
„Territories‟ considered in this paper should actually be classified as „States‟ in 
international law. 
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CHAPTER III: CULTURE & IDENTITY 
 
Culture – or the traditions, values and rituals that are inherently accepted within a 
society – is a major part of a nation‟s identity. Article 27 of the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR), for instance, declares that 
States have a duty to make sure that minorities are not denied the right to enjoy 
their own culture.
273
  Identity is also important for determining who a „people‟ are 
regarding the right to self-determination. Consequently (and as established in 
Chapter I), the recognition of identity in a Territory‟s constitution can provide an 
indication of that Territory‟s independence in international law. However, 
Henderson asserts that despite the importance of culture to a nation‟s identity, 
“the importance of tradition and culture is stressed in the [Pacific] constitutions – 
but generally in sections confined to the preamble”.274 This chapter assesses this 
claim, examining the extent to which the constitutions of the Pacific Territories 
show recognition of that Territory‟s identity, including the protection of cultural 
traditions and local land, the composition and design of local legislatures and each 
Territory‟s Head of State, the „officialisation‟ of local languages, and the creation 
of legal identity via citizenship.  
 
Constitutional Structure and Design: Protection of Local Culture 
Perhaps the most striking thing when examining the constitutional structures of 
the Pacific Territories is how Western they are in design. All the Territories have 
relatively prescriptive constitutions, which is at odds with the oral tradition of the 
Pacific Islands.
275
 Furthermore, a focus on elected representatives who make 
national decisions is at odds with traditional Pacific society. Fairbairn, Morrison, 
Baker, and Groves, for instance, note that “both Polynesia and Micronesia have 
aristocratic, hierarchical social structures with traditional authority vested in 
chiefs”.276 Helu argues that in an ideal world, Pacific Island constitutions would 
localize power as much as possible, primarily because the small population size of 
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the Pacific Islands means that “party politics always poses a threat of fragmenting 
the communities into tiny ineffective pieces, thus weakening them as systems or 
throwing them into chaos”.277  However, in the former Pacific colonies that are 
now States, “the Pacific Island constitutions [largely reflect] the political structure 
of the colonial power” that administered them,278 with most power concentrated in 
a nationally-elected legislature and the national executive, rather than at the 
village level.  
 
The same can be said of the Pacific Territories: Norfolk Island, the Cook Islands 
and Niue are largely parliamentary systems but with strong executives, as per the 
Westminster tradition in Australia and New Zealand. All use (at least in part) 
some form of first-past-the-post method to elect their legislative bodies, and the 
executive itself is formed out of the legislature, rather than elected by the people – 
just as is seen in „mainland‟ Australia and New Zealand. Similarly, French 
Polynesia and New Caledonia are quasi-presidential systems, like the Republic of 
France. Both French Territories also feature a number of bodies which have an 
advisory role in the legislative process
279
 – similar to the Economic, Social and 
Environmental Council in France, which is mandated by the French 
Constitution.
280
 Finally, the American Samoan constitution reflects that of its 
administering State (the US). Just like the US has a bicameral legislature (the 
Congress) and a President as Head of Government and Head of State, American 
Samoa has a bicameral legislature (the Fono) and a Governor as Head of 
Government and Head of State.
281
 Henderson argues that this similarity is an 
issue, as the imposition of foreign political models (and especially the adversarial 
Westminster system) into the Pacific Islands has negative social implications, as 
“the division between government and opposition accentuates internal divisions 
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within society and fosters instability”.282 This, in turn, is at odds with the 
traditional Pacific-culture of stable decision-making and family consensus.
283
 
  
However, not all Territories have whole-heartedly adopted a foreign system into 
their constitutions. Tokelau‟s constitutional structure reflects New Zealand 
influence but has clearly been adapted for Tokelauan circumstances – each 
village, for example, takes a turn having the honour of holding the Ulu position 
and hosting the Fono.  Similarly, the Niuean constitution integrates the 
Westminster system with local culture – fourteen voting members (out of twenty) 
of the Niue Assembly are elected from the traditional villages of Niue, and – 
perhaps as a result of this – Niue has not developed political parties nor a formal 
opposition,
284
 which in turn helps to overcome any potential political instability. 
 
Legislative Bodies in the Constitution 
Several Pacific Territories also include some form of legislative body whose 
purpose is to advise on how laws meet cultural traditions. Secondary legislative 
bodies are by no means unique to the Pacific: De Smith notes that throughout the 
world, “the will of the majority in the popularly elected house of the legislature [is 
often] offset by a second chamber in which minority and regional interests and 
traditional elements may be guaranteed special representation”.285 The question is: 
to what extent do the secondary legislative bodies found in the Pacific Territories 
actually protect those minorities and traditional cultures? Can they act as an 
effective brake on the legislative process, or are they advisory only? 
 
The Cook Islands Constitution, for instance, sets up the House of Ariki – 
essentially a council of Chiefs (Ariki) – which is tasked with considering matters 
relative to the welfare of the people of the Cook Islands submitted to it by the 
Cook Islands Parliament. Interestingly, the House of Ariki was not included in the 
original version of the Cook Islands Constitution, but added in 1967 by Cook 
Islands Premier Albert Henry to recognise the royal heritage of the Cook Islands 
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and to help the Cook Islands define its national identity.
286
 Similarly, the Organic 
Law relating to New Caledonia sets up the Customary Senate, which is made up 
of Kanak members from each of the customary areas of New Caledonia. The 
Customary Senate is consulted on all proposals affecting the Kanak identity and 
can suggest amendments to laws regarding distinctive symbols, rules regarding 
land, and any other matter that the National Assembly refers to it.
287
 The New 
Caledonian and French Polynesian Organic Laws also set up an Economic and 
Social Council in New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
288
 In both Territories, the 
relevant Economic and Social Council is tasked with considering proposals for 
territorial laws that have an economic or social character.  
 
However, none of the bodies mentioned in the above paragraph have the ability to 
unilaterally pass legislation, or to prevent it from passing. In effect, they are 
advisory bodies only, and can be overruled by the main legislative chamber by a 
simple majority (the Cook Islands Parliament, the French Polynesia Assembly, 
and the New Caledonian Congress). Henderson asserts that this means “the role of 
these bodies is limited, and generally does not challenge the imported Western 
political structures”.289 Furthermore, the inclusion of the Economic and Social 
councils in the French territories seems almost a throw-back to the legislative 
system of the French Republic - which has an Economic and Social council of its 
own
290
 – rather than a genuine attempt to include cultural traditions in the 
legislative process of New Caledonia or French Polynesia.
291
 Niue and Tokelau, 
on the other hand, do not have any such form of advisory body to the legislature; 
however, as noted already, both Niue and Tokelau have legislative systems that 
reflect the traditional village system and are therefore less Westminster in design. 
 
In contrast to the Cook Islands and the French territories, the Constitution of 
American Samoa sets up a culturally based upper house with power of its own. 
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Article 2 of the Constitution of American Samoa establishes the American 
Samoan Senate, which is made up of eighteen members selected in local village 
meetings. Notably, candidates must be matai (Chiefs) in order to be nominated to 
the Senate. Although the Constitution is silent on the specific role of the Senate, 
its membership suggests that its core purpose is to ensure that Bills are not in 
conflict with American Samoan values and culture – similar to the House of Ariki 
and the Customary Senate. Furthermore, in contrast to the Cook Islands and the 
French territories, there is no mechanism in the Constitution of American Samoa 
for the population-based, directly elected American Samoan House of 
Representatives to overrule the Senate: Bills must pass by three readings majority 
in each chamber,
292
 and either chamber may amend or reject the Bill at any 
stage.
293
 Robert Statham Jr provides a potential reason for this: “from the Samoan 
perspective, the primary purpose of initially agreeing to the United States‟ 
annexation of the islands was rooted in the quasi contradictory desires of being a 
part of the American family while at the same time preserving local communal 
land and Matai systems, the basic core of the Samoan way of life”.294 
Consequently, although the Constitution of American Samoa sets up a bicameral 
legislature which is in some ways very similar to the US Congress, this model has 
been significantly modified to defend the very reason American Samoa decided to 
cede sovereignty to the Union in the first place – the protection of local customs 
and the matai system.  
 
Cultural and Local Land Protection 
Several of the constitutions for the Pacific Territories include provisions regarding 
local customs. The strongest example of this is Article 3 of the American Samoan 
Constitution, which states:
 295
 
 
It shall be the policy of the Government of American Samoa to protect persons of 
Samoan ancestry against alienation of their lands and the destruction of the Samoan 
way of life and language, contrary to their best interests. Such legislation as may be 
necessary may be enacted to protect the lands, customs, culture, and traditional 
Samoan family organization of persons of Samoan ancestry, and to encourage 
business enterprises by such persons. No change in the law respecting the alienation 
or transfer of land or any interest therein, shall be effective unless the same be 
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approved by two successive legislatures by a two-thirds vote of the entire 
membership of each house and by the Governor. 
 
The inclusion of such a strong protection clause seems to be a direct result of 
American Samoa choosing to join the US in return for cultural protection.
296
 
However, Article 3 is not the only example of this. As noted in Chapter II, even 
though American Samoa is a territory of the US, the doctrine of territorial 
incorporation developed in the insular cases means that because American Samoa 
is an unincorporated Territory, the US Constitution does not automatically apply 
and is not supreme law in American Samoan courts.
297
 This means that provisions 
such as „equality before the law‟ which are inherent in the US constitution, are 
overruled by the provisions in the Constitution of American Samoa that protect 
local culture, such as the matai system.
298
  
 
Special cultural provisions are also seen in other Territories‟ constitutions, most 
commonly to do with land. Article 33 of the Constitution of Niue, for instance, 
prescribes special provisions with regard to any proposed laws affecting Niuean 
land. In particular, the Article sets up additional legislative procedures for the 
Niue Assembly if it wants to pass a Bill regarding the customary title to Niuean 
land; the alienation of Niuean land; or the purchase, taking or other acquisition of 
Niuean land for any public purpose.
299
 Angelo notes that this is important given 
that “land in Niue is almost extensively held in accordance with custom”.300  
 
In the French Territories, the Statute of Autonomy of French Polynesia contains 
very minor provisions on land: it requires the establishment of a council of experts 
to advise the institutions of French Polynesia on matters of land and property.
301
 
In contrast, the Organic Law relating to New Caledonia establishes the concept of 
„customary lands‟, which are governed by custom and which are inalienable, 
unassignable, non-transferable, and exempt from attachment.
302
 That organic law 
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also establishes the concept of customary civil status in New Caledonia: persons 
who have customary civil status are governed in civil law by their customs.
303
 The 
New Caledonian organic law also provides New Caledonia with the ability to 
freely determine its own distinctive symbols and its name.
304
 
 
Interestingly, neither the Cook Islands nor Tokelau nor Norfolk Island have 
explicit constitutional provisions regarding local culture or land ownership.  
However, the Tokelau Act 1948 contains specific provisions regarding the 
application of common law and equity: ss 4B and 5A note that in general, English 
common law and the principles of equity are in force in Tokelau, unless those 
principles are “inapplicable to the circumstances of Tokelau”.305 Furthermore, the 
would-be Constitution of Tokelau, which would have come into force if Tokelau 
had chosen to change its relationship-status with New Zealand to free association, 
does have specific provisions for land,
306
 including provisions preventing any 
non-Tokelauan from gaining an interest in Tokelauan land.  
 
Nevertheless, for the most part, the constitutions of the Pacific Territories do not 
feature many provisions surrounding cultural protection, beyond what has been 
noted above regarding including advisory bodies in the legislative process to 
protect cultural traditions. However, some Territories‟ constitutions do contain 
specific provisions restricting the use of land.  
 
Head of State 
A territorial entity‟s Head of State is also an important determination of identity. 
A Head of State is literally the representative of a territorial entity – normally with 
significant ceremonial and constitutional functions. A Head of State tends to have 
an important role in calling elections, summoning and dissolving the legislature, 
and being the overall person in charge of defence. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties also implies that a key function of the Head of State is to 
represent a territorial entity in international affairs.
307
 Consequently, whether or 
not each of the Territories has its own Head of State is important for determining 
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the extent to which each Territory has developed its own identity, as well as 
playing a role in the determination of each Territory‟s level of independence.  
 
Given this, it is important to note that that none of the Territories have their own 
de jure Head of State. The Constitution of the Cook Islands, for instance, states 
that “Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand shall be Head of State of the 
Cook Islands”.308 Similarly, the Niue Constitution states that “the executive 
authority of Niue is vested in Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand, and 
the Governor-General of New Zealand is accordingly the representative of Her 
Majesty the Queen in relation to Niue”.309 This means that the Queen in right of 
New Zealand, rather than a separate Queen in right of the Cook Islands or Niue, is 
the de jure Head of State in both Territories. However, do these semantics matter? 
After all, „the Queen in right of New Zealand‟ is a title held by Queen Elizabeth II 
– the same person who is the Queen of several Commonwealth States. For 
instance, Queen Elizabeth II is also the Queen in right of Australia, the Queen in 
right of Canada, the Queen in right of Papua New Guinea, and so forth.
310
 The 
fact that there is not a separate Queen in right of the Cook Islands or Niue perhaps 
indicates that the Cook Islands and Niue are not as independent as those 
Commonwealth States who have their „own‟ Queen. 
 
However, for most Commonwealth States, Queen Elizabeth II is simply the de 
jure Head of State – the de facto Head of State is the Queen‟s representative, or 
Governor-General.  Importantly, each State (rather than the Queen) nominates its 
own Governor-General. However, in the Cook Islands and Niue, the de facto 
Head of State is supposed to be the New Zealand Governor-General, who acts as 
the de facto Head of State for the entire realm of New Zealand.
311
 However, 
despite this, the Cook Islands has in fact set up its own „Queen‟s Representative‟ 
as its de facto Head of State,
312
 and it is this Queen‟s Representative who carries 
out the functions of the Head of State in the Cook Islands. This allows a locally 
nominated position: in practice, the Queen‟s Representative is nominated by the 
Cook Islands‟ Government and appointed by the Governor-General of New 
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Zealand – the latter of whom acts as „postman‟ for the Cook Islands given his or 
her role as an intermediary between the Queen‟s Representative and the Queen in 
right of New Zealand.
313
 In Niue, the Governor-General remains the official de 
facto Head of State; however, in practice some of the Head-of-State functions are 
carried out by the Speaker of the Niue Legislative Assembly.
314
  
 
In both New Caledonia and French Polynesia, the de jure Head of State is the 
President of France. This is because both French Polynesia and New Caledonia 
are considered Territories of the Republic, and therefore fit under Title XII of the 
French Constitution. However, the Statute of Autonomy of French Polynesia 
identifies a representative: the High Commissioner of the Republic to French 
Polynesia, who is appointed by the French Government in Parliament as “the 
depositary of the powers of the Republic”.315 A similar position exists regarding 
New Caledonia (the High Commissioner to New Caledonia).
316
 As with the Cook 
Islands, there is a shared de jure Head of State with the administering State, but 
also a local representative. However, in this case that representative is nominated 
and appointed by the administering State (France), rather than by the local 
government. A similar situation exists in Norfolk Island: although the Governor-
General of Australia is still the Head of State of Norfolk Island, in practice the 
Governor-General is represented by an Administrator, who is capable of being 
sued, entering into contracts, and acquiring property.
317
 All proposed laws must 
also be presented to the Administrator for his or her assent.
318
 However, the key 
thing is that the Norfolk Island Administrator is nominated and appointed by the 
Australian Commonwealth Government, rather than being a locally nominated 
position as seen in the Cook Islands. 
 
Interestingly, the American Samoan Constitution notes that the Governor is the 
Head of Government but is silent on whom the Head of State is. This may be 
because the US system – on which the American Samoan Constitution is based – 
is a Presidential system where the Head of Government is also the Head of State 
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at the same time. One approach to this issue could be that the American Samoan 
Head of State is the same as their administering State: after all, the President of 
the US implicitly represents American Samoans on the international stage.
319
 This 
is an important point given that a key role of a Head of State is to represent a 
territorial entity on the global stage.
320
 On the other hand, one can argue that 
American Samoa has a de facto Head of State in the form of its administering-
State-appointed official: the US Secretary of the Interior. This is especially true 
given that the Secretary of the Interior appoints Justices to the High Court of 
American Samoa,
321
 decides on legislation that is rejected by the Governor of 
American Samoa,
322
 and used to nominate and appoint the Governor of American 
Samoa.
323
 One can similarly argue that the Administrator of Tokelau is also a de 
facto Head of State, given that the Administrator is able to disallow rules made by 
the Tokelau General Fono.
324
  
 
Language 
Martin and Nakayama argue that language is a key foundation of identity.
325
 After 
all, it is through language “that we are able to identify ourselves, others, and to be 
identified by others”.326 Exploring what each of the constitutional documents of 
the Pacific Territories says about language is therefore particularly important for a 
discussion on culture and identity, especially given William Mackey‟s argument 
that “language is a reflection of economic and cultural power”.327 In fact, Colin 
Williams goes so far as to argue that “the ecology of language has much to do 
with questions of power”;328 after all, if one language is legally mandated as the 
„official‟ language of a State or Territory, this means that government agencies, 
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legal documentation, and education systems will use that language – often to the 
exclusion of other languages.  
 
The Cook Islands Constitution states that “all debates and discussions in 
Parliament shall be conducted in the Maori language as spoken in Rarotonga and 
also in the English language”,329 and that Bills and Acts must have both Maori 
and English versions.
330
 However, the Cook Islands Constitution also notes that if 
there is conflict between a Maori version and an English version of any Bill or 
Act, the English version takes precedence.
331
 Article 23 of the Niuean 
Constitution is similar – essentially establishing that Niuean and English are equal 
languages. Where Niue differs from the Cook Islands, however, is where there is 
conflict between translations. In that case “regard shall be made to all the 
circumstances that tend to establish the true intent and meaning of that 
provision”.332 Similarly, if there is a conflict in any record of proceedings or 
enactment of the Niue Assembly, the Assembly may resolve one version as the 
superior one.
333
 
 
In French Polynesia, the situation is very different. The Statute of Autonomy of 
French Polynesia declares that French is the official language of French 
Polynesia.
334
 Although the Statute of Autonomy does allow private-law contracts 
to be drawn up in some indigenous languages,
335
 and notes the importance of the 
Tahitian language for cultural identity, 
336
 French is still the obligatory language 
for legal public-law issues, “as well as for users in their relations with the public 
administrations and departments”.337 In contrast, the Organic Law relating to New 
Caledonia does not include a provision on the use of French; however, in practice, 
French is the lingua franca of the Territory. A similar situation is true for Norfolk 
Island and Tokelau, where the issue of language is absent from the Norfolk Island 
Act 1979 (Cth) and the Tokelau Act 1948 – in effect, no language is given an 
official status in these Territories. In contrast, in American Samoa, although 
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Samoan is not mentioned as an „official language‟ of the Territory, the 
Constitution of American Samoa protects local language via the Article 3 „cultural 
protection‟ provisions.338  
 
Nevertheless, a common problem in most of the Territories seems to be the use of 
a dominant language – even if it is not embedded in the constitution. Hunkin and 
Mayer note that “for island-based cultures today, the greatest threat of language 
loss is from the influence of an introduced dominant language and its 
accompanying world view, which has become accepted over the years with little 
question”.339 In the Cook Islands, for instance, although the Constitution 
recognises Maori (as spoken in Rarotonga) as almost legally equal to English,
340
 
this is not the only language. Hunkin and Mayer note that the focus on Cook 
Islands Maori has resulted in fewer speakers of other languages: 16,800 people 
now speak Cook Islands Maori, but only 600 people speak Penrhyn, only 840 
people speak Pukapuka, and only 2,500 people speak Rakahanga-Manihiki. Hiti 
Tepari‟i believes that the declaration of French as the official language of French 
Polynesia is a major issue, and argues that the imposition of the French language 
is a form of twenty-first century colonialism: “French colonialism, as a political 
system, still continues stronger than ever, through its new form – 
Francophony”.341 Tepari‟i argues that the constitutional requirement to use French 
means that the language has become all-encompassing in French Polynesia to the 
point that it strangles indigenous cultural development. These examples indicate 
that the imposition of specific languages through constitutional mechanisms can 
have wide effects due to the power that it gives the culture that „owns‟ the official 
language, and (in turn) the identity of minority cultures within nations.  
 
However, issues arise even in Territories where language is not constitutionally 
prescribed. Hunkin and Mayer note that in New Caledonia, where language is not 
specified in the Constitution, the importance of French as a lingua franca means 
that apart from Vanuatu-Bislama (1,200 speakers) and Tayo, (2,000 speakers), 
only six of the remaining Pacific languages are spoken by more than 4,000 
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speakers. Furthermore, twelve languages have between 1,000 and 4,000 speakers 
and nineteen languages have populations of fewer than 1,000 speakers. Two 
languages – Waamang and Zire – have become extinct.342 Similarly, fewer and 
fewer people are learning Tokelauan on the basis that Samoan is more useful 
given its status as a lingua franca in that region of the world.
343
 Perhaps then, the 
issue is less a result of what is stated in constitutional documents, but what has 
become accepted practice. Nevertheless, the inclusion of „official language‟ 
clauses in constitutional documents legitimises certain languages and cultures at 
the expense of others.  
 
Citizenship 
Almost all of the administering States of Pacific Territories have taken the same 
approach regarding citizenship for the people of their Territories: for the purpose 
of citizenship legislation, the Territory is covered by the same law as the 
administering State.
344
 This is important because citizenship is a legal form of 
identity: it informs others which territorial entity a person is associated with. In 
the Realm of New Zealand, s 29 of the Citizenship Act 1977 extends New 
Zealand citizenship law to the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau; consequently 
Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans who met standard New Zealand 
citizenship criteria have the right to move and reside in New Zealand, and also 
have the same rights to visas in other countries as other New Zealand citizens. 
Similarly, s 11 of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 extends Australian 
citizenship to the Australian External Territories (including Norfolk Island), with 
the resulting effect that Norfolk Islanders are Australian citizens and therefore 
have free-movement rights to live in „mainland‟ Australia.  
 
However, this right is not reciprocal. Neither „mainland‟ New Zealanders nor 
„mainland‟ Australians have the automatic right to legally reside in the Cook 
Islands, Niue and Tokelau or in Norfolk Island respectively, as in all three cases 
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the Territories maintain their own immigration regimes.
345
 In contrast, in the 
French Territories, French Polynesians and New Caledonians are both classified 
as citizens of the French Republic,
346
 therefore providing them with the right to 
reside in France. However, in contrast to the situation in the Cook Islands, Niue, 
Tokelau or Norfolk Island, citizens of the French Republic have the automatic 
right to reside in the French Territories.  
 
In contrast to the other State-Territory relationships detailed above, the US does 
not extend US citizenship to American Samoans. Instead, American Samoans are 
classified as „US Nationals‟. Although US Nationals gain US passports, they do 
not have the same rights as citizens – in particular, although US Nationals do have 
the right to reside and work in the United States without restrictions, they are not 
able to vote in federal or state elections.
347  
 
However, lack of voting rights is by no means exclusive to American Samoa. 
Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans do not have an automatic right to vote in 
New Zealand elections until they have met the standard New Zealand residence 
criteria
348
. On the other hand, French Polynesians and New Caledonians 
automatically gain the right to vote in the French Republic elections: as noted in 
Chapter II, French Polynesia and New Caledonia each elect two députés for the 
National Assembly. French Polynesia also elects two senators to the French 
Senate, while New Caledonia elects one senator to the French Senate. Similarly, 
Norfolk Islanders are entitled to enrol and vote in Australian elections.
349
 In 
contrast, New Zealand, Australian, US citizens do not gain the automatic right to 
vote in a Territory‟s elections without meeting additional residence criteria, with 
the same being true of French citizens entering French Polynesia (but not New 
Caledonia
350
).  
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Table Three: Approaches to Citizenship 
 
Citizenship 
Type 
Do Territory 
citizens have 
residence rights 
in the 
administering 
State? 
Do administering 
State citizens 
have automatic 
residence rights 
in the Territory? 
Do Territory citizens 
have the right to vote 
in State elections 
without meeting 
further residency 
criteria? 
Cook 
Islands 
NZ citizen Yes No 
No: Must reside in 
NZ for one year Niue 
Tokelau 
Norfolk 
Island 
Australian 
citizen 
Yes No Yes 
French 
Polynesia 
French 
citizen 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
New 
Caledonia 
Yes, but not 
automatic voting 
rights on entry 
American 
Samoa 
US national Yes No 
No: Must become  
US citizens 
 
The situation can therefore be summarised by Table Three above. This table 
indicates a relatively clear link between residency, citizenship and voting rights. 
In almost all cases, Territories who do not gain automatic voting rights in the 
administering State similarly tend to immigration into their own territory: Cook 
Islanders, for example, cannot automatically vote in New Zealand General 
Elections, but also restrict automatic access for New Zealanders into the Cook 
Islands. On the other hand, New Caledonians can vote for the French Republic 
legislature, but French citizens also have the automatic right to emigrate to New 
Caledonia. The exception to this is Norfolk Island, which controls its own 
immigration regime but whose residents (if Australian citizens) have the right to 
vote in Commonwealth elections even if not resident in mainland Australia – 
potentially due to the large role that the Commonwealth institutions can play in 
Norfolk Island.
351
 
 
Conclusion 
As discussed in Chapter I, identity is a major part of the right to self-
determination and also helps to set out the extent to which a territorial entity is 
independent. How the identity of the Pacific Territories is nurtured is therefore 
important, as the displacement of identity can have significant ramifications.  
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This chapter has explored how some common dimensions of legal identity are 
treated in each Territory‟s constitution. For the most part, the administering States 
have transferred their own constitutional structures into the Territories, with the 
structures adapted to varying degrees to take into account local culture. Local 
languages and cultural values have been protected in the constitutional documents 
of some of the Territories (notably Niue and American Samoa), with significant 
„cultural imperialism‟352 seen in the constitutional documents of other Territories 
(particularly French Polynesia). Similarly, none of the Territories have their own 
unique (and locally appointed) de jure Head of State, although the Cook Islands 
nominates its own de facto Head of State: the „Queen‟s Representative‟. In most 
Territories, however, the de facto Head of State is nominated and appointed by the 
administering State‟s government. Finally, none of the Territories have their own 
citizenship: Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans are New Zealand citizens, 
Norfolk Islanders are Australian citizens, French Polynesians and New 
Caledonians are French citizens, and American Samoans are US Nationals.  
 
Interestingly enough, most of the Pacific Territories seem relatively comfortable 
with the current citizenship arrangements, given the free-access rights these 
arrangements in turn give to the relevant State. However, these citizenship rights – 
in addition to the imposition of Western constitutional structures – may create 
problems for the Pacific Territories as they potentially indicate a lack of 
independent identity for the Territory. Similarly, the designation of „official 
languages‟ comes at the potential expense of minority language and culture. 
Overall, one can conclude that the extent to which a unique identity can be seen is 
rather limited in some Territories. This in turn has important implications for each 
Territory‟s independence and sovereignty – each of which will be discussed in the 
following chapters. 
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CHAPTER IV: STATE-TERRITORY LINKS AND ASSOCIATIONS  
 
As established in Chapter I, two criteria that distinguish States from other 
territorial entities in international law is that States are both independent and 
sovereign. That chapter also established that in order to be independent, a 
territorial entity should have an uncontested government that can exercise 
autonomous control over that entity‟s territory. Critically, a core principal of 
customary international law is that States do not intervene in other State‟s 
domestic affairs.
353
 However, this doctrine does not extend to Territories, which – 
by virtue of their status – retain many links with their administering State. In 
particular, for those communities who have exercised self-determination freely 
associating with an existing State, those links – or associations – are the very 
characteristics that define the international status of their governments.  
 
Independence can also be measured by the extent to which a territorial entity 
protects its own identity and culture. The extent to which a territorial entity can be 
considered independent is therefore important when determining that entity‟s 
status – as is the nature of any links between a Territory and its administering 
State. Consequently, this chapter examines the constitutional links between each 
of the Territories in this paper with their administering States in order to clarify 
each Territory‟s international legal status.354 In particular, this chapter will 
examine the extent to which each Territory can be classified as independent, as 
well as explore the degree to which each Territory remains linked with its 
administering State. To do this, the chapter focuses on five key areas: identity 
links, legislative competence, constitutional change provisions, economic links, 
and judicial associations.  
 
Identity-Based Links, including Territories’ citizenship and Heads of State 
Chapter III examined the extent to which each Territory has constitutionally 
forged its identity. In particular, that chapter examined how each Territory‟s 
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constitution mirrored that of its administering State, the extent to which legislative 
bodies and constitutional provisions protected local culture and languages, how 
citizenship laws applied to each Territory, and whether or not each Territory had 
its own distinct de jure and de facto Head of State.  
 
Table Four: Approaches to Identity 
 
How does the 
constitution recognise 
local culture? 
Are local 
languages 
protected? 
Which 
citizenship 
law applies? 
Does the Territory 
nominate its own 
de facto Head of 
State? 
Cook 
Islands 
Westminster system, 
though the House of 
Ariki has an advisory 
legislative role 
Cook Islands 
Maori has some 
protection, but 
not other local 
languages 
NZ Citizen 
Yes: Queen‟s 
Representative 
Niue 
Westminster system, 
with some provisions 
protecting land 
Niuean is given 
equal status to 
English 
In practice: 
Speaker of the 
Niue Assembly 
Tokelau 
Village-based system, 
relatively unique 
Not mentioned in 
Tokelau Act 
Norfolk 
Island 
Heavily modelled on 
Westminster system 
Not mentioned in 
Norfolk Island 
Act 
Australian 
Citizen 
No: Administrator 
of Norfolk Island 
French 
Polynesia 
Heavily modelled on 
the French system 
No: French is the 
official language 
French 
Citizen 
No: High 
Commissioner of 
the Republic 
New 
Caledonia 
Heavily modelled on 
the French system, 
although the Customary 
Senate has an advisory 
legislative role. Some 
provisions regarding 
customary civil status 
and customary land 
Not mentioned in 
the Organic Law, 
but French, is the 
lingua franca of 
the Territory 
American 
Samoa 
Significant focus on 
upholding cultural 
values, including 
explicit constitutional 
provisions 
Not mentioned in 
Constitution 
US National 
(not full US 
citizenship) 
No: Secretary of 
the Interior 
 
As shown in Table Four above, Chapter III established that for the most part, the 
administering States have transferred their own constitutional structures into the 
Territories, with the structures adapted to varying degrees to take into account 
local culture. Local languages and cultural values have been protected in the 
constitutional documents of some of the Territories (notably Niue and American 
Samoa), with significant „cultural imperialism‟ seen in the constitutional 
documents of other Territories (particularly French Polynesia). Finally, no 
Territory has its own citizenship, nor does any Territory have its own distinct de 
jure Head of State. However, the Cook Islands does nominate a „Queen‟s 
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Representative‟ who acts as the de facto Head of State, and the Speaker of the 
Niue Assembly carries out many Head of State functions.  
 
All of this indicates that there are still significant identity and cultural links 
between all of the Territories and their administering States, and some of the 
Territories have yet to see their own independent cultural identity promoted in 
their constitutional texts. This is particularly important in the case of shared 
citizenship and shared Heads of States, as both of these are often associated with 
becoming independent.
355
 However, when considering constitutional links, a 
crucial element to consider is the extent to which each Territory can be considered 
„self-governing‟, or in charge of its own domestic affairs – especially given that 
some of the Heads of States outlined above have significant powers to prevent 
legislation entering into force in the Territories. Consequently, the next section 
will examine the extent to which each of the Pacific Territories has full legislative 
competence over domestic affairs. 
 
Legislative Competence over Domestic Affairs 
This section outlines how much „legislative competence‟ each Territory has over 
its own domestic affairs, or – in other words – to what extent each Territory has 
authority to legislate on domestic matters, or the extent to which each Territory 
can be considered „self-governing‟. It will overview the three main approaches 
taken by the relevant administering States (a de jure transfer of competence, 
legislative competence with oversight, and a de facto transfer of competence) 
before moving on to consider each Territory‟s ability to change its own 
constitution.  
 
A De Jure Transfer of Legislative Competence: The Cook Islands and Niue 
In the Realm of New Zealand, the approach has been to transfer legislative 
competence from the New Zealand Parliament to the respective legislatures of the 
other realm countries. The Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 (which was 
enacted by the New Zealand Parliament, and which contains the Constitution of 
the Cook Islands), for instance, declares that “the Cook Islands shall be self-
governing”.356 Similarly Article 46 of the Cook Islands Constitution expressly 
                                                          
355
 Refer to the discussions in Chapter III at 59 and 65. 
356
 Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, s 3. 
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notes that Acts passed by the New Zealand Parliament after the Cook Islands 
Constitution enters into force shall no longer extend to the Cook Islands, 
effectively removing the ability of the New Zealand Parliament to legislate for the 
Cook Islands.
357
 Analogous provisions are seen in the Niue Constitution Act 1974 
(which was also enacted by the New Zealand Parliament). Section 3 of that Act 
states that Niue shall be self-governing, while Article 36 of the Constitution of 
Niue
358
 prevents the New Zealand Parliament from legislating on behalf of, or 
over the top of, the Niuean Legislative Assembly – with the exception that the 
New Zealand Parliament can legislate on behalf of Niue with Niue‟s consent.359 In 
effect, these statutes mean that the New Zealand Parliament has explicitly chosen 
to transfer de jure legislative competence from the New Zealand Parliament to the 
Cook Islands Parliament and the Niue Legislative Assembly.  
 
Although the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 and Niue Constitution Act 1974 
reassign legislative competence from the New Zealand Parliament to the Cook 
Islands Parliament and the Niue Legislative Assembly, this is arguably not a 
complete transfer in practice. As a Westminster Parliament, the New Zealand 
House of Representatives cannot bind its successors, meaning that a future House 
of Representatives could (in theory) repeal the Cook Islands Constitution Act 
1964 or the Niue Constitution Act 1974.
360
 However, the likelihood of New 
Zealand actually doing this is incredibly low – a unilateral act by New Zealand to 
change the Cook Islands‟ or Niue‟s constitutional arrangements (and especially 
their free-association status) would be met with significant disapproval from the 
United Nations, especially given previous General Assembly declarations that the 
Cook Islands and Niue are both self-governing.
361
. Doing so would in effect put 
New Zealand at odds with a customary international law norm that New Zealand 
has limited involvement in Cook Island and Niuean domestic affairs.  
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However, there are less overt ways that New Zealand can influence Cook Islands 
and Niue. In particular, the fact that New Zealand citizenship is extended to Cook 
Islanders and Niueans provides New Zealand with ample opportunity to still 
influence Cook Island and Niuean policy-making. Notably, in 1974, New Zealand 
Prime Minister Norman Kirk stated in a letter to the Cook Islands Premier that 
“the bond of citizenship does entail a degree of involvement [of New Zealand] in 
Cook Islands affairs. This is reflected in the scale of New Zealand's response to 
the Cook Islands' material needs; but it also creates an expectation that the Cook 
Islands will uphold, in their laws and policies, a standard of values generally 
acceptable to New Zealanders”.362  
 
This was expanded on in the Joint Centenary Declaration between the Cook 
Islands and New Zealand, where the Prime Ministers of both countries agreed that 
both countries would “share a mutually acceptable standard of values in their laws 
and policies, founded on respect for human rights, for the purpose and principles 
of the United Nations Charter, and for the rule of law”.363 This implies that the 
Cook Islands (and also Niue) are required to show respect for fundamental human 
rights in their laws, with the risk of losing New Zealand citizenship if this is not 
followed. This is significant, as the New Zealand citizenship link is particularly 
important to everyday Cook Islanders and Niueans. Teaiwa and Koloamatangi, for 
instance, draw attention to the fact that there are 20,000 Niueans in New Zealand 
(compared to 1300 in Niue) and 25,000 Cook Islanders in New Zealand 
(compared to approximately 11,000  in the Cook Islands).
364
 Consequently, it 
comes as no surprise to find that Henderson argues that “it would be political 
suicide for a Cook Islands politician to suggest any move that might threaten New 
Zealand citizenship rights”.365 The citizenship link is also important should the 
Cook Islands or Niue ever wish to alter their legal relationship with New Zealand 
– Chapter V discusses this issue in more detail.366  
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Legislative Power, with Oversight: Norfolk Island and the French Territories 
The situation in Norfolk Island, French Polynesia and New Caledonia is very 
different to that in the Cook Islands and Niue. Instead of a full transfer of power, 
what we see in Norfolk Island (administered by Australia) and the French 
Territories is the relevant administering State granting some local autonomy to its 
territory. For instance, the Norfolk Island Act 1979 (enacted by the Australian 
Commonwealth Parliament) gives Norfolk Island competence to make laws 
regarding the “peace, order and good government of the Island”,367 which in 
practice includes almost all matters except for external affairs, defence and 
currency. On the other hand, the French Parliament‟s transfer of powers to New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia is more specific: the Statute of Autonomy of 
French Polynesia and the Organic Law on New Caledonia (both of which were 
passed by the French Parliament) gives these Territories competence to legislate 
on specific constitutionally listed matters, such as employment, communications, 
civil and commercial law, and education.
368
 This is similar to a federal situation, 
but in reverse. Rather than the states ceding some power to the national 
legislature,
369
 in Norfolk Island, New Caledonia and French Polynesia we see the 
administering State taking a subsidiarity approach by devolving some of its 
powers to the Territories.  
 
However, this is not as complete a transfer of powers as seen in the Cook Islands 
and Niue. The (Australian) Joint Standing Committee on the National Capital and 
External Territories, for instance, wrote in its report on Norfolk Island that 
sections 52 and 122 of the Australian Constitution
370
 mean that “the 
Commonwealth has ultimate responsibility for the Territory‟s good governance 
and for ensuring representative democracy and proper financial management”.371 
Furthermore, neither the Norfolk Island Act 1979 nor the Statute of Autonomy of 
French Polynesia nor the Organic Law of New Caledonia are part of Australia‟s 
or France‟s written constitutions (although the French Constitution does imply 
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that Territories should make their own decisions as much as possible
372
). Instead, 
these texts are domestic legislation, and can therefore be amended in Canberra or 
Paris with normal domestic legislative processes.
373
 What we essentially have 
then, is a system where there is some transfer of power, but with oversight by the 
administering State, who still retains overall legislative competence responsibility 
for its Territories, including the ability to overrule local legislation by a statute of 
the administering State‟s own legislature. The exception to this is the transfer of 
limited enumerated powers from the French State to New Caledonia, which is 
guaranteed under the Nouméa Accord – a recognised treaty in international law.374  
 
Norfolk Island, French Polynesia and New Caledonia also all have „quasi-veto 
provisions built into their relevant legislation. The French High Commissioner to 
French Polynesia, for instance, is able to send previously passed Bills back to the 
French Polynesia Assembly for reconsideration (although the High Commissioner 
must approve them if the Bill is again passed by the Assembly).
375
 However, the 
High Commissioner of French Polynesia is also able to request that the French 
Council of State considers whether a Bill passed by the French Polynesia 
Assembly conforms with the French Constitution, French organic laws, 
international commitments and the general principles of law (in other words, the 
High Commissioner can ask for judicial review of the Bill).
376
 Nearly identical 
powers are enshrined in the Organic Law of New Caledonia: the French High 
Commissioner to New Caledonia has the power to send previously passed Bills 
back to the Congress for reconsideration,
377
 as well as the power to send a Bill to 
the Constitutional Council of the French Republic for judicial review.
378
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Similarly, in Norfolk Island, laws passed by the Legislative Assembly must be 
approved by the Administrator before they enter into force.
379
 In all the examples 
above, the relevant gatekeeper is not a „local‟: instead, the High Commissioners to 
French Polynesia and New Caledonia are nominated and appointed by the French 
State, and the Administrator of Norfolk Island is nominated and appointed by the 
Australian Commonwealth Government. This therefore highlights the oversight 
that Australia and France have over their Territories‟ potential „independence‟. 
 
It also appears that these are not just de jure constitutional provisions that are 
never actually used. Instead, the Commonwealth Parliament of Australia has twice 
rejected Norfolk Island bills which would have changed the voting method for the 
Norfolk Island Assembly to a method that had “inadequate means of ensuring fair 
representation”.380 Similarly, the French State has at times unilaterally altered the 
Statute of Autonomy of French Polynesia and the Organic Law on New Caledonia 
– mostly recently in July 2011.381 Tepari‟i consequently criticises the Statute of 
Autonomy of French Polynesia as „political manipulation‟, on the basis that 
although, “on the one hand, the Polynesians appear to be free to decide for 
themselves[,] on the other hand, the real power is with the French state”.382 The 
same could be said of the Organic Law on New Caledonia, although at least in 
New Caledonia the Nouméa Accord means that delegated powers cannot be 
rescinded by the French Republic. 
 
A De Facto Transfer of Legislative Competence: Tokelau and American Samoa 
A third approach to legislative competence is seen in the cases of Tokelau 
(administered by New Zealand) and American Samoa. Tokelau‟s and American 
Samoa‟s legislative competence are different to the near-complete de jure transfer 
of competence to the Cook Islands and Niue, and also different to the subsidiary 
transfer of competence (with oversight) seen in Norfolk Island, French Polynesia 
and New Caledonia. Instead, what we see in Tokelau and American Samoa is a 
limited de jure transfer of competence, but a significant de facto reassignment: in 
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other words, although legally, neither Tokelau nor American Samoa have really 
gained much power, in practice both operate with significant competence to 
determine their own affairs.  
 
Tokelau, for instance, is governed by the Tokelau Act 1948 (enacted by the New 
Zealand Parliament), which sets up a different regime than that in place for the 
Cook Islands and Niue. Although the Tokelau Act allows the General Fono of 
Tokelau the power to create rules for the good government of Tokelau,
383
 the Act 
does not prevent the New Zealand Parliament from legislating for Tokelau if it 
sees fit. The Act also allows the Administrator of Tokelau (who in practice is an 
official within the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to disallow any rule 
passed by the Tokelau General Fono.
384
 Thus, as seen in Norfolk Island, New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia, de jure legislative competence in the case of 
Tokelau still ultimately remains with New Zealand. However, this is not 
necessarily how things work on the ground: in practice, the Administrator rarely 
disallows rules passed by the Fono. Angelo, for instance, notes that “it is now ... 
almost unthinkable that the New Zealand Government would use its legal rights to 
override a General Fono decision on a Tokelau domestic matter”.385 In fact, in 
2004 the Administrator “formally delegated his administrative responsibilities to 
the three Village Councils” of Tokelau” (at the villages‟ request), who in turn 
ceded responsibility to the Tokelau General Fono to deal with specific matters 
deemed best handled at a national level (such as fisheries policy, shipping services 
and external relations).
386
 Consequently, the de facto situation is that Tokelau 
governs its own affairs, although the New Zealand Parliament can theoretically 
amend the Tokelau Act 1948 as it sees fit. 
  
A similar situation exists for American Samoa. Although the United States 
Constitution legally provides the US Congress with the power to legislate for US 
Territories, in American Samoa‟s case, Congress has delegated that responsibility 
for American Samoa to the US President,
387
 who has in turn delegated that 
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responsibility to the Secretary of the Interior.
388
 The American Samoan 
Constitution, therefore, exists because it was approved by the Secretary for the 
Interior in 1960 (and a revised version then approved in 1967).
389
 This essentially 
means that although the American Samoan Constitution is supreme law in 
American Samoa, it can be unilaterally amended at any time by either the 
Secretary for the Interior, the US President (who could rescind the delegation to 
the Secretary for the Interior), or the US Congress (who could repeal the 
Ratification Act 1929). However, as the current version of the American Samoan 
Constitution was explicitly approved by American Samoans via referendum in 
1966 (giving it significant legitimacy), such an action would be unlikely.  
 
Nevertheless, any of the above listed US actors can still regulate or legislate for 
American Samoa, as seen in the case of the Minimum Wage Act 2007.
390
 Besides 
the minimum wage example, however, the US Federal Government seems to have 
taken a „hands off‟ approach to American Samoa since the late 1960s.391 Instead, 
the relatively prescriptive American Samoan Constitution sets up a de facto 
transfer of complete legislative competence over domestic matters, given that it 
provides for the American Samoa Fono to legislate for American Samoa.
392
 
However, the American Samoa Constitution does allow – in very limited 
circumstances
393
 – the US-nominated Secretary of the Interior to veto laws passed 
by the American Samoan House of Representatives. 
 
Table Five, overleaf, summarises the legislative processes in the South-West 
Territories of the Pacific. That table indicates that although there are clearly 
different levels of independence regarding legislative competence, there is some 
evidence of the principle of subsidiarity in each of the Territories covered in this 
paper. In particular Table Five shows that there is at least some focus on ensuring 
that the locally elected legislature has control over domestic affairs. In the Cook 
Islands and Niue, this takes the form of de jure competence over all internal 
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Table Five: Legislative Competence 
 
Legislative Institutions  
(Excluding Advisory only)  
Legislative Process 
Cook 
Islands 
Parliament: elected by Cook 
Islanders 
Queen‟s Representative: nominated 
by the Cook Island Government 
Bills must pass by majority in the 
Parliament. They are signed into law by 
the Queen‟s Representative 
Niue Niue Assembly: elected by Niueans 
Bills must pass by majority in the 
Assembly. They are signed into law by 
the Speaker of the Assembly 
Tokelau 
Tokelau General Fono: elected by 
Tokelauans 
Administrator: nominated by NZ 
Bills must pass by majority in the Fono. 
They are subject to disallowance by the 
Administrator 
Norfolk 
Island 
Norfolk Island Assembly: elected 
by Norfolk Islanders 
Administrator: nominated by 
Australia  
Bills must pass by majority in the 
Assembly. They must then be approved 
by the Administrator 
French 
Polynesia 
French Polynesia Assembly: 
elected by French Polynesians 
Council of Ministers: elected by the 
Assembly 
High Commissioner: nominated by 
France 
Bills must pass by majority in the 
Assembly. They must then be approved 
by the High Commissioner and the 
Council of Ministers, although if either 
does not approve, they can be overruled 
by a second majority in the Assembly  
New 
Caledonia 
Congress: elected by French 
Polynesians 
Government in Council: elected by 
the Congress
394
 
High Commissioner: nominated by 
France 
Bills must pass by majority in the 
Assembly. They are then adopted by the 
Government in Council. The 
Government or the High Commissioner 
can ask for a new decision by Congress: 
if Congress passes the Bill by majority 
vote again, it becomes law.  
American 
Samoa 
House: elected by American 
Samoans 
Senate: selected by matai 
Governor: elected by American 
Samoans 
Secretary of the Interior: nominated 
by the US 
Bills must pass by majority in each 
chamber of the legislature (the House 
and the Fono). They must then be 
approved by the Governor. If the 
Governor does not approve, but both 
chambers each pass the Bill again (this 
time with a two-thirds majority), it goes 
to the Secretary of the Interior for his or 
her decision on whether to the Bill 
 
matters, while in Tokelau and American Samoa, this is the case in practice, if not 
necessarily what is strictly written in law. In the French Territories and Norfolk 
Island, the situation is more complex: Norfolk Island has broad powers to make 
laws for „good government‟, but at the same time is subject to significant de jure 
and de facto oversight. In the French Territories, the relevant legislature has fewer 
competencies, but the oversight provisions are less intrusive (as the relevant High 
Commissioner can usually be overruled). However, in addition to general 
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legislative competence, it is also useful to look at the extent to which each 
Territory can alter its constitutional structure.  
 
Legislative Competence for Constitutional Change 
As noted above, the ability for each Territory to amend its constitutional 
structures is also an important consideration to assess independence and status in 
international law. After all, if a territorial entity can modify its constitution, then it 
also has the capacity to modify its own status in international law. Consequently, 
a comparatist‟s initial hypothesis might be that administering States would desire 
Territories to have relatively stable constitutional structures, and that 
constitutional amendment provisions would therefore be reasonably strict – and 
especially so in the case of Territories where autonomy had been gained with 
some reluctance from an administering State. Helpfully, Ferreres-Comella
395
 
argues that constitutional rigidity can be measured based on three factors 
regarding constitutional change procedures: federalism, the need for a 
supermajority in the legislature, and the inclusion of ordinary voters in the 
constitutional amendment process. In the case of the Territories – which are 
already sub-units of a wider State – we can replace „federalism‟ with a more 
appropriate criterion: consent or consultation of the administering State. 
Consequently, this section assesses constitutional change provisions in the 
Territories against these criteria.  
 
The Constitution of the Cook Islands sets out an amendment provision at Article 
41. Proposed constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority at both 
second and third reading in the Cook Islands Parliament, and there must have 
been a 90 day interval between the actual second and third reading votes. Any 
changes to Article 2 (which makes the Queen in right of New Zealand the Head of 
State) or to Article 41 (the amendment provision) of the Constitution of the Cook 
Islands must also then be approved a two-thirds majority in a referendum of Cook 
Islanders entitled to vote as an elector in the Cook Islands Parliamentary 
elections.
396
 Changes do not require the consent of the New Zealand Government; 
however, the referendum provision also applies should the Cook Islands wish to 
change section 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 of the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, which 
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deal with the Cook Islands‟ constitutional status.397 This essentially means that the 
Cook Islands can alter its free-association status with New Zealand, but cannot do 
so without the support of two-thirds of the populace in a referendum.
398
 
Nevertheless, this process indicates that for most part, constitutional change in the 
Cook Islands is a relatively simple process, provided that the proposal for change 
does not alter the Cook Islands‟ Head of State or free-association status. 
Consequently, it comes as little surprise that the Cook Islands Constitution has 
been amended no fewer than 28 times: once by New Zealand and twenty-seven 
times by the Cook Islands.
399
 
 
The provisions to amend the Constitution of Niue are set out in Article 35 of that 
constitution. The amendment provisions are relatively similar to the provisions the 
Cook Islands must go through for amending the Cook Islands Constitution Act 
1964: Niuean proposals to amend its constitution must be passed by a two-thirds 
majority at both second and third reading (with a thirteen week interval between 
the two votes), and then must also be approved by a referendum of eligible 
Niuean electors. In the case of a Bill proposing to amend sections 2 to 9 of the 
Niue Constitution Act, or Articles 1, 35 or 69 of the Constitution of Niue, the 
referendum must be approved by a two-thirds majority.
400
 In the case of a Bill 
proposing to amend anything else, the referendum must be approved by a simple 
majority.
401
 The key difference here to the Cook Islands is that all proposed 
amendments must be approved by the Niuean populace – not just those that relate 
to the free association status as in the Cook Islands, although (as with the Cook 
Islands) the consent of the New Zealand Government is not required in either 
case. As a result of this stricter process, it is perhaps unsurprising that Niue has 
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only amended its constitution once, and that amendment was via an omnibus Bill 
that made several changes at once.
402
  
 
Unlike the Cook Islands, Niue has not repealed the provision of its Constitution 
which allows the New Zealand Parliament to legislate for Niue (on the request 
and with the consent of the Niuean Government).
403
 Angelo argues that this 
means constitutional change could theoretically happen by the Niuean 
Government asking the New Zealand Government to amend the Schedules to the 
Niue Constitution Act 1974, and then allowing those Schedules to enter into force 
in Niue (thereby replacing the current Niuean  Constitution) – rather than 
including voters as per the constitutional change section in the Niuean 
Constitution. The likelihood of New Zealand doing this in practice, however, 
seems low as it would essentially be a way of overriding a mechanism to allow 
Niueans to choose for themselves.
404
 
 
Article V, Section 3 of the Constitution of American Samoa sets out an 
amendment procedure, which requires agreement by the American Samoan 
Legislature, the American Samoan people, and the United States Congress. 
Amendments may be proposed in either chamber of the American Samoan Fono, 
but must be agreed to by three-fifths of all members of each House (voting 
separately). Following this, the proposed amendment must then be agreed to by a 
majority of American Samoans: this is a hurdle that should not be underestimated 
given that the last attempt to amend the American Samoan constitution was 
rejected by 70% of voters.
405
 Once the amendment is approved by the populace, it 
must then also be approved by the United States Congress.
406
 The Constitution of 
American Samoa states that only the approval of the Secretary of the Interior is 
required;
407
 however, in 1983 the US Congress passed a law ruling that future 
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amendments to the American Samoa Constitution could be approved only by an 
Act of Congress.
408
 This congressional requirement is therefore an interesting 
example of the American Samoan Constitution‟s status outside of domestic US 
(federal) law. Nevertheless, overall the amendment procedure is relatively similar 
to that of the Cook Islands and Niue with one major exception: unlike in the Cook 
Islands and Niue, where constitutional change can proceed without New Zealand 
consent, the United States legislature must agree to any changes proposed by 
American Samoa. This is perhaps representative of the fact that American Samoa 
is not officially in a freely associated relationship with the United States, despite 
its large amount of internal autonomy.   
 
In comparison, the relevant legal texts for Tokelau, New Caledonia, French 
Polynesia and Norfolk Island do not allow the Territories to amend their own 
Constitutions. No provisions for amendment exist in the Tokelau Act 1948, the 
Organic Law on New Caledonia, the Statute of Autonomy of French Polynesia or 
the Norfolk Island Act 1979. Instead, should any of these Territories wish to 
modify their constitutional documents, they would have to petition the New 
Zealand (for Tokelau), French (for New Caledonia and French Polynesia), or 
Australian Commonwealth (for Norfolk Island) Governments, with an explicit 
provision allowing such a petition in the Statute of Autonomy of French 
Polynesia.
409
 No such petition provision exists in the case of the Tokelau Act 
1948; however, New Zealand has been open to suggestions from Tokelau in 
recent years, including a major re-write of the Tokelau Act in 1996 when the 
Tokelauan Fono requested greater power to make rules for the Territory.
410
 
Similarly, the Norfolk Island Act 1979 is silent on the question of amendment, 
although in practice most amendments are made by the Australian 
Commonwealth Parliament either subsequent to a request from, or in consultation 
with, the Norfolk Island Government.
411
 
 
                                                          
408
 Amendment of Constitution of American Samoa 48 USC § 1662a 
409
 Article 133 of the Statute of Autonomy of French Polynesia 2004 (France) allows the French 
Polynesian Legislative Assembly to adopt resolutions aimed at “repealing, amending or 
supplementing [French] legislative or regulatory provisions that apply to French Polynesia”, 
which presumably includes the Statute of Autonomy itself. These resolutions are sent to the 
Overseas Minister of the Republic, although there is no requirement for the Minister to act. 
410
 Tokelau Amendment Act 1996, preamble. 
411
 See the discussion in n 373 at 75. 
84 
Overall, the above discussion indicates that there is a myriad of administering-
State-approaches to managing the issue of constitutional change in its Territories. 
For the most part, the hypothesis of reasonably rigid constitutional structures 
seems to be correct: as shown in the Table Six overleaf, four Territories (Tokelau, 
Norfolk Island, French Polynesia and New Caledonia) cannot even amend their 
own constitutions, as this can only be done by the relevant administering State.  
 
Table Six: Constitutional Change Provisions 
 
Constitutional 
Change 
Approach 
If the Territory can amend its Constitution… 
Is a legislative 
supermajority 
required? 
Is a referendum 
required (and by 
what percentage of 
voters)?  
Does the 
administering 
State need to 
consent? 
Cook 
Islands 
The Cook 
Islands and Niue 
have full power 
to amend their 
Constitutions 
Yes: Two-Thirds 
in Parliament 
For a change in 
constitutional status, 
yes (two-thirds).  
Otherwise, no. No 
Niue 
Yes: Two-Thirds 
in the Niue 
Assembly 
Yes: two-thirds for 
constitutional status. 
Otherwise: majority. 
Tokelau 
No provisions are included to amend these Territories‟ constitutional texts, 
indicating that it can only be done by the administering State. In Tokelau and 
Norfolk Island, this is usually done by the administering State in consultation 
with (or on the request of) the Territory. In French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia, France has shown a willingness to amend its Territories‟ 
constitutional documents unilaterally.  
Norfolk 
Island 
French 
Polynesia 
New 
Caledonia 
American 
Samoa 
American Samoa 
can amend its 
Constitution with 
the consent of 
the US 
Yes: Three-
Fifths in each 
House 
Yes: Majority 
Yes: Must be 
approved by an 
Act of the US 
Congress 
 
Similarly, in American Samoa, the approval of the US Congress is required for 
constitutional cahnge, even if a supermajority of members of the Fono and a 
majority of American Samoan voters have accepted the changes. The only 
Territories where administering-State-consent is not required are the Cook Islands 
and Niue. However, even in these Territories we can see Ferreres-
Comella‟scriteria creating rigidity,412  as in both Territories a supermajority is still 
required in the relevant legislature, and in Niue (and in some cases in the Cook 
Islands) a referendum is also required. 
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Economic Links between Territories and Administering States  
Economic links between the States and Territories in this paper are also 
remarkably strong. Overall, it seems that – at least in an economic sense – the 
Territories in the Pacific seem to have done better than those countries that have 
become independent, sovereign States. Werner vom Busch and others, for 
example, argue that Territories in free association with an administering State 
“have higher per capita incomes, higher standards of health and education, more 
human rights and greater personal freedom than the constitutionally independent 
nations”.413 This is not particularly surprising given that some of the Territories 
have explicit provisions included in their constitutional documents regarding 
support from the administering power. Other research reveals that there are still 
significant economic business links between Territories and their administering 
States, primarily due to the large amounts of natural resources in some Pacific 
Territories. The Asian Development Bank, for instance, notes that the Exclusive 
Economic Zones of the Pacific contain much of the world‟s richest tuna fishery,414 
while New Caledonia is often credited as having one of the largest deposits of 
Nickel in the world.
415
 Consequently, this section overviews the extent to which 
these legal and in-practice economic links exist.  
 
Economic Support as „Foreign Aid‟ – the New Zealand Approach 
New Zealand has made significant commitments to economically support the 
Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. For instance, New Zealand Prime Minister 
Norman Kirk‟s letter to the Cook Islands indicated that in his view, it was New 
Zealand‟s responsibility to be „involved‟ in Cook Island affairs by providing 
material assistance to the Cook Islands as long as there was a citizenship link 
between the two countries.
416 
However, an even stronger commitment to 
economic assistance is seen in the Niue Constitution Act 1974, which explicitly 
states that “it shall be a continuing responsibility of the Government of New 
Zealand to provide necessary economic and administrative assistance to Niue”.417 
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Similarly, the preamble to the Tokelau Amendment Act 1996 notes that even 
though the purpose of the Act was to move Tokelau closer to self-government, 
“the needs of Tokelau at a national level are the responsibility of the Government 
of New Zealand”.418 A major aid initiative of the New Zealand Government is 
also to charter a ship (PB Matua) between Apia (Samoa) and Tokelau, ensuring 
that Tokelau has some transport links with the rest of the world.
419
 
 
In practical terms, this means that a significant amount of New Zealand‟s 
development aid goes toward supporting the Realm countries: in the year ended 
30 June 2012, for instance, over 10% of New Zealand‟s total aid went to the Cook 
Islands, Niue and Tokelau, with New Zealand providing NZD 19.37 million to the 
Cook Islands,  NZD 16.185 million to Niue, and NZD 23.324 million to Tokelau 
in overseas development assistance. On this note, it is interesting that all three 
Territories fall under the jurisdiction of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and, similarly, that all three Territories receive economic assistance 
classed as overseas development assistance.
420
 However, the Cook Islands, Niue 
and Tokelau also all use the New Zealand dollar as their currency.
421
 
 
Economic Support as „Domestic Aid‟ in France, the US and Australia 
The decision by New Zealand to have its Territories receive overseas development 
assistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is even more interesting 
when one realises that this is different to the approach of other administering 
States in this paper. France, for example, provides assistance via its Ministry of 
Overseas Territories. Article 210 of the Organic Law relating to New Caledonia 
states that “multiannual development contracts are concluded between the State, 
on the one hand, and New Caledonia and the provinces, on the other hand ... for a 
duration of five years”.422 The State‟s focus here is constitutionally on training, 
young people, economic development, improving living conditions, and cultural 
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development.
423
 Similarly, Article 169 of the Statute of Autonomy of French 
Polynesia notes that “at the request of French Polynesia, and by way of 
agreements, the State may offer, within the limits of the financial laws, its 
financial and technical assistance for economic and social investments, notably 
for training and promotional programs”.424  
 
What is particularly interesting about the wording in the French Territories is that 
the provisions are not structured as obligations of support - as seen particularly in 
the case of Niue‟s section 7 “continuing responsibility‟” provision. Nevertheless, 
in practice the Republic of France provides significant support to its Pacific 
Territories: the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade estimates that 
France annually provides approximately NZD 2 billion in aid to New Caledonia 
and to French Polynesia each year.
425
 As Territories of the European Union, both 
French Territories also receive aid via the EU‟s five-yearly Overseas Countries 
and Territories aid programme: under that programme, New Caledonia will 
receive 19.81 million euro and French Polynesia will receive 19.79 million euro 
over the period 2007-2013.
426
  
 
However, in practice the economic links between France and its territories are 
largely conducted by European immigrants from mainland France, rather than by 
the indigenous people of New Caledonia and French Polynesia. Fraser, for 
instance, notes that in New Caledonia “[t]he mining sector is dominated by 
European settlers, who also own most of the arable land and control the mining 
industry”,427 while Henry points out that in French Polynesia, “most of the 
business community wish to retain integration with France”.428 It is therefore 
unsurprising that the Organic Law relating to New Caledonia contains specific 
provisions regarding mining: Article 39 requires the New Caledonian Congress to 
create a plan for the exploitation of mineral wealth, while Article 42 establishes a 
Mines Council, which is consulted by Congress on government and private 
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members‟ proposals regarding the exploitation of mineral resources.429 Both 
French Polynesia and New Caledonia (along with Wallis and Futuna) use the CFP 
Franc as their currency.
430
 The CFP Franc is pegged to the euro (ie: the currency 
used in the Republic of France).
431
 
 
The American Samoan Constitution contains only one clause regarding US-
American Samoa economic links: Article II, s 1(c) of that constitution establishes 
a requirement for the Governor of American Samoa to prepare a preliminary 
budget plan for approval of the Fono and to point out any requests for federal 
funds to the Congress of the United States. However, no provisions are included 
that require the US Congress to provide these funds. Despite this, in 2011, the 
United States Department of the Interior (which formally administers American 
Samoa
432
) provided American Samoa with USD 35.899 million of development 
assistance.
433
 Again, it is important to note that this assistance does not constitute 
„foreign aid‟ from the US Department of State, but is instead seen as an internal 
matter (especially given the American Samoan Constitution‟s own framing as a 
request for „federal‟ funds). In addition, Faleomavaega notes that American 
Samoa has a unique economic opportunity in that it “is a gateway to the largest 
consumer market in the world”.434 This is particularly important given the large 
tuna industry in American Samoa: canned tuna sold to the US is American 
Samoa‟s primary export, and the tuna cannery is one of the largest employers in 
American Samoa.  
 
Interestingly, although in general American Samoa is considered to be self-
governing, some US federal laws do apply, such as the Minimum Wage Act, 
which was extended to American Samoa in late 2007.
435
 Interestingly, American 
Samoa‟s delegate to Congress strongly opposed that law extending to American 
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Samoa on the basis that it would increase business costs and could lead to the tuna 
industry shifting jobs to the continental US (with a potential loss of 8,118 jobs – 
45.6 percent of total employment).
436
 Sure enough, in 2009, one of the (then) two 
tuna canneries closed in American Samoa, citing that its costs were too high as a 
result of the Minimum Wage Act extension. That said, American Samoan 
Governor Togiola Tulafono argued that the canneries could have reduced salaries 
and bonuses of top-tier employees instead of making minimum wage workers 
redundant.
437
 Nevertheless, the example shows there are clear economic links 
between American Samoa and the continental US, even though these are not 
mentioned in the American Samoan Constitution. American Samoa also uses the 
US Dollar as its currency. 
 
The Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth) does not set out a requirement for Australia to 
provide development assistance, although that Act does set out provisions 
allowing Norfolk Island to borrow funds from the Commonwealth if needed. 
Interestingly, s 50C of that Act prevents Norfolk Island from entering into any 
other borrowing arrangements beyond this,
438
 unless they are approved by the 
Commonwealth Finance Minister.
439
 Furthermore, Norfolk Island is required to 
keep both its responsible Commonwealth Minister and the Commonwealth 
Finance Minister informed about its budget.
440
 Residents of Norfolk Island do not 
pay federal taxes; however the Australian Commonwealth Government does 
control the Exclusive Economic Zone around Norfolk Island.
441
  Beyond this, 
there has traditionally been very limited Commonwealth involvement in Norfolk 
Island‟s economy, to the point that the Commonwealth Grants Commission in 
1997 described Norfolk Island as receiving less support from Canberra than any 
other Australian Territory or state.
442
  
 
However the global financial crisis led to large deficits for the Norfolk Island 
budget. The Commonwealth Government stepped in to manage this issue, and 
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provided AUD 6.4 million to assist Norfolk Island in 2010-2011 and AUD 14.1 
million to support Norfolk Island in 2011-2012.
443
 In return, Norfolk Island 
agreed to make changes to its economic arrangements (including introducing 
taxes) to help ensure its financial sustainability into the future.
444
 The 
Commonwealth Government also amended (with the Norfolk Island 
Government‟s support) the Norfolk Island Act 1979 to “improve Norfolk Island's 
governance arrangements and strengthen the accountability of the Norfolk Island 
Government”.445 This is an interesting development, as Norfolk Island has 
essentially been required to trade some of its subsidiary economic sovereignty 
back to Australia in return for financial aid from the Commonwealth Government.  
 
Financial Responsibility in the Global Economy 
There are therefore some significant links between each of the Territories in this 
paper and their administering states. What is less clear is the extent to which each 
administering State is responsible for its various Territories. Clearly, the 
Commonwealth Government of Australia felt that it was responsible for Norfolk 
Island‟s debts, and so acted to solve this problem. Jacqueline Tepaeru Evans notes 
that a similar situation happened in the Cook Islands in the early 1990s, when the 
Cook Islands Government debt rose to NZD 160 million.
446
 This, plus a sharp 
decline in the number of tourist arrivals, led the Cook Islands Government to 
declare a financial crisis for the 1995/1996 financial year.
447
 The New Zealand 
Government played a major role in helping resolve this financial crisis, helping to 
negotiate a debt-write-off for the Cook Islands Government, and also helping to 
organise finance so that the Cook Islands could follow New Zealand and Asian 
Development Bank recommendations to reduce its public service.
448
 It seems that, 
like in the case of Australia and Norfolk Island, New Zealand felt at least partially 
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responsible for the Cook Islands‟ financial issues,449 and so acted to solve this 
problem. In both cases, however, we see the administering State „advising‟ 
significant economic reforms to the Territory‟s economy, implying that perhaps 
these Territories‟ de facto independence over economic sovereignty is conditional 
on things going well. On the other hand, there is not so much difference between 
the events outlined above, and what is often seen in international lending 
contracts, such as the International Monetary Fund‟s imposition of 
„conditionality‟ when it provides loans to members.450 
 
Nevertheless, the issue of economic accountability is an important point to 
consider given the increase in development assistance loans to Territories: China, 
for instance, has recently offered to provide the Cook Islands with a RMB 165 
million (approximately NZD 32 million) loan to help develop the Cook Islands‟ 
water infrastructure. The question is: would New Zealand be responsible for 
paying this loan back if the Cook Islands defaulted – even though New Zealand 
approval was not required for the Cook Islands to receive the funds? The answer 
to this is unclear, but would probably depend on the extent to which a Territory 
could be considered to be economically independent,
451
 in charge of its external 
affairs,
452
 and whether or not there are specific constitutional provisions linking a 
Territory and its administering State economically.
453
 From the analysis above, 
very few of the Territories in this paper can be said to have complete economic 
independence and responsibility, especially given the oversight provisions that 
some administering States have incorporated into their Territories‟ constitutions. 
454
 In the end, however, this question is heavily linked to the question of whether a 
Territory can be considered to have developed its own international legal 
personality, which is discussed further in Chapter V. 
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Judicial Links between Territories and Administering States 
In the originally enacted version of the Cook Island and Niuean constitutions, 
both the Cook Islands and Niue used the New Zealand Court system as their 
judiciary. However, both the Cook Islands and Niue have now amended their 
constitutions to create their own judicial systems. The Cook Islands Constitution, 
for instance, sets up the High Court of the Cook Islands,
455
 which can be appealed 
to the Court of Appeal of the Cook Islands.
456
 There is no appeal to a New 
Zealand Court; rather, appeals lie to the Privy Council in London, which is no 
longer a Court for New Zealand.
457
 Judges in the Cook Islands are appointed by 
the Queen‟s Representative, acting on the advice of the Cook Islands Executive 
Council tendered by the Prime Minister.
458
 Interestingly, Article 49(2) restricts 
who can become a Judge of the Cook Islands High Court, noting that “a person 
shall not be qualified for appointment” unless they have been either a barrister for 
at least seven years or a judge in either New Zealand, or another Commonwealth 
country.
459
 The Cook Islands Court of Appeal comprises the Judges of the Cook 
Islands High Court, plus at least one Judge of either the Court of Appeal of New 
Zealand (or a person who has held office as a Judge of that Court) or the High 
Court of New Zealand.
460
 
 
The judicial situation in Niue is very similar to the Cook Islands. The Niuean 
Constitution sets up the High Court of Niue,
461
 decisions of which can be 
appealed to the Court of Appeal of Niue.
462
 Judges of the High Court are 
appointed by the New Zealand Governor-General, but on the advice of the Niuean 
Cabinet tendered by the Niuean Premier.
463
 Judges of the High Court are also 
Judges of the Court of Appeal by virtue of their office,
464
 although a Judge of the 
Court of Appeal cannot sit on a hearing which is an appeal of a decision made by 
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him or by a Court which he sat on as a member.
465
 Unlike in the Cook Islands, the 
Niuean Constitution does not set out the requirements to become a Niuean Judge; 
however Angelo notes that in practice, “the Chief Justice and other Judges of the 
[Niue] High Court have typically been New Zealand judges closely connected 
with the Maori Land Court”,466 primarily because most Niuean cases are to do 
with Niuean land and customary law. Nevertheless, what this sets up is a system 
where Niue has an independent judiciary that is separate from New Zealand, but 
also is able to tap into members of the New Zealand judiciary should it so please.  
 
In contrast to the Cook Islands and Niue, Tokelau has retained a clear link to the 
New Zealand judicial system. On one hand, the court of first instance in Tokelau 
is the Commissioner‟s Court and Village Appeal Committee in each village,467  
which deal with minor criminal and civil matters.
468
 Each Village Appeal 
Committee is made up of three people nominated and appointed by that village‟s 
council. Serious criminal and civil matters are dealt with at first instance in the 
High Court of New Zealand.
469
 On the other hand, the High Court of New 
Zealand is also the appellate court from the Village Appeal Committees; however, 
in practice no appeal has been made from Tokelau.
470
 
 
The American Samoan situation is somewhat similar to that of Niue and the Cook 
Islands. In American Samoa, the District Courts are the courts of first instance.
471
 
They can be appealed to the American Samoan High Court
472
 and no appeals are 
possible to the Federal Court system in the continental US – similar to the 
inability to appeal from the Cook Islands or Niue to the New Zealand court 
system. However, Laughlin notes that there are indirect appeal options: “a review 
of sorts can be had in the Article III courts by suing the United States Secretary of 
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the Interior in his official domicile, the District of Columbia)”.473 In particular, 
American Samoans who are unhappy with a decision of the High Court of 
American Samoa can use a miscarriage of justice rationale to sue the US Secretary 
of the Interior.
474
 Furthermore, in American Samoa, the judicial appointment 
process is not localised like it is in Niue; instead, the Chief Justice and Associate 
Justices of the American Samoan court system are all nominated and appointed by 
the US Secretary of the Interior, rather than by the American Samoans 
themselves.
475
 That said, in practice, the Associate Justices tend to be matai in line 
with the American Samoan Constitution‟s strong focus on protecting local culture 
and the matai system.
476
 
 
In contrast to the above Territories, The Norfolk Island judicial system is heavily 
linked to that of its administering State (Australia). For example, the court of first 
instance in Norfolk Island is the Court of Petty Sessions, which has jurisdiction 
over minor criminal matters and of disputes that are less than AUD 10,000 AU.
477
 
Magistrates for that Court are nominated and appointed by the Norfolk Island 
Minister in charge of the judiciary,
478
 and tend to either be Magistrates from the 
Australian Capital Territory or Norfolk Island residents. The Court of Petty 
Sessions can be appealed to the Norfolk Island Supreme Court, which is also the 
court of first instance for serious criminal and civil matters.
479
  However, the 
Supreme Court does not appear to have a bench that solely deals with Norfolk 
Island – instead, the Governor-General of Australia can appoint persons to 
become Judges of the Supreme Court if they are “a Judge of another court created 
by the [Australian Commonwealth] Parliament”.480 In this regard, the Governor-
General acts on the advice of the responsible Commonwealth Minister; however, 
the Commonwealth Minister must receive comments from the Norfolk Island 
Executive Council before tendering his or her advice to the Governor-General.
481
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Appeals lie from the Supreme Court of Norfolk Island to the Federal Court of 
Australia.
482
 
 
In New Caledonia and French Polynesia, the judiciary remains a competence of 
the French State. Consequently, the judicial system in both French Territories is 
set up by a separate organic law passed in Paris, rather than by the French 
Polynesian Legislative Assembly or the New Caledonian Congress. As a result, 
the judicial systems of both the French Territories look similar to the French 
system with two types of courts. As in France, „Administrative Courts‟ deal with 
public law matters. In both French Polynesia and New Caledonia, these matters 
are directly referred to the Administrative Court of France (in Paris), which can 
then be appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, and then to the Conseil 
d'Etat (Council of State).
483
 Given that the Administrative Courts are on the other 
side of the world to the French Pacific Territories, and therefore costly to access, 
this has important ramifications for access to justice. 
 
On the other hand, and as also seen in France, „Judicial Courts‟ deal with disputes 
between private individuals, as well as “disputes involving the Government, the 
French State or a New Caledonia/French Polynesian institution when it is acting 
in a commercial capacity”.484 Judicial courts therefore have jurisdiction over (as 
examples) civil law, commercial law, labour law, criminal law, and commercial 
law. In New Caledonia, there are various judicial courts of first instance that deal 
with these matters: for instance, a labour issue would go to the New Caledonian 
Labour Court. This could then be appealed to the Nouméa Court of Appeal.
485
 A 
smaller structure exists in French Polynesia: there are the Courts of First Instance, 
which can be appealed to the French Polynesian Court of Appeal (located in 
Papeete – the administrative centre of French Polynesia).486 However, in both 
French Polynesia and New Caledonia, judicial matters can then be appealed to the 
Civil Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) in Paris, which has jurisdiction over all 
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French territories. All judges in New Caledonia and French Polynesia are 
nominated and appointed by France.
487
 
 
What does this tell us about Independence? 
One can therefore argue that the „Territories‟488 covered in this paper still have 
significant constitutional, legal, economic and judicial links with their 
administering States. In particular, none of the Territories covered in this paper 
have their own Head of State, citizenship, or currency – although several do 
impose their own immigration regimes, as well as residency criteria for voting in 
local elections. Similarly, only the Cook Islands and Niue have complete 
legislative competence over all matters, primarily because all of the other 
Territories can be subjected to significant interference by their administering 
State. That said, in terms of the amount of power each Territory has to determine 
its own affairs, a good case could be made for arguing that not only the Cook 
Islands and Niue, but also American Samoa, Norfolk Island and (to an extent) 
New Caledonia, are reasonably self-governing – and therefore have at least some 
degree of legislative independence. On the other hand, several Territories have 
explicit provisions in their constitutional documents which imply economic 
assistance will be provided by the State.  
 
In any case, all of the Territories covered in this paper currently receive some 
form of financial assistance from the administering State, and there are also many 
business and economic ties between the two. Judicially, all of the Territories 
covered in this paper have their own court system, although these courts are often 
presided over by judges appointed by the administering State (and particularly so 
in the French Territories). Furthermore, in Norfolk Island, New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia (and to an extent in American Samoa), a clear judicial link 
remains – decisions can be appealed to an Appellate Court in the administering 
State.   
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Several conclusions can be drawn from this about the concept of „independence‟. 
First, this discussion indicates that most of the Territories have strong 
constitutional connections to their administering State, especially in terms of their 
global identity. Although this is discussed further in Chapter V in terms of each 
Territory‟s control over its external affairs,489 it is worth noting again that none of 
the Territories in this paper have their own unique citizenship, their own currency, 
or their own de jure Head of State. Many Territories also have strong judicial 
connections to the administering State.  
 
However, these sorts of arrangements are not seen just in the context of State-
Territory relationships; instead, „independent‟ States often share these important 
identity issues too. For instance, in terms of economic links and monetary policy, 
many States are part of currency unions or have their currency pegged to another, 
with the Euro-zone perhaps being the most well-known of these arrangements. 
Similarly, Smith draws attention to the fact that many States shared British 
citizenship for most of the twentieth century
490
 – Canada, for instance, did not 
develop its own citizenship until 1946, and Australia did not develop its own 
citizenship until 1948. However both Canada and Australia were considered 
„States‟ prior to this point.491 Finally, many States share judicial ties: prior to the 
Supreme Court Act 2003, for instance, New Zealand‟s highest Appellate Court 
was the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. Despite 
these points, what is particularly striking about the constitutional Territory-State 
links covered in this chapter is the sheer number of them, and the fact they still 
remain at a time where many States are focused on forging their own independent 
identity with their own Head of State, their own citizenship, and their own judicial 
system. 
 
Second – and building on the first point above - this discussion helps to highlight 
the distinction in international law between States, which are able to act 
independently to manage their domestic and external affairs, and Territories, 
which are not.
492
 In particular, although the Territories in this paper do have the 
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competence to legislate on most issues that would be considered domestic affairs, 
most lack full competence in areas such as immigration control, administrative 
law, race relations, police and security, and defence. Furthermore, in Norfolk 
Island, Tokelau, American Samoa, and French Polynesia (and to an extent, New 
Caledonia), the relevant administering State retains the ability to legislate on 
behalf of the Territory, and the laws of the administering State‟s legislature over-
rule any local legislation or customs.  
 
Third, the number of links between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, and 
between Niue and New Zealand, helps explain why these two Territories are 
considered to be „in free association‟ New Zealand. As the name suggests, it is in 
part because of the number of „associations‟ between the Cook Islands or Niue (as 
the Territory) and New Zealand (as the administering State), although there are 
fewer links in the Cook Islands-New Zealand relationship compared to that of 
Niue-New Zealand. Nevertheless, this helps to explain what the term „in free 
association‟ means in practice, especially as the term „free association‟ is not 
defined particularly well in any of the General Assembly Resolutions dealing with 
self-determination.
493
 In any future research, it would be useful to compare the 
New Zealand-Cook Islands and New Zealand-Niue free association relationships 
with the other countries formally in a free association relationship: the United 
States with (separately) the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
and Palau – all of which are considered as independent sovereign States in 
international law. This would be particularly interesting as while the New 
Zealand-Cook Islands and New Zealand-Niue free association relationships have 
been created constitutionally,
494
 the United States‟ free association relationships 
have been created via international treaties. 
 
Given these points, it would therefore be quite a stretch to argue that most of the 
Territories in this paper could be considered to be „independent‟. While economic 
links (which are common in the twenty-first century), and Head of State, judicial 
and citizenship links (which have been common in the past) are relatively 
understandable, the fact that most of the Territories do not possess full legislative 
competence over their own domestic affairs – or can be overridden on these 
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matters by the administering State – is a very difficult point to overcome. The fact 
that many of the Territories do not possess the ability to alter their own 
constitutional documents (while the administering State can do this unilaterally) is 
another major issue challenging these Territories‟ status as independent entities in 
international law.   
 
However, the above arguments do not hold as well in the Cook Islands and Niue, 
where (in both cases) the local legislature has complete competence over domestic 
affairs, and the New Zealand House of Representatives has explicitly renounced 
its ability to unilaterally legislate on Cook Islands or Niuean affairs, including any 
ability to amend the Cook Island or Niuean constitutions.
495
 Furthermore, the 
Cook Islands has no provisions in its constitution regarding economic links with 
New Zealand, and has also created an independent Cook Islands‟ representative 
for the Queen in right of New Zealand. Overall, this suggests that the Cook 
Islands (and perhaps Niue) could be considered „independent‟ in some form.  
 
Conclusion  
Overall, significant links between the Territories and their Administering States 
remain. These extend into multiple areas, including shared citizenship, currencies 
and Heads of State; constitutional provisions limiting the Territories‟ ability to 
legislate on their domestic affairs without interference; economic links beyond 
development assistance; and judicial links in terms of both where appeals lie from 
each Territory‟s courts and in terms of which judges sit on each Territory‟s 
highest local Court. Overall, these links undermine the ability for most of the 
Territories to be considered fully „independent‟. On the other hand, the lack of 
many of the characteristics listed above gives weight to arguments suggesting the 
Cook Islands (and perhaps Niue) meet the „independence test‟. 
 
Nevertheless, this chapter has – for the most part – confined itself to a discussion 
of internal affairs and constitutional links, with a key goal of focusing on whether 
or not each Territory could be said to meet the „independence citerion‟ of 
Statehood. Although this is useful for a discussion of whether or not the 
Territories are self-governing, or in complete control of their domestic affairs, 
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questions still remain: can some of the Territories with significantly more powers 
(in particular, the Cook Islands, who appears to be a de facto independent 
territorial entity) be classified as sovereign, and therefore a „State‟ in international 
law, with a full international legal personality? Chapter V attempts to answer this 
all-important question.  
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CHAPTER V: MOVING FROM SELF-DETERMINING TERRITORIES TO 
SOVEREIGN STATES 
 
Chapter IV has examined whether or not the various „Territories‟496 covered in 
this paper can be classed as independent. However, this is not the only criterion a 
territorial entity must meet to be considered a State. Instead, territorial entities 
must also show that they are sovereign, which is when a Government is seen as 
“having supreme authority and being rightfully entitled to exercise that 
authority”.497 In particular, sovereignty means that a State has an unencumbered 
international legal personality, and can therefore enter into bilateral and 
multilateral international agreements. 
 
Consequently, this chapter sets out to examine the extent to which each Territory 
can be considered sovereign, by focussing on three key aspects. First, the chapter 
considers the current status of each Territory, including an examination of 
whether that Territory can be said to have exercised self-determination. Second, 
the chapter compares the extent to which each Territory has control over its 
external affairs – a key requirement in order to be considered sovereign.498 Third, 
the chapter compares how each Territory interacts with and is recognised by other 
members of the international community. These three sections allow for a 
discussion of the „so what?‟ question – whether or not any of the „Territories‟ can 
be considered „States‟. In particular, the chapter concludes by examining the 
definition of „Statehood‟ laid out in Chapter I, and whether or not this definition is 
appropriate given the characteristics of twenty-first century Pacific Island 
Territories. 
 
A Review of Self-Determination in the Pacific Territories 
Before moving on to questions of „Statehood‟ and „international legal 
personality‟, however, it is useful to re-examine the concept of self-determination, 
and the implications of this concept for the Pacific. Chapter I established that a 
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people do not necessarily have to achieve Statehood to have exercised their right 
to self-determination.
499 
General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV)
500
 instead 
outlines three avenues of self-determination: forming a new State, free-association 
with an existing State, or integration with an independent State. To that end, 
Chapter II provided information on each Pacific Territory‟s status in international 
law (as classified by each Territory‟s administering State). This section focuses on 
the implications of that status for each Territory‟s recognition as a sovereign 
State, set out in the table below. 
 
Table Seven: The Status of each Territory (as per its administering State)  
 Status How was this status achieved? 
On the UN List of 
Non-Self-Governing 
Territories? 
Cook 
Islands 
Self-
Governing in 
Free 
Association 
with NZ
501
 
The Cook Islands and Niue 
Governments chose to enter into free 
association, following consultation 
with New Zealand. This was then 
endorsed by a subsequent election of 
that relevant Government. 
 
Niue  
Tokelau Territory 
Classified by New Zealand as per the 
Tokelau Act 1948. Two referendums in 
the early 2000s failed to reach the 
requisite majority to change the status 
quo. 
Yes 
Norfolk 
Island 
External 
Territory 
Classified in this way by the Australian 
Government as per the Norfolk Island 
Act 1979. No referendum, but 
significant consultation with Norfolk 
Island. 
 
French 
Polynesia 
Territorial 
Collectivity 
Classified by the French State.  
No referendum. 
 
New 
Caledonia 
Special Status 
Community 
Based on the Nouméa Accord, which 
was approved at a referendum by New 
Caledonians. 
Yes 
American 
Samoa 
Territory 
Chiefs of American Samoa ceded their 
Territory to the US in the early 1900s. 
Current constitution approved via 
referendum in 1966. 
Yes 
 
The Self-Determination Movement in the Pacific 
The path to greater autonomy in the Pacific took a very different course than in 
other parts of the world. The Asian Development Bank notes that “the steady 
drumbeat of [Pacific] political independence ... was generally accepted as a 
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natural and proper course of events, whose benefits were widely anticipated, but 
whose costs were given less consideration”.502 Similarly, Sir Geoffrey Henry, 
previous Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, writes that in the Pacific “there was 
little violent upheaval, no overreactions as in Africa, for example, where much 
was lost in the show of „throwing the rascals out‟”.503 This perhaps explains why 
the Pacific region contains such a large number of Territories relative to other 
areas in the world. Nevertheless, the 1950s-1980s period saw the Pacific nations 
become more autonomous, even if not all previous colonies became completely 
independent. Ghai argues that the rationale for this slow process was because the 
primary goal was not actually independence in itself.
504
 Instead, Ghai‟s argument 
is that “the major issues for decolonisation [in the Pacific] became the size and the 
shape of the financial package and the provisions of the constitution – in that 
order, at least for the colonised”.505  
 
What is particularly striking about Table Seven is that while some of the 
Territories chose the status that they have now, others have not. In particular, New 
Caledonians accepted the Nouméa Accord (which set out New Caledonia‟s status 
as a Special Status Community) by referendum, and will have another referendum 
in the near future to determine their status. Similarly, the people of the Cook 
Islands and Niue chose their current status by re-electing Governments that 
proposed freely associated relationships with New Zealand (after those 
Governments were in turn offered a choice of the status quo (Territory status), 
free association, or full Statehood by New Zealand). Both the Cook Islands and 
Niue are also able to change their status via referendum. This was aso attempted 
in Tokelau, where Tokelauans voted on whether or not to also be in free 
association with New Zealand. However, as the requisite two-thirds majority was 
not reached, Tokelau remains a Territory of New Zealand.
506
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In American Samoa, the situation is not so clear. American Samoan leaders in the 
early 1900s ceded their territory to the US, and while this was not put to a 
referendum at the time, American Samoans have voted to accept the current 
constitution, implicitly endorsing their current status. This can be contrasted to 
Norfolk Island and French Polynesia, which are classed as Territories by the will 
of the administering State.  
 
The UN List of Non-Self Governing Territories  
What then, determines whether the people of a Territory have exercised their right 
to self-determination? The United Nations maintains the List of Non-Self-
Governing Territories („the list‟) of all the Territories that it considers are not self-
governing, or in other words, a list of territories that it feels have not effectively 
exercised their right to self-determination.
507
  
 
Entry onto the list is theoretically based on the obligation for States to provide 
information about their Territories to the United Nations.
508
 However, what really 
strikes a comparative scholar is which Territories are on the list and which are not. 
General Assembly Resolution 1541 establishes that there is an obligation to 
“transmit information in respect of a territory which is geographically separate 
and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it”,509 
until that territory exercises self-determination by emerging as a new State, freely 
associating with an independent State, or integrating with an existing State.
510
 In 
other words, States are required to transmit information about Territories that are 
not self-governing. In particular, States are required to transmit information about 
Territories where the latter is in a position of subordination to the former.
511
  
 
Given this, what differentiates the situation in American Samoa (which is on the 
UN List of Non-Self Governing Territories) from the situation in French 
Polynesia (which is not)? French Polynesia‟s Statute of Autonomy, for instance, is 
simply an Organic Law of the Parliament of France, and can be altered by the 
French Republic at any time, even if it does not consult with French Polynesia. 
That situation is not too different to the American Samoan Constitution being at 
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the whim of the Ratification Act 1929.
512
 Legally, French Polynesia and 
American Samoa are therefore both „subordinate‟ to their administering States 
(the French Republic and the USA), especially given that in both cases local 
legislation can be overruled or not come into force via the actions of the 
administering State. Furthermore, French Polynesians have not voted on their 
current status (although, like other French Territories, French Polynesia did take 
part in a referendum in the 1950s as to whether they should secede from France), 
while there are at least treaties signed by American Samoan leaders ceding the 
territory to the United States in 1900 and 1904. Similarly, it is noteworthy that 
Tokelau remains on the list even though there is clearly not enough support in 
Tokelau to change that Territory‟s current status.  
 
What helps to explain the listing of the above Territories (compared to those who 
are listed) is that originally, it was deemed the responsibility of States to 
determine whether or not their Territories were on the list.
513
 This helps explain 
the case of French Polynesia, as it was France who decided that French Polynesia 
(along with New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna) no longer „qualified‟ to be on 
the List of Non-Self Governing Territories, citing a „change in status‟ as the 
rationale for removal in 1947.
514
 However, as more and more former colonies 
became States and joined the UN in their own right, the balance of power shifted, 
and the General Assembly became more involved in the administration of the list. 
Consequently, it seems New Caledonia on the list is because the General 
Assembly ruled that New Caledonia was still a non-self-governing Territory and 
therefore placed it back on the list, against the wishes of the French State.
515
 
Furthermore, despite the fact that in practice Tokelau and American Samoa 
conduct their own domestic affairs,
516
 both appear on the UN List of Non-Self 
Governing Territories – a situation that pleases neither Tokelauans nor American 
Samoans.  
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What then, does this tell us about self-determination and sovereignty? Perhaps the 
key issue is that self-determination in the United Nations‟ context is heavily 
underpinned by a decolonisation discourse. In other words, it seems that a people 
have only exercised their right to self-determination if they have explicitly chosen 
to become independent, to become self-governing via free association, or to 
become integrated with the administering State. Importantly, the lack of other 
choices in GA Resolution 1541 (XV),
517
 combined with the examples of Tokelau 
and American Samoa remaining on the UN List of Non-Self Governing 
Territories, indicates that even if a people explicitly choose to have dependent 
Territory status, they have not exercised the right to self-determination as far as 
the United Nations is concerned, and are therefore perceived as lacking 
sovereignty in the international system.  
 
In effect, there is a „right way‟ to exercise self-determination, which is heavily 
geared towards secession – as is evidenced by the limited discussion in UN 
documents regarding free association or integration as self-determination options. 
Retaining Territory status, it seems, is not acceptable. In some ways this is almost 
a reverse form of neo-colonialism, and is an example of what Gay Morgan terms 
the „liberal paradox‟:518 in this case, United Nations‟ members are trying to 
impose the „correct‟ way to exercise self-determination on other Territories. This 
is an issue, given that many Territories are reluctant to alter their status so that 
they do not lose economic support: Quentin-Baxter, for instance, asserts that 
taking on full responsibility for complete self-government is too expensive for 
some very small states.
519
  Pursuing full sovereignty, therefore, may too expensive 
fpr some Territories, who are more than happy to have a different status than 
Statehood. 
 
Control of External Affairs 
As a result, although the above findings about self-determination are useful for 
this paper, they do not in themselves answer some of the other questions still 
remaining; in particular, do the Territories covered in this paper have their own 
effective international legal personality, and are they (therefore) sovereign 
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independent States? Self-determination therefore seems focussed on ensuring self-
government
520
 rather than on achieving sovereignty per se. As established in 
Chapter I, sovereignty is more than just independent control over domestic affairs; 
instead, self-determination and self-government are necessary but not sufficient 
for a would-be State to be considered sovereign in the international system. 
Instead, sovereignty is about being recognised as having an international legal 
personality, with full control and full rights of governance over territory.  
 
Consequently, a major consideration as to whether a territorial entity is sovereign 
is whether or not it has full, independent control of its external affairs – after all, a 
territorial entity can hardly develop an international legal personality unless it is 
responsible for pursuing its own foreign policy. Consequently, this section 
therefore discusses the extent to which the Territories covered in this paper have 
competence over their external affairs. 
 
„Responsibility‟ for External Affairs: The Cook Islands and Niue 
The Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, for instance, contains provisions 
regarding control over external affairs and defence. Section 5 of that Act states:  
 
Nothing in this Act or in the Constitution shall affect the responsibilities of Her 
Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand for the external affairs and defence of 
the Cook Islands ... 
 
A nearly identical provision is seen in s 6 of the Niue Constitution Act 1974, 
where external affairs are again a „responsibility‟ of the Queen in right of New 
Zealand. The use of the term „responsibility‟ in these sections is interesting, as it 
neither clearly assigns the competence of external affairs to the Cook Islands or 
Niue nor restricts either New Zealand Realm country from pursuing its own 
foreign policy. The sections seem to reflect the historical context in which they 
were enacted: Smith argues that in the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of „free 
association‟ was relatively new, and most States simply saw it as a legal status 
that confirmed a Territory was in control of its domestic affairs but in association 
with an administering State regarding foreign policy.
521
 To that end, it is likely 
that the intention of the sections was for New Zealand to retain control over the 
Cook Islands‟ and Niue‟s external affairs.  
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However, the ambiguous wording has led to a different outcome in practice. Over 
time the Cook Islands and Niue have taken control of their own external affairs. 
The Cook Islands, for instance, has entered into significant treaties with other 
States (both bilaterally and multilaterally), has established diplomatic relations 
with 21 countries, and has become a member of a range of international 
organisations, including a full member of the Pacific Islands Forum, the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Islands Community, The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the Asian Development Bank 
and the World Health Organisation (WHO) – some of which are open only to 
„States‟.522 New Zealand has not raised any public objections over this 
development of competence in external affairs, going so far as to note in the Joint 
Centenary Declaration with the Cook Islands that “in the conduct of its foreign 
affairs, the Cook Islands interacts with the international community as a sovereign 
and independent state”.523 It is important to note, however, that the Joint 
Centenary Declaration does not go so far as to explicitly state that New Zealand 
considers the Cook Islands to be an independent, sovereign State, but simply that 
the Cook Islands acts like one.
524
 
 
Laws for „Good Government‟: Norfolk Island, Tokelau and American Samoa 
The Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth), on the other hand, implies that external affairs 
are not within the competence of the Norfolk Island Legislative Assembly. The 
Act instead only authorises “laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
Territory”.525 Only a very broad interpretation would read this provision as 
including control over external affairs, especially seeing as s 19(2) of the Act 
explicitly states that the Norfolk Island Legislative Assembly does not have 
competency over defence matters (although Norfolk Island does control its own 
immigration regime). A similar situation exists in Tokelau: s 3A(1) of the Tokelau 
Act 1948 uses almost exactly the same language as s 19(1) of the Norfolk Island 
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Act, providing the Tokelau General forum with the ability to make rules that “it 
thinks necessary for the peace, order, and good government of Tokelau”.526 
Again, what is implicit in this section is that the General Fono does not have the 
power to make rules relating to external affairs, as these are beyond its mandate of 
„peace, order and good government of Tokelau‟ – i.e. domestic affairs.  
 
The American Samoan Constitution is more explicit, stating that “the Legislature 
shall have authority to pass legislation with respect to subjects of local 
application”,527 again restricting the Territory from exercising competence of 
external affairs. The American Samoan case is particularly interesting given the 
relatively restricted constitutional links between American Samoa and the 
continental US, leading Robert Statham Jr to note that “the United States and 
American Samoa treat each other as unified under American sovereignty 
internationally, and as separate foreign nations domestically”,528 a situation which 
is not dissimilar for how the US treats Native American tribes.
529
  
 
A Developing External Affairs Competence: the French Territories 
Things are different again in the French Territories. In New Caledonia, the 
Nouméa Accord states that “international relations remain the responsibility of the 
State”; however the interpretation of „responsibility‟ here is more restrictive than 
in the case of the Cook Islands and Niue. Instead, Section 2 of the Organic Law 
on New Caledonia sets out that external affairs is a „shared power‟: New 
Caledonia is able to join some international organisations (mostly Pacific and UN 
regional bodies) and establish diplomatic relations with Pacific States and 
Territories in its own right. The Government of New Caledonia also has the 
authority to negotiate and sign international agreements with those organisations 
and entities, but only in the areas that New Caledonia has legal competence over. 
This means that as the French Republic maintains control over defence, New 
Caledonia may not enter into defence agreements.
530
  However, Articles 28 and 29 
also explicitly state that while the New Caledonian Government can sign these 
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agreements, they must still be ratified by the French Republic under the 
provisions of the French Constitution.
531
 New Caledonia‟s competence over 
external affairs is therefore heavily restricted, and appears to be mostly concerned 
with providing New Caledonia with the opportunity to engage with the Pacific 
community, rather allowing it to establish a full international legal personality.  
 
A similar approach is taken in the State of Autonomy of French Polynesia, 
although the provisions are not the same. Instead, French Polynesia is able to 
negotiate agreements with any State, Territory or international body regarding a 
matter that is within its competence; however, French Polynesia must inform the 
French State that it is doing this, and France has the power to oppose the 
negotiations.
532
 This is important, because it means that although French 
Polynesia has the authority to negotiate agreements, it does not have an automatic 
right to sign these agreements. As with New Caledonia, ratification is done by the 
French State under the provisions of the French Constitution.
533
 French Polynesia 
may also – with the agreement of the French Republic – become a member or 
associate member of international bodies of the Pacific, where it is represented by 
the President of French Polynesia.
534
 Overall, French Polynesia‟s competence 
over external affairs is heavily restricted, and the little competence it is provided 
under the Statute of Autonomy is subject to French oversight. 
 
Interaction and Recognition in International Law 
It is important to also examine the implications of control over external affairs.  
While a Territory may have the ability to control its own external affairs, this does 
not mean it is sovereign. Instead it is important to examine each Territory‟s status, 
recognition and interaction with the international community: in particular, how 
are the Territories in this paper seen by others?   
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What‟s in a name?  
The Cook Islands, for instance, has also amended its original Constitution to 
„upgrade‟ some of its terminology in an attempt to improve its status. While the 
original constitution declared that the Cook Islands had a „Legislative Assembly‟ 
and a „Premier‟, the Constitution today sets up the Cook Islands „Parliament‟, led 
by the Cook Islands „Prime Minister‟. Smith notes that this change was made by 
the Cook Islands to assert itself as an international player: the former terms are 
those used in sub-national entities such as regional parliaments in federal 
systems,
535
 while the new terms are those that are commonly seen in the 
constitutions of independent States.  
 
Table Eight: Names of Constitutional Organs 
 
Administering 
State Legislature 
(Lower/Upper Chamber) 
Territory 
Legislature 
(Lower/Upper Chamber) 
Administering 
State Head of 
Government 
Territory Head 
of Government 
Cook 
Islands 
NZ House of 
Representatives 
Parliament 
Prime Minister 
Prime Minister 
Niue Niue Assembly Premier 
Tokelau General Fono Ulu o Tokelau 
Norfolk 
Island 
Australian 
Parliament 
(House/Senate) 
Legislative 
Assembly 
Prime Minister Chief Minister 
French 
Polynesia French Parliament 
(National 
Assembly/Senate) 
French Polynesia 
Assembly 
Prime Minister 
President 
New 
Caledonia 
Congress President 
American 
Samoa 
Congress 
(House/Senate) 
Fono 
(House/Senate) 
President Governor 
 
As shown in the table above, this does seem to be the case in the other Territories: 
highlighted cells in the table indicate a subordinately named legislature or head of 
government. American Samoa, for instance, is led by a „Governor‟ (as is seen in 
the US states) rather than a President, while Norfolk Island is led by a „Chief 
Minister‟ and Niue by a „Premier‟ rather than by „Prime Ministers‟. Similarly, 
Norfolk Island, Niue and French Polynesia have „Assemblies‟ rather than 
„Parliaments‟ (as seen in the Westminster system) or „National Assemblies‟ (as 
seen in the French system).  
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However, the names used for constitutional organs simply signifies how a 
territorial entity itself wishes to be perceived by others. What is more useful for 
determining a territorial entity‟s status is the extent to which it is recognised by 
others.  
 
International Recognition via Diplomatic Relations 
The interaction of the Pacific Territories with the international community can be 
broadly divided into three groups. First, while Tokelau, Norfolk Island and 
American Samoa are all given explicit power to legislate on domestic affairs – or 
for the „peace, order and good government of the Territory‟ – this does not seem 
to constitutionally give rise to any power to control external affairs. Certainly in 
practice, each of these Territories is represented by their administering State in 
almost all regional and international bodies, including the Pacific Islands Forum 
(although Tokelau and American Samoa both have Observer status). The only 
exception is the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, of which Tokelau and 
American Samoa are full members.
536
 
 
Second, in the French Territories, the analysis above indicates that neither French 
Territory has full competence over its own external affairs, and neither certainly 
has its own international legal personality: although French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia can enter into international treaties, ratification must still be done by 
the French State. Furthermore, in French Polynesia, the power of the French State 
to oppose negotiations and prevent an agreement being signed is a clear indication 
of where competence for external affairs (and therefore control over French 
Polynesia‟s interaction with the international community) ultimately lies: with the 
French Republic. Nevertheless, the French Territories‟ competency to interact 
with regional organisations has meant that both French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia are Associate Members of the Pacific Islands Forum. Both are also full 
members of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, which is headquartered in 
Nouméa (the capital city of New Caledonia). New Caledonia‟s ability to enter into 
diplomatic relations with other Pacific States and Territories also does provide it 
with some degree of sovereignty; however this is limited by the restriction on 
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diplomatic relations outside of the Pacific, and the need for New Caledonia to 
inform the French State of what diplomatic relations it has developed.
537
 
 
Third, and in comparison to all of the Territories discussed above, New Zealand 
has not attempted to publicly curtail how the Cook Islands and Niue interact with 
the international community.
538
 Consequently, one could argue that both the Cook 
Islands and Niue have control over their external affairs, lending strength to the 
argument that the Cook Islands and Niue ought to potentially be classed as 
sovereign, independent States.  In particular, both „Territories‟ have established 
diplomatic relations with several States.
539
 Both are also active members of the 
Pacific Islands Forum and a host of other multilateral organisations, including 
UNESCO and the WHO. Membership of UNESCO is particularly important 
because UNESCO‟s Constitution declares that only States “may be admitted to 
membership of the Organization”,540 but that Territories “not responsible for the 
conduct of their international relations” may be admitted as Associate 
Members.
541
 Given that both the Cook Islands and Niue are full – rather than 
Associate – UNESCO members, this implies that the Cook Islands and Niue are 
both „States‟ in international law, or at the very least are seen as responsible for 
the conduct of their international relations. 
 
However, diplomatic recognition does not necessarily mean that the Cook Islands 
or Niue are seen as independent, sovereign States, but merely that a territorial 
entity has recognised them as having some form of international legal personality: 
the US, for instance, has diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands, but still 
includes it on the US Department of State‟s list of „Dependencies and Areas of 
Special Sovereignty‟.542 This indicates that the US may not consider the Cook 
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Islands to have a full international legal personality. Furthermore, the Cook 
Islands has also faced difficulty in having its voice heard in international forums: 
at the Rio+20 summit in December 2011, for instance, the Cook Islands had to 
fight to gain speaking rights after UN General Assembly Resolution 66/197 
limited participation at the Rio+20 summit solely to State members of the United 
Nations.
543
 
 
The Rio+20 example illustrates that it is not just States who matter in international 
law, but that sovereignty can also be influenced by membership of international 
organisations. For instance, the Cook Islands‟ and Niue‟s membership of 
UNESCO raises questions about their status in international law, given that 
UNESCO membership is only open to States.
544
 To fully examine a territorial 
entity‟s international status, then, it is important to examine that entity‟s 
recognition by the most prominent global organisation – the United Nations itself 
(rather than one of its and the Bretton Woods‟ Institutions. Notably, none of the 
Territories considered in this paper have applied to join the UN. Consequently, 
this section now turns to examining the UN‟s membership criteria, and whether 
the Cook Islands (as the Territory with the most unencumbered international legal 
personality) could successful apply to join that organisation.
545
 
 
The United Nations 
Article 4 of the UN Charter states that “Membership in the United Nations is open 
to all other peace-loving [S]tates which accept the obligations contained in the 
present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to 
carry out these obligations”.546 To join the UN, a State must have its application 
recommended by the UN Security Council and then approved by a decision of the 
UN General Assembly.
547
 Key here is the explicit use of the word „State‟, which – 
as was established in Chapter I – implies that a territorial entity is both 
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independent and sovereign. This seems to be particularly important in the case for 
the United Nations, given that Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides the UN 
Security Council with the ability to make binding resolutions regarding defence – 
resolutions which (given their subject matter) only a fully sovereign State would 
always be able to carry out. 
 
None of the Territories covered in this paper are members of the United Nations, 
although the Cook Islands and Niue are members of some UN organisations that 
restrict membership to „States‟. However, as neither the Cook Islands nor Niue 
has ever officially applied for UN membership, it is not yet clear whether they 
would meet the membership criteria for full United Nations membership in 
practice. This is especially true given that the decision is essentially a political one 
made by the Security Council and General Assembly, rather than a technical one 
made by UN officials. This is important because sovereignty comes from 
recognition by other States: in other words, the Cook Islands would only be able 
to join the UN if at least a majority of UN Members in the General Assembly 
recognised it as sovereign.
548
 
 
In 1948 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion that Article 4 
implied there were five criteria for membership: a candidate had to (1) be a State, 
(2) be peace-loving, (3) accept the obligations of the UN Charter, (4) able to carry 
out these obligations, and (5) willing to carry out these obligations.
549 
These 
criteria were seen as all-interlinked: Stephen Smith argues that a candidate would 
only be able to meet criterion (1) if it could meet the other criteria:
550
 in other 
words, only a State would be able to accept the obligations of the Charter, as only 
a State would actually have the necessary independence and sovereignty to carry 
those obligations out. 
 
Given this, one potential argument is that some of the Territories covered in this 
paper would be able to meet the conditions of UN Membership. In particular, 
Smith argues that the Cook Islands and Niue are not really „Territories‟ at all, but 
– due to their competence in external affairs – would be able to accept and carry 
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out the obligations of the UN Charter, and are therefore „States‟ as far as UN 
Membership is concerned.
551
 However, a dissenting argument is that an 
application for membership would be rejected on the basis that both the Cook 
Islands and Niue are still too connected to New Zealand. In particular, as 
discussed in Chapter IV, both are officially still part of the Realm of New 
Zealand, both still have the Queen in right of New Zealand as their de jure head of 
state, both still use the New Zealand dollar as their currency, and both still do not 
have their own citizenship, but instead still use New Zealand citizenship.
552
 
Consequently, if either joined the United Nations, the connection to New Zealand 
might be seen as so strong that it was essentially giving New Zealand multiple 
votes – a key issue given that in the United Nations, each member only gets one 
vote, regardless of its size. This in turn could limit any recognition of the Cook 
Islands‟ and Niue‟s sovereignty, and therefore restrict those territorial entities‟ 
ability to join the UN. 
  
Recognition and Sovereignty of Pacific Territories 
Overall, this presents a confusing picture as to whether the Cook Islands would be 
able to successfully apply for UN membership – and consequently, whether any 
of the „Territories‟ in this paper can be also classed as a sovereign State. On the 
one hand, the Cook Islands theoretically meets the UN‟s membership 
requirements – it is clearly self-governing, has control over its domestic affairs, 
and acts as if it has its own international legal personality. On the other hand, the 
Cook Islands‟ administering State (New Zealand) has explicitly stated that 
although the Cook Islands is in control of its external affairs, “this does not mean 
that the Cook Islands is, in constitutional terms, an independent sovereign 
state”.553 Instead, New Zealand‟s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) 
has advised that for the Cook Islands to become an independent sovereign state, 
the Cook Islands would have to go through its internal constitutional change 
provisions – including a referendum and amendments to the Cook Islands‟ 
constitution
554
 – presumably to amend s 3 of the Cook Islands Constitution Act 
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1964 so that the Cook Islands was no longer „in free association‟ but instead 
„independent and sovereign‟. MFAT also noted that such a change would “have 
implications in terms of Cook Islanders‟ eligibility for New Zealand 
citizenship”.555 A similar MFAT opinion has not been written about Niue;556 
however, one would presume that the same points would apply.  In other words, 
MFAT seems to have taken the view that despite what the de facto situation is, the 
Cook Islands is not a de jure sovereign State.  
 
This is a key issue given the political nature of international organisation 
membership, where New Zealand would surely be asked its opinion on the Cook 
Islands‟ status should UN membership be pursued. In particular, it would be 
unlikely that the Cook Islands would gain the necessary support of the UN 
General Assembly if New Zealand did not support a declaration that the Cook 
Islands is a „State‟, primarily due to fear from existing States of encouraging 
unilateral secessionism in areas of their own territory. 
 
This reflects the fact that no matter what a purely legal analysis might conclude, 
international law is heavily political. In this case in particular, for instance, the 
Cook Islands has a prima facie case that it is a sovereign State: it is clearly an 
independent, self-governing entity that is in control of its own domestic affairs, 
and acts on the international stage as if it has a full independent legal personality 
and control over its external affairs. Notably it also exercises these functions 
independently and without the oversight of New Zealand. However, as many 
United Nations‟ members still perceive New Zealand as the Cook Islands‟ 
administering State, significant issues are raised as to whether the Cook Islands 
(or any of the other Territories in this paper) can indeed be considered sovereign.  
 
Altogether, this analysis therefore indicates that most of the territorial entities 
have a reasonably clear status: they are perceived as Territories due to their 
limited control over external affairs, their limited capacity to enter into 
international agreements, and their limited membership of international 
organisations.  However, in the case of the Cook Islands – which has developed 
its own foreign affairs policy, has entered into several international agreements, 
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and is a member of many international organisations – this is not necessarily the 
case. Instead, the Cook Islands acts as though it is a de facto State. That said, this 
does not mean that the Cook Islands is sovereign, as not all other States view it as 
such. Furthermore, the New Zealand view appears to be that because the Cook 
Islands is “self-governing in free association with New Zealand”, and is not, in 
constitutional terms, a sovereign independent State, the Cook Islands is precluded 
from Statehood in international law.
557
  
 
Free Association and Sovereignty: Should ‘Statehood’ be redefined? 
What is particularly interesting is the way New Zealand prefaces its descriptions 
of the Cook Islands‟ status with the term ‘in constitutional terms‟. The issue 
appears to lie around s 3 of the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, which states 
that “the Cook Islands shall be self-governing” rather than declaring the Cook 
Islands as a sovereign State. This can be compared to the Western Samoa Act 
1961, where New Zealand explicitly legislated for the independence of Western 
Samoa (today known as Samoa).
558
 Today, New Zealand recognises Samoa as a 
sovereign State while classifying the Cook Islands as “self-governing in free 
association with New Zealand”.559  
 
Does Free Association exclude sovereign Statehood? 
The issue for New Zealand regarding the Cook Islands‟ status appears to be that 
as the New Zealand House of Representatives has not explicitly legislated that the 
Cook Islands is independent, New Zealand is prevented from informing the 
United Nations that the Cook Islands is a sovereign State. However, because it has 
renounced its ability to legislate for the Cook Islands, New Zealand is also 
prevented from amending s 3 of the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 unless a 
clear referendum of the Cook Islands‟ people shows support for altering the Cook 
Islands‟ constitutional status. In other words, New Zealand is unable to inform the 
United Nations that the Cook Islands has a new de jure status, until this has been 
„approved‟ by the Cook Islands – which has not actually happened. This argument 
is supported by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade‟s view 
that “free association is a status distinct from that of full independence in that it 
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allows the Cook Islands to maintain New Zealand citizenship, while administering 
its own affairs”.560 Consequently, (in New Zealand‟s view) New Zealand‟s only 
response to questions about its Territory‟s status can be that the Cook Islands (and 
Niue) are constitutionally still in free-association but have competence over their 
domestic and external affairs. One would also suspect that New Zealand would be 
unlikely to support a declaration that the Cook Islands and Niue were independent 
States while they continued to be subject to New Zealand citizenship laws.
561
  
 
Essentially, then, this means that the Cook Islands and Niue are classed as „in free 
association‟ with New Zealand – rather than as independent and sovereign States. 
After all, General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) presents three alternate 
options for how non-self-governing territories (most of which were external 
territories) could become self-governing: “emergence as an independent sovereign 
state” or “integration with an independent state” or “free association with an 
independent state”.562  Given that these paths to self-determination are presented 
as contrasting options in the resolution, one could conclude that free association 
does not mean a country has become “an independent sovereign state”.563 As 
noted earlier, for instance, the Cook Islands‟ and Niue‟s status can be compared to 
Western Samoa, which is explicitly classed as „independent‟ in New Zealand 
legislation.
564
 A similar contrast is seen in GA Resolution 2625 (XXV), where the 
exercise of self-determination is again seen as being fulfilled by a people either 
seceding and becoming a sovereign State, or becoming part of or the integral 
territory of an administering State, or associating with an existing State. Musgrave 
argues that the language of Resolution 1541 (XV) “emphasized that independence 
was to be regarded as the normal outcome for non-self-governing territories”.565  
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This restrictive view of free association is another example of the „liberal 
paradox‟ referred to earlier.566 Again, the focus seems to be that secession is the 
„usual‟ or „right‟ outcome to self-determination, and this focus seems to have 
gone relatively unchallenged in the UN-era. An example of this is the provisions 
in New Caledonia‟s constitution allowing a second referendum on whether New 
Caledonia should become a State, even if a majority of voters vote against this 
proposal in a constitutionally ordained referendum eighteen months earlier.
567
 
Similarly, it seems that to be an international player, especially in the UN, 
Territories should follow the examples of existing post-colonial States and secede 
rather than freely associate.
568
  
 
Or can a territorial entity be a Freely Associated State? 
However, it must be borne in mind that international law – just like domestic law 
– develops over time through practice and custom, and the General Resolutions 
referred to above are now several decades old. Consequently, just because a 1960s 
General Assembly Resolution implies that the „correct‟ option for a Territory to 
achieve Statehood is via secession, does not mean that this is the only way to 
become a State in the twenty-first century. For instance, General Resolution 1514 
(XV), while adopted the day prior to GA Resolution 1541, advocates strongly for 
all peoples to enjoy self-determination and independence by the “transfer of all 
powers to the peoples of those territories”.569 Similarly, as noted in Chapter I, the 
still-recognised Montevideo Convention established that a State in international 
law must possess “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other [S]tates”.570  
 
Consequently, could the Cook Islands (or Niue) be considered a „sovereign state‟ 
while remaining in free association with New Zealand? Both territorial entities 
have a permanent (although declining due to emigration) population and a defined 
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territory. Each also has, by virtue of the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 and 
the Niue Constitution Act 1974 respectively, an independent government, and 
both have entered into relationships with and been legally recognised by other 
States. In line with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), New Zealand has 
also transferred „all powers‟ to the Cook Islands and Niue. This implies that the 
Cook Islands and Niue are both „States‟ in international law, even if there are 
difficulties in arguing that they are universally recognised as sovereign with 
unencumbered international legal personalities.  
 
Furthermore, one can compare the Cook Islands‟ and Niue‟s free association 
relationships with New Zealand to the free association relationships between 
several territorial entities in Micronesia and the US. In particular, three of the 
countries emerging out of the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
(Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and 
the Republic of Palau) are full members of the United Nations, indicating that all 
three are considered to be sovereign States in international law. However, all three 
of those Micronesian States are also considered to be in free association with the 
United States, indicating that „free association‟ in practice is not necessarily a 
mutually exclusive alternate to sovereign Statehood.  
 
That said, all three of those States have their own citizenship,
571
 indicating a clear 
separation of identity from the US that is not seen in the New Zealand-Cook 
Islands and New Zealand-Niue relationships. As discussed above, the New 
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade noted that if the Cook Islands 
wished to become independent, then this would “have implications in terms of 
Cook Islanders‟ eligibility for New Zealand citizenship”.572  Furthermore, unlike 
the New Zealand-Cook Islands and New Zealand-Niue free association 
relationships, which have been created through statutes passed by the New 
Zealand House of Representatives, the US-FSM, US-Marshall Islands and US-
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Republic of Palau compacts of free association have been created through 
international treaties between the US and the former trust territories.  
 
What this indicates is that although General Assembly Resolutions 1541 (XV)
573
 
and 2625 (XXV)
574
 imply that „free association‟ and „secession‟ (i.e. becoming a 
sovereign State) are mutually exclusive terms, the de facto situation appears to be 
that a territorial entity can be both a „State‟ and „in free association‟. This is true 
in the case of several Micronesian States, which, as members of the United 
Nations, are considered to be sovereign States, but which are also considered to be 
in free association with the US. Similarly, both the Cook Islands and Niue are in 
free association with New Zealand, yet at the same time, both are members of 
organisations that are traditionally open only to „States‟.  
 
However, perhaps the issue is our definition of „State‟, which (as noted in Chapter 
I), is very traditional. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the New Zealand Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade always notes that the Cook Islands is nota  
„sovereign, independent State‟ rather than simply not a „State‟. Perhaps then, this 
indicates that the concept that Statehood automatically implies notions of 
sovereignty is out-of-date? Such an argument would help to explain the Cook 
Islands‟ and  Niue‟s own status – both are members of several organisations that 
require applicants to be „States‟ (but not necessarily sovereign States), but are not 
members of the United Nations (where full sovereignty and a full international 
legal personality seem to be required). This also would fit with other analysis in 
this thesis – such as the significant identity-based links that still remain between 
New Zealand and the Cook Islands, as well as the ambiguity as to whether New 
Zealand would be liable in international law for any debt incurred by the Cook 
Islands‟ government. Furthermore, despite the Cook Islands‟ impressive 
diplomatic relations, it is not yet fully recognised as sovereign by other major 
States such as the US.
575
 One can therefore argue that while the Cook Islands may 
not have an entirely unencumbered international legal personality (due to limited 
recognition of full sovereignty), it is – at least in some form – a „State‟. 
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Conclusion: Sovereignty as a Spectrum 
Consequently, a major conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that the 
dividing line between a „Territory‟ and a „sovereign State‟ has become 
increasingly blurred since the formation of the United Nations. Similarly, there is 
growing evidence that „States‟ do not necessarily have to be have full 
independence, full sovereignty and a completely unencumbered international legal 
personality. Part of the issue, in fact, is that the term „sovereignty‟ seems to have 
been classified in absolute terms – territorial entities are either fully sovereign, or 
they are not. Although some of the Territories in this paper clearly meet the 
„standard‟ view of what a Territory is (some control over domestic affairs, with no 
international legal personality), others have more power and status than the 
standard definition of „Territory‟ would entail. One can instead perhaps view 
things as a spectrum, with „Territory status‟ being at one end, and „sovereign 
Statehood‟ at the other.  
 
Figure One: A Spectrum of Sovereignty 
 
 
Using this approach, Norfolk Island, Tokelau and American Samoa sit at the 
„Territory‟ end of the spectrum: all three can be considered to be reasonably self-
governing and in control of their domestic affairs;
576
 however, it would be 
incredibly difficult to argue any of these Territories have any significant 
international legal personality.
577
 French Polynesia and New Caledonia, on the 
other hand, sit near the middle: both have some competence over external affairs, 
and constitutionally can engage internationally with other Pacific Nations on areas 
that they have been given competence over; however, France retains significant 
veto power regarding the ratification of agreements that its Territories have 
entered into. Furthermore, while New Caledonia‟s external affairs provisions are 
based on an international treaty (the Nouméa Accord), and are therefore difficult 
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to modify, France can still alter the Statute of Autonomy of French Polynesia to 
further restrict French Polynesia‟s ability to engage on the international stage. 
Finally, the Cook Islands and Niue sit close to the „sovereign Statehood‟ end of 
the spectrum – both have de facto control over their external affairs, have 
diplomatic recognition from many other States, and are members of international 
organisations (including those that are restricted to „States‟).  
 
However, perhaps the strongest theme in this chapter is the reinforcement that 
international law is highly contextual and more than just a little politicised, and 
whether or not criteria have been met may be superseded by political 
considerations. For instance, the concept of self-determination – and whether a 
people have exercised it – appears to be heavily influenced by a political discourse 
of decolonisation, as does the UN List of Non-Self Governing Territories. 
Similarly, whether or not any of the „Territories‟ in this paper would be able to 
successfully apply for membership of the United Nations is likely to be heavily 
influenced by political considerations: one cannot see States facing secessionist 
action in parts of their territory readily agreeing to the Cook Islands becoming a 
member of the United Nations without New Zealand‟s explicit blessing and 
support for Cook Islands as an independent, sovereign State.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper finds that even though the United Nations-era has seen an 
extraordinary rise in the number of States in the international system, 
independent, sovereign Statehood is by no means that only status that territorial 
entities may take in international law. In particular, despite a significant United 
Nations‟ focus on all peoples exercising their right to self-determination, 
including three UN-ordained „International Decades for the Eradication of 
Colonialism‟,578 Territories still remain as a feature of international law, and 
especially so in the South-West Pacific. 
 
Control over Domestic and External Affairs: A Comparison 
What is even more interesting is the South-West Pacific Territories
579
 have 
differing degrees of autonomous power. As an illustration, Table Nine below 
summarises the main findings of this paper regarding each of these Territories 
control over domestic and external affairs. 
 
Table Nine: Control of Domestic and External Affairs 
 Competence over domestic affairs Competence over external affairs 
Cook 
Islands 
Full independence. New Zealand cannot 
legislate and does not intervene in 
domestic affairs. 
De facto control over external 
affairs. Both are developing their 
own international legal personality. Niue 
Tokelau 
Each village deals with its own affairs, 
and the General Fono deals with national 
issues. In theory, the Administrator of 
Tokelau can overrule local legislation. 
Limited participation in the 
international system. Usually 
represented by New Zealand where 
needed. 
Norfolk 
Island 
Can legislate for domestic affairs, but 
legislation must first be approved by the 
Australian-appointed Administrator.  
Represented by Australia in the 
international system. 
French 
Polynesia 
Can legislate on specific enumerated 
matters, although the French-appointed 
High Commissioner can require 
reconsideration of legislation. French 
State can modify constitution.  
Limited international legal 
personality. Allowed to engage 
with the Pacific, subject to some 
oversight by France. 
New 
Caledonia 
Can legislate on specific enumerated 
matters. French State can modify 
constitution.  
American 
Samoa 
Can legislate for domestic affairs. In 
limited circumstances the US Secretary 
of the Interior can veto legislation.  
Represented by the US in the 
international system. 
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Freely Associated States: the Cook Islands and Niue 
As shown in the table above, the Cook Islands and Niue, are both fully 
independent when it comes to exercising legislative competence over domestic 
affairs. Both the Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 and the Niue Act 1974 
declare that the Cook Islands and Niue are “self-governing”, and the respective 
Cook Islands and Niue Constitutions clearly state that New Zealand cannot 
legislate for the Cook Islands or Niue.
580
 Similarly, although these statutes note 
that foreign affairs remain the “responsibility” of the Queen in Right of New 
Zealand, both the Cook Islands and Niue have de facto control over their external 
affairs, and have pursued their own foreign policy, complete with accredited 
diplomatic relations with other States and full membership of some international 
organisations. The Cook Islands and Niue also have the ability to alter their 
constitutional status as “self-governing in free association with New Zealand”.581 
Given this, one can see why it is possible to argue that the Cook Islands and Niue 
and not really Territories, but could instead be classed as States in international 
law. 
 
Traditional Territories: Norfolk Island, Tokelau and American Samoa 
Norfolk Island, Tokelau and American Samoa, on the other hand, fit far more 
within the traditional view of a „Territory‟. All three have some form of control 
over domestic affairs, subject to oversight by the relevant administering State. The 
American Samoan Fono, for example, has competence to legislate for “subjects of 
local application”, which in practice has meant complete competence over 
domestic affairs. Similarly, both the Tokelau Act 1948 and the Norfolk Island Act 
1979 provide local governments with the authority to pass legislation necessary 
for the “good government” of Tokelau and Norfolk Island respectively.582 
However, in all three cases this power is subject to some form of oversight. In 
Norfolk Island and Tokelau, local legislation is subject to disallowance by an 
administering-State-appointed Administrator. This disallowance also possible in 
American Samoa, although only in very limited cases (notably when the 
American-Samoan-elected Governor refuses to sign a piece of legislation passed 
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by the Fono into law). Furthermore, in all three cases, the administering State 
retains the ability to pass legislation for the relevant Territory. All three 
Territories also have very little participation in international affairs, with foreign 
policy instead being the domain of the administering State.  
 
Something inbetween: French Polynesia and New Caledonia 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia occupy a different space than the 
„Associated States‟ of the Cook Islands and Niue, and the „Traditional Territories‟ 
of Norfolk Island, American Samoa and Tokelau. In particular, the Statute of 
Autonomy of French Polynesia and the Organic Law on New Caledonia (both of 
which were passed by the French Parliament) give these Territories competence to 
legislate on specific constitutionally listed matters, such as employment, 
communications, civil and commercial law, and education. However, in French 
Polynesia the French-appointed High Commissioner has the power to refer 
previously passed Bills back to the French Polynesia for consideration before he 
or she signs them into law. Similarly, in both French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia, the relevant High Commissioner has the power to refer Bills for 
judicial review in France (regarding that Bill‟s applicability under the relevant 
constitutional document).
583
 The French Parliament also retains the right to 
modify the Statue of Autonomy of French Polynesia or the Organic Law on New 
Caledonia – and has done so in the past unilaterally. In effect, this means that 
France retains control over its Territories‟ constitutional documents. The 
exception to this is the transfer of limited enumerated powers from the French 
Republic to New Caledonia, which is guaranteed under the Nouméa Accord – a 
recognised treaty in international law.
584
  
 
What this indicates is that both New Caledonia and French Polynesia have some 
competence over domestic affairs, but this is subject to oversight by the French 
State. However, unlike American Samoa, Tokelau and Norfolk Island, both New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia have some competence over external affairs – 
both are able to enter into diplomatic relations and treaties with Pacific territorial 
entities and relevant regional and international organisations, although French 
                                                          
583
 In New Caledonia, this judicial review is conducted by the French Constitutional Council, 
while in French Polynesia this judicial review is conducted by the French Council of State. 
584
 Nic Maclellan “New Caledonia” in S Levine Pacific Ways: Government and Politics in the 
Pacific Islands (Victoria University Press, New Zealand, 2009) 130 at 134. 
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Polynesia is more restricted than New Caledonia in doing this. Finally, it is worth 
noting that New Caledonia‟s status is not set in stone – instead the Organic Law 
sets up a series of transitional transfers of competence over domestic affairs from 
the French State to New Caledonia, culminating in a series of referenda of New 
Caledonians as to whether New Caledonia should become an independent, 
sovereign State in international law, with full competence for both domestic and 
external affairs.  
 
The link between Self-Determination and Competence 
What the above summary illustrates is that the Territories which have formally 
achieved self-determination (as defined by the United Nations
585
) appear to again 
have more legislative competence than those who have not. In particular, the 
Cook Islands and Niue have both previously moved from Territory status to being 
considered by New Zealand as “self-governing in free association with New 
Zealand”586 as a way of exercising self-determination. Similarly, New Caledonia 
is moving towards self-determination progressively – and New Caledonians did 
approve via referendum the Nouméa Accord. It is therefore striking that these 
three „Territories‟ have far greater de jure independent control over their own 
affairs (and in the case of the Cook Islands and Niue, to alter their own 
constitutional arrangements – including their current status) than what is seen in 
Tokelau, Norfolk Island, French Polynesia, and American Samoa.  
 
Thoughts on Free Association 
It is clear that the concept of „free association‟ has developed significantly since 
the 1960s, when it was included in General Assembly Resolution 1541 as one of 
the three alternate options that a people could pursue to achieve self-
determination. At that time, „free association‟ seems to have been synonymous 
with a Territory becoming self-governing over its domestic affairs, and was 
implied as a status that was not full Statehood in international law.
587
  
 
                                                          
585
 See for instance, GA Res 1541, XV (1960), which sets out three options for exercising self-
determination: secession from, freely associated with, or integrating with an existing State.  
586
 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “Cook Islands: Country Paper” (7 
November, 2012) <www.mfat.govt.nz> 
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 See for instance, the discussion at 24 in Chapter I regarding how communities can achieve self-
determination via free association.  
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However, it now seems erroneous to think of free association as an alternative to 
full independence, especially as that view seems to create a „liberal paradox‟ of 
forcing Territories to become free.
588
 For instance, although they are not covered 
in great detail in this paper,
589
 the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall 
Islands and Palau are all considered to be „in free association‟ with the United 
States of America, while also being recognised as sovereign States.
590
 
Furthermore, the analysis in Chapters IV and V indicates that although there are 
some links between New Zealand and the Cook Islands, the Cook Islands has both 
de jure and de facto control over its domestic affairs as a self-governing country, 
and similarly also exercises independence over its external affairs. It is therefore 
independent and has some form of sovereignty. In fact, the reasons why New 
Zealand seems reluctant to declare that the Cook Islands is a sovereign State are 
due to constitutional complexity and ongoing constitutional links given the Cook 
Islands‟ membership of the Realm of New Zealand.  
 
Given that New Zealand‟s own Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has stated 
that the Cook Islands acts as though it is a sovereign, independent State, it is clear 
that the way in which „free association‟ is considered by the United Nations needs 
to be reviewed. „Free association‟ should not be seen as a contrast to Statehood, 
but instead as a constitutional structure that territorial entities (whether they are 
States or Territories) may adopt as a way of formalising a solid, collaborative 
relationship, where a smaller partner links or „associates‟ itself in several ways to 
a larger partner. In fact, free association can work in tandem with Statehood (as 
seen in the Micronesia States), and a freely associated relationship should not 
indicate a territorial entity lacks Statehood. Indeed, a growing number of 
constitutional scholars now refer to territorial entities such as the Federated States 
of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau and the Cook Islands as „Freely 
Associated States‟, indicating the growing blur between the statuses of 
„Territories‟, „Free Association‟, and „Statehood‟ in international law591. 
 
                                                          
588
 Gay Morgan “”Reflections on Pluralist Conundrums” (1998) 2(1) Yearbook of New Zealand 
Jurisprudence 71, at 83. 
589
 Because they are in the North Pacific 
590
 See the discussion in Chapter IV at 98 and Chapter V at 121. 
591
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Reconceptualising ‘Statehood’ in International Law 
Chapter I set out that the „traditional‟ and commonly used definition of statehood 
is a territorial entity that is recognised as sovereign, due to that entity‟s 
independent identity, independent legal personality, and independent control over 
its own affairs (which in turn means the absence of any provisions allowing 
another State to intervene in that entity‟s affairs). Most States, therefore, are seen 
as having „independent, sovereign Statehood‟  
 
However, the above discussion on free association indicates that the traditional 
definition of Statehood may be too strict in twenty-first century international law. 
In particular, the acceptance of concepts such as „Associated States‟ in the 
international community may be establishing a customary international law norm 
that Statehood does not necessarily require complete independence and 
recognition of full sovereignty, as was expected in the past. This is supported by 
the growing acceptance of Associated Statehood by international organisations: 
the Cook Islands and Niue, for instance, are members of UNESCO, which is only 
open to States in international law. However, the analysis in Chapter V indicates 
that the Cook Islands and Niue would likely face significant difficulty in joining 
the United Nations, due to a perception that neither entity is fully de jure 
sovereign. After all, Chapter III indicated that there are still significant identity, 
economic and judicial links between all of the Territories covered in this paper, 
and their administering States, including those questions surrounding what would 
happen should a Territory ever default on a loan contract in international law. 
 
Consequently, this paper argues that the „old‟ view of seeing Territories and 
States as either/or options does not effectively take into account the state of affairs 
in the twenty-first century. Territories are no longer usually seen as sub-State 
units that „belong‟ to an administering State, with competencies over small 
matters of domestic affairs. Instead, the Territories covered in this paper have 
significant de jure and de facto control over their domestic affairs, and operate as 
semi-autonomous units within a fully sovereign State‟s wider realm, and in some 
cases operate as a partner alongside that sovereign State. Furthermore, as seen in 
recent developments such as the Nouméa Accord (1998), the Statute of Autonomy 
of French Polynesia (2004), and the Tokelau Amendment Act 1996, Territories 
are gaining more autonomy and control, rather than States restricting Territories‟ 
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power to control their own destiny. There is therefore a growing blur between 
where the definition of „Territory‟ ends, and where the definition of „State‟ 
begins. Similarly, it seems no longer appropriate to classify an entity as either 
having an international legal personality, or not having one at all. Instead, just like 
in many domestic jurisdictions, there are varying degrees of international legal 
personality, ranging from the ability to gain some form of diplomatic recognition 
from other entities, and the ability to enter smaller international organisations as 
an associate member, right up to full capacity to ratify international treaties and 
enter the United Nations as a fully sovereign State.  
 
Accordingly, when considering the „status‟ of South-West Pacific „Territories‟ in 
international law, it is important not to fall into the trap of solely examining the de 
jure status of these entities, as defined in legislation passed by the administering 
State. Far more useful is to look at what happens in practice, and to make a prima 
facie assessment of which elements of Statehood an entity possesses. Only then, 
can an effective analysis occur. 
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APPENDIX A: MAP OF THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC 
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APPENDIX B: EXTERNAL TERRITORIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
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APPENDIX C: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE PACIFIC 
TERRITORIES 
 
This appendix provides some background demographic and constitutional 
information on each of the territorial entities („The Pacific Territories‟) covered in 
this paper. Demographic and geographical information is sourced from the CIA 
Factbook.
592
 Constitution information is from the author‟s own research. 
 
Cook Islands 
Entity Name Cook Islands 
Administering State New Zealand 
Administrative Centre Avarua (Rarotonga) 
Head of State (De Jure) Queen in right of New Zealand 
Head of State (De Facto) Queen‟s Representative 
Head of Government Prime Minister of the Cook Islands 
Legislature Cook Islands Parliament 
Status (according to administering State) Self-Governing in Free Association with NZ  
Population 10,777 (July 2012 est.) 
GDP (Total) $183.2 million (2005 est.) 
GDP per capita $9,100 (2005 est.) 
Land (Territory) size 236 sq km 
  
Niue 
Entity Name Niue 
Administering State New Zealand 
Administrative Centre Alofi 
Head of State (De Jure) Queen in right of New Zealand 
Head of State (De Facto) Governor-General / Speaker of Niue Assembly 
Head of Government Premier of Niue 
Legislature Niue Assembly 
Status (according to administering State) Self-Governing in Free Association with NZ  
Population 1,269 (July 2012 est.) 
GDP (Total) $10.01 million (2003 est.) 
GDP per capita $5,800 (2003 est.) 
Land (Territory) size 260 sq km 
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 Central Intelligence Agency “World Factbook” (2010) <www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook> 
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Tokelau 
Entity Name Tokelau 
Administering State New Zealand 
Administrative Centre Apia (Samoa: a different State) 
Head of State (De Jure) Queen in right of New Zealand 
Head of State (De Facto) Administrator of Tokelau 
Head of Government Ulu-o-Tokelau 
Legislature General Fono / Village Councils 
Status (according to administering State) Territory 
Population 1,368 (July 2012 est.) 
GDP (Total) $1.5 million (1993 est.) 
GDP per capita $1,000 (1993 est.)  
Land (Territory) size 12 sq km  
 
French Polynesia 
Entity Name French Polynesia 
Administering State France 
Administrative Centre Papeete (Tahiti) 
Head of State (De Jure) President of France 
Head of State (De Facto) High Commissioner to French Polynesia 
Head of Government President of French Polynesia 
Legislature French Polynesia Assembly 
Status (according to administering State) Territorial Collectivity 
Population 274,512 (July 2012 est.) 
GDP (Total) $4.718 billion (2004 est.) 
GDP per capita $18,000 (2004 est.) 
Land (Territory) size 3,827 sq km 
 
New Caledonia 
Entity Name  New Caledonia 
Administering State  France 
Administrative Centre Nouméa 
Head of State (De Jure) President of France 
Head of State (De Facto) High Commissioner to New Caledonia 
Head of Government President of New Caledonia 
Legislature Congress 
Status (according to administering State) Special Status (Sui-generis) Collectivity 
Population 260,166 (July 2012 est.)  
GDP (Total) $3.158 billion (2003 est.)  
GDP per capita  $15,000 (2003 est.) 
Land (Territory) size  18,575 sq km 
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Norfolk Island 
Entity Name Norfolk Island 
Administering State Australia 
Administrative Centre Kingston 
Head of State (De Jure) Queen in right of Australia 
Head of State (De Facto) Administrator of Norfolk Island 
Head of Government Chief Minister of Norfolk Island 
Legislature  Norfolk Island Assembly 
Status (according to administering State) External Territory 
Population 2182 (July 2012 est.) 
GDP (Total) Not available 
GDP per capita Not available 
Land (Territory) size  36 sq km 
 
American Samoa 
Entity Name American Samoa 
Administering State United States of America 
Administrative Centre Fagotogo / Pagopago 
Head of State (De Jure) President of the United States of America 
Head of State (De Facto) US Secretary of the Interior 
Head of Government Governor of American Samoa 
Legislature American Samoa Fono (House / Senate) 
Status (according to administering State) Territory 
Population 54,947 (July 2012 est.) 
GDP (Total) $575.3 million (2007 est.) 
GDP per capita $8,000 (2007 est.) 
Land (Territory) size 199 sq km 
 
